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ABSTRACT
Whetstone, Crystal Marie M.A., International and Comparative Politics M.A. Program, Wright
State University, 2013. Is the Motherist Approach More Helpful in Obtaining Women’s Rights
than a Feminist Approach? A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Liberia.
The theory that women gain rights during the social upheaval of war has not held
universally. While the debate has traditionally centered over women’s participation in fighting
and entry into the workforce this paper explores the topic from the form of mobilization,
motherist or feminist, that women’s organizing takes during war through the use of a
longitudinal, comparative study of Lebanon and Liberia. Lebanese women’s organizations
overwhelmingly employed motherist mobilization and tackled practical gender interests that
made no attempt to end women’s subordination. In contrast, during the Liberian civil war
women’s groups were more apt to focus on strategic gender interests which acknowledged
hierarchical gender relations. This paper addresses whether a motherist approach allows women
a culturally acceptable space from which to make demands or if, in fact, the motherist approach
limits opportunities to increase women’s rights.
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Chapter 1: Statement of the Problem
Introduction
Scholars have long debated whether war and its aftermath bring an opportunity to further
women’s equality in political, economic, and social standing (Bop, 2002; Meintjes, 2002;
Turshen, 2002). Within the camp that argues that wars do bring changes which hasten female
liberation, the debate has centered over whether it is due to women’s direct participation in
fighting, or whether such progress is due to women entering the workforce (Enloe, 1993). This
thesis seeks to add to this debate by considering motherist and feminist movements, in order to
determine whether the approach of mobilization affects women’s rights following wars.
1.1 The Research Question and Sub-Questions
Isabel Casimiro, Joy Kwesiga, Alice Mungwa, and Aili Mari Tripp insist that postwar
situations in several countries, including Liberia, have opened up new opportunities for women
(Casimiro, Kwesiga, Mungwa, and Tripp, 2009). Indeed, Funmi Olonishakin began stressing as
early as 1995 the positive changes to the status of Liberian women due to the civil war
(Olonishakin, 1995). Liberia has received ample media attention for its postwar president Ellen
Johnson-Sirleaf, Africa’s first democratically elected female head of state. Her election to the
presidency is chiefly credited to her large female base which campaigned on her behalf (Adams,
2008). Furthermore, Liberian women continue to experience positive changes in the postwar
milieu (Bhatia, 2011). Yet Lebanese women did not achieve the same level of success as their
Liberian counterparts immediately following the end of Lebanon’s civil war in 1990.
This thesis seeks to understand why Lebanese women failed to make significant gains
towards equality directly following the Lebanese civil war in which women’s groups were active.
The Lebanese case will be analyzed alongside Liberia to ask: Is a largely motherist approach
more helpful in obtaining women’s rights than a mainly feminist approach? The sub-questions
1

will be: Which approach did each case study generally follow, motherist, feminist, or hybrid?
Does a motherist approach allow women a more culturally acceptable space from which to make
demands? Can a motherist approach actually limit calls for gender equality? Or, can a feminist
approach backfire and actually increase resistance to women’s rights?
1.2 Literature Review
A rich literature covers the role of women in political movements. It is not possible to
cover all aspects of women’s activism due to the brevity of this thesis. Therefore, this literature
review will summarize motherist movements, feminist movements, hybrid motherist-feminist
movements, and practical and strategic gender interests.
In most parts of the world, women have not been political elites, and in fact have been
viewed by the state as peripheral actors or weak players in need of the state’s protection
(Anderlini, 2007; Bahar, 1996). Historically and near universally, governments and cultural
norms have dissuaded or refused females direct participation as members of parliament or
cabinet officials. Additionally, in many countries today women are routinely denied leadership
roles in political parties and in non-state organizations (Anderlini, 2007).
Yet women have been actively involved in various political movements. Women’s groups
run the gambit of the political spectrum, ranging from far left wing to far right wing (Anderlini,
2007). Filomina Steady argues that many women’s groups are concerned with development
issues and often orient their agendas toward improving society as a whole rather than focusing
solely on “women’s issues” (Steady, 2006).
According to Janet Saltzman Chafetz, Anthony Gary Dworkin, and Stephanie Swanson,
women have long been involved in political and social movements but the concept of women’s
only movements, or those movements focused specifically on women, did not arise until the
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early nineteenth century (Chafetz, Dworkin, and Swanson, 1990). As Amrita Basu has noted,
Western feminists have long been aware of the struggle for women’s rights in the United States
and Europe but often lack an appreciation for the long history of women fighting for better
treatment in the Middle East, South America, Asia, and Africa. Many Western feminists wrongly
believe that the West has been the sole source of inspiration for women’s movements around the
world, but Basu’s book The Challenge of Local Feminisms documents the local origins of several
women’s rights campaigns across the non-West (Basu, 1995).
Women’s movements, however, are not always feminist movements. For example, in
Latin America, feminism is often associated with bourgeois elitism and is thus rejected by many
activists in countries with a large proportion of socioeconomically disadvantaged women such as
Nicaragua (Chinchilla, 1994). Women can be mobilized into political action on the basis of many
identities and causes but this thesis will focus on the debate over motherist versus feminist
women’s movements. This first section will summarize motherist movements, outline feminist
criticisms of motherist movements, describe hybrid motherist-feminist movements, and finally,
consider feminist critiques of these movements.
Motherist Movements
Motherist movements inspire women to act based on their maternal identities. Linda
Rennie Forcey describes mothering as a socially constructed role which revolves around
nurturing and caring for others (Forcey, 1991). Annelise Orleck notes that the varied types of
motherist movements, which cover the political spectrum, include environmental, subsistence,
anti-militarist, nationalist, anti-colonial, and even racist movements (Orleck, 1997).
Simona Sharoni argues that what these motherist movements have in common is that
those involved appear to adhere to traditional gender roles since they embrace their maternal
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identities (Sharoni, 1997). As a result, women’s political actions can be entirely masked when
they are acting as mothers (Neuman, 2004). Cynthia Edmonds-Cady observes that motherhood
can be a difficult concept from which to unite women as it is not simply a shared experience but
varies considerably by markers of social location such as class or race (Edmonds-Cady, 2009).
However, motherist movements do benefit from being seemingly unthreatening to traditional
society (Sharoni, 1997). Dorothea Hilhorst and Mathijs van Leeuwen confirm that women
politically mobilized as mothers receive ample media attention for their causes because of their
non-threatening status and because it is more difficult for adversaries to attack them (Hilhorst
and van Leeuwen, 2007). Additionally, it can be easier to attract large numbers of women to
motherist movements than to feminist movements since women find it less problematic to gain
approval or permission for their political activism when it is based on motherhood rather than on
feminism (Hewitt, 2006).
The critiques of motherist activism are leveled mainly by feminists. Judy El-Bushra
insists that motherist movements cannot bring women power because in their role as mothers,
women’s position of authority derives, ironically, from their powerlessness. According to ElBushra, the very weakness which from which mothers speak out ultimately means that they
cannot be taken seriously as political players (El-Bushra, 2007). Rema Hammami observes that
for some women, being mothers who serve everyone else’s needs is the only way for them to
advocate for their own right to resources. This implies how undervalued women are in many
places since society looks down on women who advocate for themselves (Hammami, 1997).
Nevertheless, Anderlini postulates that even women’s groups formed on the basis of their
identities as mothers can break social barriers by using motherhood as a political tool (Anderlini,
2007). Moreover, Orleck argues that although motherhood may appear apolitical, it has often
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served as a springboard for activism. For instance, mothers can connect caring for their children
to caring for the future which galvanizes them into action (Orleck, 1997). Additionally, Sharoni
notes that many mother activists use their motherhood subversively. This has, in some cases, led
to a blurring of the distinctions between motherist and feminist movements (Sharoni, 1997).
For example, Diana Taylor chronicles the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina.
These women used the concept of traditional motherhood, which includes suffering, irrationality,
self-sacrifice, passivity, and powerlessness, to bring attention to their missing children known as
the “disappeareds,” who were kidnapped and either killed or abused by the state during the Dirty
War. While the Argentine military junta had originally promoted mothers as sacred, once the
women gained attention for protesting the regime’s actions, the military began cracking down on
them. Taylor points out that this eventually led the women to redefine motherhood as not a
biological but a political concept, which thus arguably transformed them into a feminist
movement. This transformation is important because these women realized that mere
motherhood was not enough to make the changes they sought, and instead they needed the
politicization of motherhood (Taylor, 1997). Lynn Stephen documents the same phenomenon in
El Salvador where motherist activists became feminist over time. As feminists, these Salvadorian
women were able to achieve new laws against domestic violence, draw attention to the state’s
human rights abuses, and educate women about their political rights (Stephen, 1995). In both
cases, women re-appropriated the image of motherhood and used it as a strategy toward
achieving their goals.
Feminist Movements
In contrast to motherist movements which are rooted in maternalism and may or may not
address issues of gender equality, women’s rights always play a central role in feminist
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movements. Furthermore, while many schools of feminism exist, most are generally united by
the basic ideology that gender plays an integral role in the structuring of social organization.
Most schools of feminism hold that in the majority of known cultures women are deemed to be
of lower status and less importance than men, and that additionally, women receive fewer
opportunities and reduced access to resources as compared to men. Feminists also regard gender
inequality as socially produced rather than biologically determined, thus believing that gender
inequality can be eliminated (Sapiro, 1986). This section provides an overview of the tensions
between motherist and feminist movements, the backlash feminists fear motherist movements
justify, and finally feminists’ issue with essentialism.
Sharoni concedes that many motherist movements will avoid any association with
feminism since feminism threatens the known social order (Sharoni, 1997). In fact, Heather
Hewett argues that precisely because feminist movements wish to shake up social norms, many
motherist movements avoid any connection to feminism in order to attract more people to the
cause. She points out that there is often strong tension between feminist and motherist
movements (Hewett, 2006).
Sara Ruddick discerns that many feminists are reluctant to support motherist causes
because they view such political mobilization as a backlash intended to restrict women to
traditional gender roles (Ruddick, 1997). Within feminism, there is a history of criticizing
motherhood as an oppressive institution to women. Feminists have also blamed motherist
movements for essentializing women because such movements imply a conflation of mother and
woman as one in the same (DiQuinzio, 1993). According to Elizabeth Grosz, essentialism refers
to defining a woman’s fundamental essence as strictly her biological capabilities, such as
childbirth. Grosz goes on to say this is often associated with naturalism, or what is viewed as
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God-given or immutable characteristics, that may or may not take on physical forms. An
example would be the belief that women naturally should take care of children or cook all the
meals. In addition, essentialism also refers to the idea that women universally experience the
same things (Grosz, 1990). This latter idea is prominent in motherist movements as they view all
women as understanding motherhood.
The majority of feminists consider essentialism the most problematic aspect of motherist
movements. They fear the reduction of women to their identities as mothers because this implies
women’s only role in life can be a domestic one, which thus limits women’s opportunities.
Additionally, it implies that all women are natural mothers. Most feminists are uncomfortable
with the biologically determinist characterization of such reductions as they feel culture plays a
much larger role in differences between the sexes (Moore, 2008; de Beauvoir, 2009). As
mentioned above, the collapsing of woman into mother is also viewed as not only erroneous
since not all women become mothers, but feminists also consider it dangerous as it prescriptively
implies all women should become mothers (DiQuinzio, 1993).
Overall, the tensions between motherist and feminist movements are strong as many
feminists fear that motherist movements justify forcing women to adhere to traditional gender
roles. Feminists also take issue with the essentialism rooted in the motherhood identity as they
believe it reduces women’s opportunities. Yet there are feminists who have embraced many of
the ideals espoused by motherist movements.
Hybrid Movements
Beginning in the 1970s, certain feminists were questioning feminism’s animosity to
motherhood. Scholars such as Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan embraced essentialist
arguments by insisting that women and men are indeed fundamentally different from one
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another, just as male supremacist ideology claims. The divergence in their assertions lay in that
these feminists maintained that women are superior to men. They believe this superiority arises
due to the fact women are, according to them, more empathetic, kind, caring, and
accommodating than men (Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982). Following the same line of
thinking, by the 1980s, some feminists were trying to reclaim motherhood as a feminist concept.
These scholars included Sara Ruddick, Jean Bethke Elshtain, and Betty Reardon (Dietz, 1985).
For instance, Elshtain created the idea of “social feminism” which is a movement that
seeks to re-create the private sphere in the public sphere. According to Elshtain, the family is the
most important aspect of all human life as she considers the family morally superior to public
life. This opinion mirrors conservative ideology that emphasizes the family as the building
blocks of human civilization. Much as Gilligan and Chodorow emphasize women’s superiority to
men, Elshtain emphasizes the superiority of the private realm over the public realm. She believes
that mothers should be the focus of feminism because according to her, family is where women’s
support systems thrive. Elshtain criticizes feminists for demeaning what she views as women’s
very identities, by calling motherhood oppressive (Elshtain, 1979; Elshtain, 1981; Elshtain,
1982). However, other feminists, such as bell hooks, argue that views like Elshain’s romanticize
and idealize motherhood, and even reinforce patriarchical attitudes by narrowly focusing on
women’s biological capacities (hooks, 1985).
This debate between feminists continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s where many
mother-centered pacifist and environmentalist feminist movements remained popular but
continued to receive criticism from other feminists. During this period Sarah Ruddick claimed
that since women are the sex which give birth and thus are the “life givers,” they are nearly
incapable of being violent (Ruddick, 1983). Similarly, Betty Friedan made the argument that if
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militaries simply included more women in their ranks, the military would be less violent since
women, according to her, have a less violent nature than men (Friedan, 1981). Environmentalist
feminist movements rooted in motherist traditions viewed women as “moral mothers” with a
primary connection to Mother Nature which these feminists claimed naturally led them to oppose
violence and war (Bromley, 1982).
The concept of moral mothers remains popular today. It has inspired Muslim women
activists in Iran, both feminists and non-feminists alike. There women’s groups call attention to
the contradictions in the Islamic republic’s praise of mothers as the guardians of culture and
moral values while simultaneously denying women many rights. Female Iranian activists argue
that women as mothers are valuable to society and yet are not given the respect, in the form of
legal rights, which they deserve (Gheytanchi, 2001). In fact, throughout much of the nonWestern world, motherhood is often central to women’s activism in both feminist and nonfeminist contexts (Oyewùmí, 2003). According to Haleh Afshar, in many Muslim countries,
feminist activists often reject the typical focus of Western feminism’s push for equality in the
workforce. Instead, they emphasize the honor and importance women have as mothers and
wives. Afshar argues that Muslim women often choose domesticity and marriage in order to
more effectively seek resources for themselves and their children. Afshar also notes that Muslim
activists feel that their Western counterparts look down on them for being mother-oriented
(Afshar, 1996).
Traditionally, Muslim women have been encouraged to be mothers. Aliah Schleifer
emphasizes that Islamic scriptures place mothers in a highly venerated position where their
duties include caring for a husband’s household and his children. Marriage is considered
necessary for women, as is bearing and rearing children. This is because in Islam being pregnant,
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giving birth, nursing, and raising children are all considered spiritual acts for women. In
conventional Islamic teachings, it is actually considered part of a woman’s religious duty to
marry and bear children. Although Islam has historically permitted women to be scholars,
artisans, merchants, and even soldiers, their primary role has traditionally been defined as being
mothers (Schleifer, 1986).
Despite this historical emphasis on a woman’s duty to be a mother, there have been many
Muslim feminists working to expand women’s rights in the Islamic world. During the anticolonial period of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the women's movement was active
across the Middle East, frequently in tandem with the nationalist movement (Baron, 2005).
Elizabeth Baron observes this phenomenon in Egypt where the nation was often symbolically
represented as a woman. One of Egypt's most famous sculptures created during its struggle for
independence depicts a woman defiantly removing her veil as she poses next to a sphinx. This
statue, Nahdat Misr, or the Awakening of Egypt, came to represent Egyptians’ desire to
overthrow British colonial rule. However, the statue also suggests women's desire to assert their
rights (Baron, 1997). According to Baron, Egyptians in the early women's movement argued that
the only way that the nation could progress was by increasing women's access to education. This
was a strategy to gain women rights by emphasizing that women were the “Mothers of the
Nation” who if educated, would be knowledgeable enough to raise their sons to be devoted to the
nation (Baron, 2005).
Similarly, Elizabeth Thompson discusses the techniques used by women's rights
supporters in Syria and Lebanon during the same period, where activists embraced a concept
known as “patriotic motherhood” as way to obtain greater rights for females. Originally, women
in Syria and Lebanon had openly advocated for women's suffrage, rights to equal inheritance,
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and an end to polygamy, among other demands. But by the 1930s, they began promoting the idea
of women as dedicated patriots who would raise their children to be devoted citizens. Women's
rights activists foresaw this patriotic duty as a mechanism which overtime would earn them a
justified position from which to demand political rights. Women's groups also hoped that the
motherist approach would appeal to more women and be less controversial in order that the
movement would attract greater numbers (Thompson, 2000).
Scholars such as Baron and Thompson have closely documented the work done by
women's rights activists in the Islamic world during this period of nationalism. Motherist tactics
were often employed as Muslim women across the Middle East organized boycotts, rallies,
protests, debates, and demonstrations which demanded both independence from colonial rule as
well as greater rights for women (Baron, 2005). Moreover, female activists gave speeches and
wrote editorials arguing for everything from outright equal rights between men and women, to
the freedom to choose whether or not to veil, to the right to vote (Thompson, 2000; Khater,
2004).
In more recent times, Muslim feminists have continued to advocate for women’s rights.
Fatima Mernissi is one of the most internationally well known of these feminists. In her book
Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Enquiry, she suggests that imams and
politicians created misogynistic traditions that have distorted what the Prophet Muhammad
originally intended. She argues that women were never meant to be subservient to men in Islam
but that men incorrectly interpreting Islamic texts have misled the Muslim community (Mernissi,
1991). Roxanne Marcotte explains that many Muslim feminists have followed Mernissi’s
example by claiming the right to ijtihad, which is the practice of interpreting the Qur’an or other
Islamic works. Ijtihad has traditionally been performed by educated, upper-class males. Many
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Muslim feminists now perform their own readings of Islamic texts that view women positively
and claim that women deserve improved rights (Marcotte, 2010). For example, Asma Barlas has
reinterpreted the Qur’an in a manner that seeks to prove that Islam provides men and women
with equal rights. According to Barlas, it has been misinformed traditions which have prevented
women from enjoying their full rights under Islam (Barlas, 2002). Marcotte argues that Muslim
feminists such as Mernissi and Barlas are challenging patriarchy by contesting traditional
authority figures in the Muslim world (Marcotte, 2010).
In addition to these Muslim feminist scholars who focus on the reinterpretation of Islamic
scriptures, there are Muslim feminists who work toward bettering women’s rights through
transnational networks. Valentine M. Moghadam discusses the many feminist networks which
exist in the Muslim world, including the two most famous of these: Women Living under
Muslim Laws (WLUML) and the Sisterhood is Global Institute (SIGI). Women Living under
Muslim Laws and the Sisterhood is Global Institute each began in 1984 and connect both
Muslim and secular feminists living in the Muslim world to one another as well as to feminists
around the world. Activists with Women Living under Muslim Laws work to bring attention to
violations of women’s rights in the Muslim world by sending out “action alerts” to members
concerning specific cases of human rights abuses. Those with the organization also catalog the
general treatment of women and the family code in each Muslim country. Similarly, individuals
with the Sisterhood is Global Institute seek to educate women in Muslim countries about their
rights through both publications and workshops (Moghadam, 2005).
Overall, among many Muslim women activists exists a deep identification with
motherhood. Similarly, Casimiro, Kwesiga, Mungwa, and Tripp note that it is common in much
of Africa for both non-feminists and feminists alike, to characterize women as mothers because
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mothers are seen as nurturing and caring, traits that are considered natural to females, as well as
positively rated. For example, in political campaigns, the few African women who do run for
office often campaign as caregivers and play up their role as mother. Nevertheless, there are also
African feminists who feel that this feeds stereotypes and limits women’s possibilities in politics
and social movements (Casimiro et al, 2009).
Nonetheless, as Linda Rennie Forcey notes, valorizing a feeling of difference in an
oppressed group can be an effective consciousness-raising tool (Forcey, 1991). As Gheytanchi
notes in her study, many Iranian women feel that as the guardians of moral values, they deserve
better treatment by the state because their work as mothers preserves Iranian culture. Female
activists praise women’s role as mothers for being different from fathers’ roles. This technique is
used to inspire women to demand rights from the government (Gheytanchi, 2001). Nevertheless,
many feminists reject the above arguments as pure biological determinism (Mason, 2005).
For example, these feminists consider Francis Fukuyama’s 1998 article “Women and the
Evolution of World Politics” as a case in point. In this piece he argues that feminists pay too
much attention to culture and not enough to biology. According to his research, women are
biologically more peaceful than men. Here Fukuyama is in agreement with many
environmentalist and pacifist feminists. Yet Fukuyama regards this natural peacefulness as a
liability since the world in which we live is, according to him, masculinized. He believes that in
order to protect ourselves from masculinized men elsewhere, masculine defense policies are
required. This means that most women, whom he believes the majority to be “feminine” and
therefore by nature peaceful, will be incapable of providing the necessary defense policies. Thus
he insinuates that women should remain out of politics. Yet Fukuyama also contends that even if
every society in the world were entirely run by women this would ultimately lead to violence

13

because there would be no outlets for male aggression except war (Fukuyama, 1998). According
to Hilary Charlesworth, Fukuyama is following the same line of thinking as many
environmentalist feminists and pacifist feminists but he comes to a far less appealing conclusion.
From Charlesworth’s view, declaring an innate connection between women and peace or women
and nature ultimately winds up keeping women in a subordinated position (Charlesworth, 2008).
In conclusion, it must be noted that despite the many feminist criticisms made against
motherist movements, this has not prevented hybrid motherist-feminist movements from
emerging, especially in the non-Western world. Debates also continue over the essentialist label,
as to whether essentialism should be avoided or embraced as a method of consciousness-raising.
Practical versus Strategic Gender Interests
Another divide in the literature on women’s movements is in the type of goals pursued by
women’s groups. In the mid-1980s, Maxine Molyneux created two concepts, one called strategic
gender interests (SGIs) and the other practical gender interests (PGIs). According to Molyneux,
the former encompass interests that seek to alleviate women’s subordinate status. The latter are
interests of urgent need which usually do not entail immediate female emancipation or gender
equality. Essentially, strategic gender interests directly challenge patriarchy while practical
gender interests do not immediately do so, but may overtime (Molyneux, 1985). Georgina
Waylen explains that practical gender interests often epitomize economic survival whereas
strategic gender interests usually revolve around feminism (Waylen, 1994). Since Molyneux first
employed this concept, the tool has had a far-reaching effect all the way to the present. Today
many scholars continue to believe that only when practical gender interests are met can strategic
gender interests be addressed (Easton, Miles, and Monkman, 2007).
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Yet Lynn Stephen has criticized Molyneux’s typology for reinforcing what she considers
the false Western assumption of a public/private divide (Stephen, 1997). For example, Karina
Barker, in her study on Argentine women involved in the Piquetero movement, argues that
although the movement reproduced patriarchy it actually allowed women to gain strategic gender
interests, at least within in the home. The Piquetero movement revolved around notions of
traditional gender norms and family life while working to end economic hardships for both
sexes. The movement has long been credited with helping women’s practical gender interests by
alleviating problems due to poverty through the procurement of temporary minimum wage jobs
and food aid. However, Barker insists that since these women became involved in an activity
outside the home, it also increased their bargaining power within the home and hence gained
them strategic gender interests as well (Barker, 2007). Scholars remain divided over the use of
Molyneux’s tool of gender interests but this study will employ these concepts on the grounds that
they do provide insight into the women’s movements in Lebanon and Liberia by helping to
determine if they were overtly feminist.
Conclusion
The debate between motherist and feminist activism is not a new one. During the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, nationalism was on the rise throughout the non-Western
world as people began to openly advocate for the end of colonialism. Across Asia and Africa,
women's rights movements sprang up alongside and within nationalist movements. As Baron
observes, in Egypt, male nationalists made excellent use of women's efforts in the struggle for
independence, but once these men controlled state institutions, they kept women from running
for office, joining political parties, and voting (Baron, 2005). A similar situation occurred in
Lebanon and Syria. There female activists expected the male nationalists that they helped buoy
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into power to in turn provide women with increased rights. Instead these activists were dismayed
to find that male nationalists formed political coalitions with religious groups intent on keeping
women from participating in civic life (Thompson, 2000).
Likewise, Algerian women played a decisive role in the war of independence from France
through their armed resistance, including participation in suicide bombings, as well as through
their support of combatants' efforts. Yet, despite women's proven bravery and abilities, they were
expected to return to their former roles of strictly being wives and mothers and staying out of
public life (Benallègue, 1983). This pattern is not limited to the Middle East, but repeats itself
across different societies. For example, in Namibia's war of liberation, women provided not only
food and shelter for fighters, but also took political initiatives by organizing protests and
demonstrations against the South African regime, and additionally were involved in actual
warfare. The main movement against the colonial oppressor was the South West African's People
Organization (SWAPO) which claimed to support gender equity during the years of the war, but
did not in fact implement such rhetoric into policy once in power (Soiri, 1996). In fact, according
to Heike Becker, the South West African's People Organization party leaders made alliances with
traditional chiefs who regarded women's place as in the home and out of the realm of politics
(Becker, 2006).
This thesis ultimately seeks to understand why some progress towards equality has been
made in Liberia directly following its recent civil war while it remained relatively elusive in
Lebanon's immediate postwar climate. In order to do this, it is important to analyze the use of
motherist and feminist movements, as well as practical and strategic interests, and the context in
which they were operating, as other factors are likely to come into play. It appears that Lebanese
women’s activism was overall mainly rooted in maternalism, while Liberian women’s organizing
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was predicated on a combination of feminism and motherism, thus seeming to hint that feminism
could play a role in paritially explaining why Liberian women have made more progress in
women’s rights in the postconflict context as compared to Lebanese women (Shehadeh, 1999a;
Ward, 2009; “The Right Livelihood Awards 1984,” 2012; “Pray the Devil Back,” 2008; Ekiyor
and Gbowee, 2005). It is hoped that the findings of this study will offer lessons that benefit nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) which seek to promote women’s rights, and help women in
postconflict situations reap all the gains to which they are entitled as citizens.
1.3 Procedure
Variables and Operationalization
Is a more motherist approach better than a more feminist approach in promoting women’s
rights? The hypothesis is that a simply motherist approach limits gender equality. The subquestions are: (1) does a motherist approach allow women a culturally acceptable space from
which to make demands? and (2) can a feminist approach backfire and actually increase
resistance to women’s rights?
The dependent variable, women’s rights, will be measured based on five indicators:
female literacy rates, the availability of birth control, the rate of maternal mortality, the number
of women in parliament, and changes to the family code. These indicators were selected because
of their status as widely accepted measures of equality (Issan, 2010; Lovenduski and Norris,
2003; Pezzini, 2005; Bianco and Moore, 2012).
Research Design
This paper will consist of a longitudinal, comparative study of the two cases, Lebanon
and Liberia, for a period of five years prior to their civil wars, during their civil wars, and five
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years following their civil wars (for Lebanon 1970-1995 and Liberia 1984-2008). This will result
in a total of 25 years for Lebanon and 24 years for Liberia.
Following John Stuart Mill’s guidelines for the method of difference, Liberia and
Lebanon are useful cases for comparison. Both experienced civil wars of nearly the same
duration, and are additionally each defined by ethnic cleavages, postcolonial histories, and
consistent women’s activism during wartime. The only major point of difference lies in the rights
for women gained directly following their respective civil wars and the overall approach taken
by the women’s movements in Lebanon and Liberia during the war period (Van Evera, 1997).
Although Lebanon and Liberia may not appear to be a ready comparison, the two
countries in fact share many similarities, despite one being situated in the Middle East and the
other in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most significantly, both Lebanon and Liberia experienced
colonialism, albeit in different ways, that resulted in one ethnic group dominating the political
and economic institutions of each country. In Lebanon, as a result of French rule, Maronite
Christians gained the upper hand in government and in business (Cleveland, 2004; Khalidi,
1979). Likewise, for most of the period in which the state of Liberia has existed, black
immigrants from the U.S. essentially controlled the government and economic assets in the
country (Kieh, 1989; Kieh, 1992). Thus, ethnic conflict has been viewed as a defining factor in
the civil wars of each case (Cleveland, 2004; Kieh, 1992). Moreover, both Lebanon and Liberia
witnessed large numbers of organizing women throughout their respective civil war periods. In
Lebanon, female activists with the Lebanese Women’s Council, the Renaissance Women’s
Gathering, and other women’s associations were engaged during the war (Ward, 2009; Wehbi,
2002; Shehadeh, 1999a). Similarly, in Liberia, activists associated with the Liberian Women’s
Initiative, the Women in Peacebuilding Network, and other women’s groups participated in
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organizing efforts (Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005; “Pray the Devil Back,” 2008; “African Women
and Peace Support,” 2004). Thus, broadly speaking, Lebanon and Liberia share enough
commonalities to warrant a comparative study.
Through Bennett and Geroge’s method of process-tracing, connections between the
causes and observed outcomes can be mapped in order to determine whether a motherist or
feminist approach to women’s mobilization existed in Liberia and Lebanon. This will then be
used to decipher which independent variable, a motherist or a feminist approach, had an effect on
the dependent variable, women’s rights, in the two cases (Bennett and George, 2005).
Organization
This paper will be divided into four chapters. The first chapter is the introduction and
literature review and sets the stage for the debate over motherist versus feminist movements. The
second chapter will provide context by discussing Lebanon’s civil war, and will also explain the
actions taken by women’s groups during the civil war, including an analysis of the form of
mobilization. The third chapter will describe Liberia’s civil war as well as the women’s activism
during the war and will be followed by an analysis of their mobilization. Finally, the concluding
chapter will provide an analysis of the respective gains made by the Lebanese and Liberian’s
women’s groups since the war, as well as what can be learned from their mistakes and successes.
Sources
Although primary sources will be used wherever possible, secondary sources will provide
the main information for this paper. This will be a traditionally researched paper relying heavily
on newspapers, periodicals, journals, and reports. To review women’s activism in Lebanon, the
women’s magazine Al-Raida will be used to document women’s work and their forms of
mobilization during and after the years of the civil war. In the case of Liberia, accounts from the
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United Nations will be used including “Best Practices in Peace Building and Non-Violent
Conflict Resolution: Some Documented African Women’s Peace Initiatives,” a document jointly
published by UNHCR, UNESCO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and UNIFEM. Additionally, the
documentary film Pray the Devil Back to Hell along with Liberian newspapers, such as the Daily
Observer, will also provide information on Liberian women’s activism.
The information for this paper’s indicators will be obtained from various sources,
including from Bahia Hariri’s study “Women and Education in Lebanon” which will provide
literacy rates (Hariri, 1996), and the World Bank’s data catalog which will cover contraceptive,
maternal mortality, and female literacy rates. In addition, the United Nations report “The
Situation of Children and Women in Lebanon, 1995” (“The Situation of Children and Women,”
1995) will provide both maternal mortality and birth control usage rates. The Global Health
Observatory Data Repository will cover maternal mortality rates, the Inter Parliamentary Union
will provide the data for the numbers of female members in parliament, and UNICEF will
provide maternal mortality and birth control usage rates. Additionally the gender-related
development index (GDI) will be used where applicable.
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Chapter 2: Women's Activism during Lebanon's Civil War
2.1 Introduction
In the majority of literature concerning Lebanon's fifteen year civil war, there is little
mention of the work performed by female activists who were in fact highly involved in
organizing throughout the war. This chapter will chronicle women's activism as well as provide
an analysis of women's organizing based on Maxine Molyneux's typology of gender interests. To
understand the context in which Lebanese women acted, this chapter will furthermore provide
background information on Lebanon, a summary of the civil war, and finally, a description of
women's experiences both prior to, and during, the civil war.
2.2 Background on Lebanon
To understand how the civil war began, the importance of Lebanon's unique history must
be stressed. Lebanon is a small country with a population of about 4,100,000, located at a
crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa (“Lebanon, World Factbook,” 2012; Meo, 1965). What is
today Lebanon was formerly part of the Ottoman Empire. On April 25, 1920, in the aftermath of
the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, the colonial French government was awarded a mandate
by the League of Nations over the area of what was known as Greater Syria (Cummings and
Held, 2011; Odeh, 1985). Greater Syria, also called “historic Syria,” was a term that for over
2,000 years referred to the geographical area which encompasses present day Syria, Lebanon,
Jordan, Israel, the western portion of Iraq, and Israeli-occupied sections of Palestine (Cummings
and Held, 2011). Mount Lebanon, an area lying within Greater Syria, contained an historic
community of Maronite Christians that had since 1860 been run autonomously under the
Ottoman Empire. This was due to pressure from European governments who sought reassurances
that the Maronite community would be singled out for protection after a war between the
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Maronites and the Druzes in 1860 resulted in heavy sectarian violence on both sides (Safa, 2006;
Makdisi, 2002). After gaining the League of Nations mandate in 1920, France affixed other
sections of Greater Syria to Mount Lebanon in order to create the new country of Lebanon
(Cummings and Held, 2011).
According to John Thomas Cummings and Colbert C. Held, Lebanon is often associated
with cultural diversity and pluralism (Cummings and Held, 2011). Eighteen confessional, or
religious, groups are officially recognized by the state, including Shi'a Muslims, Sunni Muslims,
Druze, Isma'ilis, Alawites, Maronite Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Melkite Catholics, Armenian
Orthodox, Syrian Catholics, Armenian Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Roman Catholics,
Chaldeans, Assyrians, Copts, Protestants, and Jews (“Background Note: Lebanon,” 2011; Payne
and Salamey, 2008). Nevertheless, Cummings and Held point out that Lebanon from its
inception has been characterized by a Christian-Muslim divide (Cummings and Held, 2011).
Scholars such as Walid Khalidi and William L. Cleveland have suggested that France
created Lebanon for the sole purpose of protecting the Maronite Christians who were
concentrated in Mount Lebanon. The sections of Greater Syria which France attached to Mount
Lebanon contained small portions of Sunni-dominated areas and Shi'a-dominated areas which
allowed the Maronites to be the numerical majority (Khalidi, 1979; Cleveland, 2004). According
to Leila M. T. Meo, many Christians were fearful that the Muslim population would institute a
Muslim theocratic state if given the opportunity, and therefore Christians, especially Maronite
Christians, embraced France's intervention in the region (Meo, 1965).
Even prior to the French mandate period, outside involvement in the area was evident. As
previously mentioned, several European powers, including the governments of England, France,
Prussia, Russia, and Austria, had pressured the Ottoman government into allowing Mount
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Lebanon to be run autonomously after the outbreak of violence between the Maronite and Druze
communities in 1860. These European powers insisted that Mount Lebanon be overseen by a
European, Christian governor. According to Latif Abul-Husn, the governor was supported by an
appointed administrative council which was meant to represent all the communities living in the
area, according to a confessional formula. This confessional form of representation would later
be solidified under the French mandate period beginning in 1920 (Abul-Husn, 1998; Dekmejian,
1978).
Abul-Husn explains that while the administrative council was dissolved following the
declaration of the new state of Lebanon on September 1, 1920, the French mandate government
next created a new council which was elected but nonetheless maintained confessional
requirements (Abul-Husn, 1998). According to Imad Harb, confessionalism is a system of
governance which distributes political power proportionally according to each religious
community living in the state (Harb, 2006). Confessionalism is actually a form of
consociationalism, which is a type of democracy designed to help plural societies protect
minority groups. Consociationalism functions on the basis of electing elites from each ethnic or
religious group to be representatives of their respective communities. These elites then cooperate
and compromise with the elected elites from the other communities, while simultaneously
working toward the interests of their own particular group (Jabbra and Jabbra, 2001; Lijphart,
1977).
William L. Cleveland describes Lebanon's independence as a process. The government of
France considered it a duty to protect Christians in the Levant, particularly the Maronite
community. The Maronites were the largest sectarian group in Lebanon but constituted only
thirty percent of the population. Cleveland argues that this was by design so that a French
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presence in Lebanon would be championed by the Maronites and other Christian groups who
would seek protection from a perceived threat of Muslim domination. The French mandate
government created a constitution in 1926 which arranged for a single chamber parliament that
would then elect a president whose duties would include appointing a prime minister and
cabinet. In 1943, the Lebanese achieved independence from France and established the National
Pact which would have long-lasting effects on Lebanese politics (Cleveland, 2004).
Sami G. Hajjar describes the National Pact as an unwritten agreement which established a
confessional form of power-sharing among the eighteen recognized religious communities of
Lebanon (Hajjar, 2009). Nevertheless, as Richard Dekmejian notes, the confessional system had
already been institutionalized during the French mandate period (Dekmejian, 1978). The
National Pact, however, would take confessionalism much further. Based on the 1932 census
which showed Christians constituting the numerical majority of Lebanese, the National Pact
declared that the parliament would always contain a ratio of six Christians for every five
Muslims. The National Pact also guaranteed that the president, the most powerful position in
Lebanon, would be filled by a Maronite Christian. Additionally, the agreement stipulated that the
prime minister would be a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of the house a Shi'a Muslim. In fact,
every high office was accorded a religious community requirement. For example, the deputy
prime minister was always to be a Greek Orthodox Christian and the army commander was to
always be a Maronite Christian (Hajjar, 2009). By its very design, the National Pact made
elections based on religious identification.
One other significance of the National Pact was that it offered a compromise between the
Christian and Muslim communities regarding the national identity of Lebanon. According to
Cleveland, the agreement specified that Lebanon was an independent, Arab nation. This was a
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sacrifice for both Muslims and Christians. Many Muslims felt that Lebanon should never have
been separated from Syria, while many Christians preferred to think of Lebanon as a
Mediterranean, rather than an Arab, state. The National Pact assured Christians that Lebanon
would remain independent from Syria while it simultaneously guaranteed Muslims that Lebanon
was a part of the Arab world (Cleveland, 2004).
In the early years of its independence and well through the 1960s, Lebanon was a source
of hope in the Middle East as it experienced both economic growth and political stability
(Hudson, 1997b; Safa, 2006). Often referred to as “the Switzerland of the Middle East,” while its
capital Beirut was known as “the Paris of the Middle East,” Lebanon was a middle-income
country on par with Portugal (Safa, 2006: 25; Stewart, 1996: 489). However, as alluded to above,
the underlying conflict over the identity of the nation continued to create problems.
2.3 Lebanon's Conflict over Identity
While scholars such as Cummings and Held note that Lebanon's many confessional
groups experienced conflict with one another, including Maronites versus Greek Orthodox and
Sunnis versus Shi'as, they have also insisted that Lebanon can be broken down into a simple
Christian-Muslim divide (Cummings and Held, 2011). Scholars such as Kamal Salibi have
explained that this Christian-Muslim split led to two opposed political ideologies concerning the
identity of Lebanon. The first was an ethno-nationalist Christian identity which insisted that
Lebanon should be considered a Mediterranean or European state, while also seeking to promote
a pro-Western political agenda. The opposing ideology, known as the Arab nationalist thesis,
held that Lebanon was part of the Arab world and thus should become actively involved in the
politics of the Middle East (Salibi, 1988).
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According to Walid Phares, the nationalistic Christian point of view regarded Lebanese
Christians as having entirely different ethnic, linguistic, and historical roots than those of
Lebanese Muslims. Essentially, nationalist Christians held that they were fundamentally not
Arab. These Christians believed that they were non-Arabs based on the fact that their ancestors
used to speak Aramaic, and thus they often considered themselves to be ethnically Aramaean
(Phares, 1995). In other instances, many Christians regarded themselves as either ethnically
Phoenician or Byzantine (Cummings and Held, 2011). These Christian ethno-nationalists
believed that Lebanon’s purpose was to serve as a homeland for Christians. According to Phares,
in this worldview all Muslims were considered non-indigenous as they were deemed to be
invaders from the Arabian Peninsula (Phares, 1995).
Salibi considers this phenomenon of identifying as non-Arab as part of the pro-Western
view of nationalist Christians, who believed that they were integrally connected to the Western
world as opposed to the Arab world and the larger Middle East. Although Christians in Lebanon
had been speaking Arabic and identifying as Arabs for centuries, Salibi argues that their
repositioning as non-Arabs was a recent development which occurred only under European
involvement in the Levant (Salibi, 1988). Albert Hourani has described this same Christian
nationalist position as the “ideology of the mountains” since it was held mainly by the Maronites
who were located predominantly on Mount Lebanon, and who viewed themselves as a distinct
community from the rest of the historical Greater Syria (Hourani, 1976).
The belief system in direct contrast to Christian nationalism was that of Arab nationalism.
Salibi ironically notes that it was in fact a Christian who originated the idea of Arab nationalism,
and also concedes that there were indeed some Arab nationalist Christians as many Christians
throughout Lebanon considered themselves Arab. Arab nationalists agreed that the height of
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Arab culture occurred under Islam so that Islam and Arab nationalism were deeply intertwined
and could not be understood apart from one another. Salibi indicates that most Arab nationalists
in Lebanon were Muslim and that for these Arab nationalists, it was integral to orient Lebanon
toward the Arab world (Salibi, 1988). Hourani refers to this position as the “ideology of the
cities,” as most adherents were Sunnis who lived mainly in Beirut and other coastal towns
(Hourani, 1976).
The conflict between the two dichotomous positions of Christian nationalism and Arab
nationalism manifested itself early on in Lebanon. For example, many nationalist Christians
resisted learning Arab history and literature, and preferred to speak French or English rather than
Arabic. Meanwhile, Arab nationalists pushed for Arab history and literature courses to be taught
in schools (Salibi, 1988; Phares, 1995). In 1958, Lebanon appeared to experience violent conflict
between followers of these two opposed ideologies. According to Hajjar, when the governments
of Egypt and Syria joined as the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), the majority of Lebanese
Muslims indicated their wish for Lebanon to politically join with the United Arab Republic as
well. Meanwhile, most Lebanese Christians virulently resisted such a move, as did President
Camille Chamoun who requested U.S. troops to help quash the internal revolt. The Eisenhower
administration indeed sent U.S. troops to keep the pro-Western government in power (Hajjar,
2009). Kamal Salibi counters, however, that this may not have been as much about ChristianMuslim conflict as it originally appeared. Most Muslims, and even many Christians, were more
outraged by Chamoun’s intent on extending his presidency, and much of the violence and protest
associated with this period is more attributable to Chamoun’s unpopularity and excesses (Salibi,
1965). Nevertheless, Michael C. Hudson notes that the subtext surrounding the 1958 crisis was
the pronounced Muslim-Christian divide (Hudson, 1997b). In the end, the head of the army,
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General Emir Fu’ad Shihab was elected president since he remained neutral during the crisis
(Salibi, 1965). This ominous event in 1958 certainly foreshadowed the civil war which would
come less than two decades later.
2.4 Summary of Lebanon's Civil War
According to Khalidi, it was the 1967 Arab-Israeli war which truly began to polarize
most Maronite Christians against the majority of Muslims. The two sides' divisions centered over
the Palestinian issue (Khalidi, 1979). As Lamia Rustum Shehadeh points out, Palestinians had
been a presence in Lebanon since their expulsion from Palestine, which occurred with the
creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Palestinian intellectuals such as lawyers and doctors were
attracted to Lebanon's free society and business opportunities. Yet those Palestinians who did not
have high levels of education were crowded into fifteen refugee camps around the country which
were located on the outskirts of major cities (Shehadeh, 1999a). The Lebanese government
granted about 3,000 Christian Palestinians Lebanese citizenship but the majority of Palestinians,
who were mainly Sunnis, were denied citizenship as the Lebanese government feared that their
numbers would tip Lebanon's population in favor of the Muslims (Hudson, 1997a; Shehadeh,
1999a). The 1969 Cairo Agreement, which allowed the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) to legally function out of the Arqub region of Lebanon, as well as be supplied militarily
by the Syrian government, stoked the fear of many Maronites who worried that the Palestinians
were forming a state within a state (Shehadeh, 1999a).
In retrospect, the large presence of Palestinians divided the Lebanese and became the
foremost political issue in the lead up to the outbreak of war. Lebanon’s fifteen year civil war is
best understood in three stages: the initial two year war from 1975-1976, the Israeli invasions of
1978 and 1982, and the final stage of the late 1980s which culminated in the 1990 Ta’if Accord.
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With the signing of the Cairo Agreement, many Maronites began forming militias as they feared
the increase of Muslims due to the rising number of Palestinian refugees. Tensions grew during
the early 1970s until April 13, 1975 when a shooting outside of a Maronite church led to a
retaliatory shooting of Palestinians, the event which is usually cited as the war’s official
beginning (Khalidi, 1979; Phares, 1995). By 1976, as violence erupted across Lebanon, President
Suleiman Franjieh called on Syria's president Hafiz al-Asad, requesting Syrian troops to help
restore order. Many scholars such as Khalidi have viewed the request for these troops as a way to
return complete Maronite power over Lebanon (Khalidi, 1979). According to the scholars with
the MERIP reports, Syria's government had strategic reasons for wanting to become involved in
Lebanon's conflict. Asad hoped to usurp Egyptian political dominance of the Arab world, but he
felt that this required appeasing the Israeli government by ensuring Maronite political control of
Lebanon. Indeed, if Lebanon were ruled by pro-Palestinian factions, they would likely have
aligned themselves with the government of Iraq, thus hurting Asad's efforts to be leader of the
Arab world (MERIP, 1976).
Shehadeh argues that by the late 1970s, two political blocs had clearly emerged. The first
was the right-wing Lebanese Front which included political parties and militias such as the
Phalangist or Kataib Party, the National Liberal Party, the Guardians of the Cedars, the Maronite
Monastic Orders, and the National Bloc. The opposing leftist bloc consisted of the Progressive
Socialist Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the Baath Party, the Communist Party, the
Organization of Communist Action, and the Independent Nassirite Movement, among others.
Additionally, Beirut became a divided city with a Christian East and a Muslim West, separated
by the so-called “green line” (Shehadeh, 1999a).
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The arrival of the Syrians on June 1, 1976 quickly led to more outside involvement which
took the war into its second phase. Hajjar notes that the Syrians eventually occupied Lebanon
north of the Litani River. This was subsequently followed by a second foreign occupation which
began on March 14, 1978 when Israeli troops entered Lebanon to control land south of the Litani
River, an area which the Israelis soon referred to as Free Lebanon. The Israelis left southern
Lebanon in the care of Major Sa'ad Haddad, a Christian Lebanese, on April 18, 1979. Haddad
commanded what became known as the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA). Composed mainly of
southern Christian militiamen, with some Shi'a militiamen as well, the Southern Lebanese Army
was a proxy, funded and armed by the Israeli government (Hajjar, 2009). The United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) arrived in Lebanon on March 23, 1978 during the first
Israeli invasion. Its mandate, given under UN Resolution 425 on March 19, 1978, was to
evacuate Israeli troops from Lebanon, although the UNIFIL operation ultimately failed to do so
(Shehadeh, 1999a; Fisk, 2002; “Resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March,” 1978).
Israeli troops returned to Lebanon in full force on June 6, 1982 (Odeh, 1985). According
to Robert Fisk, the Israeli military was ultimately able to drive the Palestinian guerrillas out of
the country, but only after causing tremendous suffering to the Lebanese civilians of West
Beirut. Fisk also emphasizes the significance of the 1982 massacre of women, children, and
unarmed men at the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila which occurred at the hands of the
Phalangist militiamen, along with the complicity of the Israeli military and government. For Fisk
and many other scholars, it was one of the most horrific incidents in a war full of horror (Fisk,
2002).
Additionally, the 1980s also witnessed the rise of Hizballah, or the Party of God, which
was a Shi'a organization. Judith Palmer Harik notes that Hizballah focused expressly on ridding
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Lebanon of an Israeli presence and establishing a theocratic Islamic state. Hizballah members
often clashed with adherents of another Shi'a organization, Amal (Harik, 1996). According
Shehadeh, Amal formed just prior to the outbreak of the civil war as a protest movement which
demanded more government services for the Shi'a in the south (Shehadeh, 1999a). However,
after Amal's founder Musa al-Sadr disappeared on a visit to Libya in 1978, Hizballah began to
attempt to usurp Amal's position as leader of the Shi'a. As the war progressed, adherents of both
groups fought each other as often as they did Israeli troops, Palestinian guerrillas, and Druze
militiamen (Harik, 1996; Fisk, 2002).
Fighting between militias with their constantly shifting alliances continued throughout
the remainder of the 1980s, as did Israeli and Syrian involvement. The final phase of the civil
war began in 1988. According to Robert Fisk, Army Chief of Staff Michel Aoun and former
Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss, backed by Syria's government, each formed their own Lebanese
government on separate sides of Beirut. Fighting between the forces representing each
government began in 1989 and ended only when Aoun was pressured by Western governments
into a cease-fire brokered by the Arab League. This then led to what became known as the Ta’if
Accord (Fisk, 2002).
The Ta’if Accord took form when the Saudi government invited the Lebanese parliament
to Ta’if, Saudi Arabia in 1989. There, on 22 October, parliament members voted to replace the
National Pact with a new power-sharing doctrine known as the Coexistence Pact (Shehadeh,
1999a; Hanf, 1993). However, in early 1990, Michel Aoun, who had rejected the Ta’if Accord,
commanded the Lebanese army against the Christian Lebanese Forces of Samir Geagea. Fighting
dragged on between the two sides in intra-communal warfare until the Vatican brokered a peace
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deal in late May 1990, thus bringing a close to the fifteen year Lebanese civil war (Shehadeh,
1999a).
Scholars such as Fisk and Oren Barak have been critical of the Ta’if Accord. As Barak
notes, although the agreement stipulated for the need to end political sectarianism, it in fact
continued the same confessional power-sharing formula that had always existed in Lebanon,
which essentially enshrines sectarianism (Barak, 2002). Moreover, despite the Ta’if Accord’s
increase in the number of Muslim representatives in parliament as well as the increase in the
executive powers of the prime minister, Fisk criticized the agreement for continuing Shi'a underrepresentation in government (Fisk, 2002; Payne and Salamey, 2008). Additionally, Fisk felt it
was unfair that a Muslim could still never become president or that a Christian could never
become prime minister as confessional requirements remained intact (Fisk, 2002). Yet, Joseph
Maila points out that the Ta’if Accord did limit the powers of the presidency to ensure that this
was no longer an office which would control the government. Instead, the president’s new role
was to ensure that the constitution was properly adhered to and to strengthen Lebanon’s
governing institutions (Maila, 1994). Overall, however, most scholars have found much to be
wanting in the Accord mainly due to its strengthening of sectarianism. Hajjar too has been
critical of the Ta’if Accord but for different reasons, instead viewing the agreement as
inappropriately giving Syria too much influence in Lebanon. Indeed, in 1991, the Lebanese and
Syrian governments signed a treaty which obligated Syrian troops to enter Lebanon for any
perceived security threat, and vice versa (Hajjar, 2009).
Therefore, the Ta’if Accord brought an end to the long civil war which had resulted in the
destruction of Lebanon's economy as well as the downtown area of Beirut. Additionally,
thousands of homes as well as many hospitals, governmental buildings, and even the water and
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electricity supplies were completely destroyed as a result of the fighting (Shehadeh, 1999a).
While the events of Lebanon's civil war can be simplified into three phases, including the initial
two year war from 1975-1976, the two Israeli invasions, and the final events of the late 1980s,
the causes of the war are far more convoluted.
2.5 The Causes of Lebanon's Civil War
Despite Lebanon's small size, it is a vastly complex country composed of disparate
communities of people who have often sought to implement incompatible visions for Lebanon.
Additionally, the political and social institutions within Lebanon are also complicated
(Cummings and Held, 2011). The majority of scholars have suggested that the origins of
Lebanon's civil war's lie in ethno-religious conflict, a confessional system of political rule, in
economic inequalities, the corruption of the political elite, in an influx of Palestinian refugees,
and in external interference.
One of the most obvious causes of the conflict revolves around differing views of
Lebanon's identity, which has already been addressed. During the war, the differing perceptions
of the Christian nationalists and Arab nationalists were striking. For example, although everyone
agreed that the killing of a Christian on April 13, 1975 officially began the civil war, the manner
in which this incident has been described by opposing sides is significant. In Walid Khalidi’s
telling, an unknown individual fired at a Maronite church in the suburb of Ain el-Remmane,
killing one person. This then led to a retaliation killing spree by a Maronite militia who murdered
twenty-eight passengers on a bus, most of whom were Palestinian (Khalidi, 1979). The disparity
between this Palestinian scholar’s rendition and the Christian Lebanese scholar Walid Phares is
noteworthy. According to Phares, four Palestinians murdered a Christian standing in front of a
Maronite church and in retaliation for the murder, militiamen ambushed a bus carrying
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Palestinian Liberation Organization guerrillas (Phares, 1995). Differences over the interpretation
of this event set the tone for the war. For example, Fisk documented in his book Pity the Nation
the various radio stations run by each faction who spun the news to suit their side throughout the
war (Fisk, 2002). The cause of this Christian-Muslim split, however, is often traced to
confessionalism.
In fact, the majority of scholars suggest that it was largely confessionalism which led to
the war. Joseph G. and Nancy W. Jabbra insist that confessionalism allowed Lebanon’s political
elites to further their own interests rather than the interests of their particular communities. The
Jabbras point out that this system also over-empowered Christians by ensuring that for every five
Muslims in government there were six Christians which thus resulted in a consistent Christian
majority. Furthermore, Lebanon's confessional system unfairly guaranteed that the presidency,
the most powerful position in Lebanon, was always filled by a Maronite Christian (Jabbra and
Jabbra, 2001). Michael C. Hudson believes that Lebanon could have withstood the arrival of
Palestinian refugees and even Syria’s subsequent invasion if the Lebanese had been able to
present a united front. He too blames confessionalism for entrenching divisions among the
Lebanese (Hudson, 1997b). Florian Bieber similarly accuses sub-state nationalism due to
confessionalism as ultimately advancing Lebanon’s descent into civil war (Bieber, 2000).
Likewise, Oren Barak blames confessionalism for Lebanon's civil war which he cites as
increasing intra-ethnic conflict. According to Barak, confessionalism led those from the same
ethnic communities to vie with one another to represent the group at the national level. This
intra-communal fighting eventually led to inter-ethnic conflict as political candidates tried to
outbid one another by initially promoting the primacy of their own community over other
communities. Over time, however, this progressed into a practice where politicians advanced
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negative or hateful messages about other religious communities in order to gain voters’ support
(Barak, 2002).
Scholars have also labeled economic or class issues as a contributing cause of the war.
The Jabbras note that economic issues were salient because Christians prospered more so than
Muslims, causing immense friction between the two groups. The Jabbras have also highlighted
the differences in development between rural and urban areas, with the countryside being largely
neglected. It was mainly the Shi'a who lived in rural areas and who were the most economically
disadvantaged (Jabbra and Jabbra, 2001).
Patronage systems have also been attributed as a cause of the war. Crawford Young
argues that the dominant pattern of resource allocation in Lebanon was through patronage
networks (Young, 1976). According to Samir Khalaf, leading political figures gave resources to
their followers in return for political support. This pattern developed from particular feudal
conditions and affected every confession in Lebanon, including Christian, Muslim, and Druze
communities (Khalaf, 1977). As Barak points out, it became paramount for those wishing to
remain in power that they win elections in order to maintain their access to resources. These
resources would allow them to keep their supporters happy which would in turn give them
prestige and honor within their communities (Barak, 2002).
Yet the majority of scholars agree that the Palestinians were a significant cause of the
Lebanese civil war. Fabiola Azar and Etienne Mullet largely attribute the civil war to the
150,000 Palestinian refugees that Lebanon received in the years between 1948 and 1971 (Azar
and Mullet, 2002). The Jabbras discuss how the Palestinian issue divided along confessional
lines with Sunnis, the Shi'a, and the Druze largely allying themselves with the Palestinians while
most of the various Christian groups aligned themselves against the Palestinians (Jabbra and
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Jabbra, 2001). Scholars such as Oussama Safa conclude that had the Palestinians not entered
Lebanon in such large numbers, the confessional system would have survived. He believes that
since most Palestinians were Sunni, their presence upset the religious balance in Lebanon by
numerically over-empowering Muslims (Safa, 2006).
Finally, Lebanon's civil war involved many outside actors which scholars argue
exacerbated the conflict. Marwan Buheiry insists that Lebanon has never experienced an internal
conflict that was not aided by external forces, and concludes that Lebanon's civil war was no
different (Buheiry, 1990). Moreover, Robert Fisk has chronicled both Syria and Israel’s
infamous interventions into Lebanon, including Israel’s proxy militia, the Southern Lebanese
Army (SLA). He has also recounted the presence of the U.S., France, and Italy as well as the
strong Iranian involvement during the war. Fisk concludes that these external interferences
destabilized and exacerbated the situation (Fisk, 2002).
Therefore, scholars have attributed many causes to Lebanon's civil war. Overall,
however, Lebanon’s ethno-religious conflict, its confessional system of political rule, economic
inequalities, patterns of corruption, an influx of Palestinian refugees, and external interference
are all considered major contributors to the civil war. The fifteen years of war were noted for
their brutality, and the citizens and residents of Lebanon suffered greatly. This chapter's focus is
ultimately concerned with Lebanese women's wartime experiences. Women, as a group, is a
demographic which scholars such as Julinda Abu Nassr have noted suffered particularly harshly
during the war (Abu Nassr, 1996). However, to understand the context of women's wartime
experience, an appreciation of Lebanese women's general experiences prior to the war is also
necessary.
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2.6 Women in Lebanese Society
Like women in virtually all societies, Lebanese women have been historically oppressed
by many forms of patriarchy. According to Gerda Lerner, patriarchy is the institutionalization of
male dominance over women and children both within the family as well as in larger society
(Lerner, 1987). In order to understand the context of women's experiences during the war, the
patriarchal parameters of women's lives in Lebanon must be analyzed. Regardless of
confessional affiliation, Lebanese women have had their lives defined by the structure of the
family, a distinct public/private divide, the cultural notion of honor, and finally by the personal
status codes of Lebanese law (Hijab, 1988; Van Dusen, 1976; Shehadeh, 2010; Accad, 1990;
Tucker, 1993).
As Kamal Salibi asserts, despite Christian nationalists’ insistence that they are not Arab,
members of the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and other Lebanese Christian
communities are in fact Arab. Members of these groups have historically spoken Arabic as well
as adhered to Arab customs. As mentioned earlier, it was only with the advent of European
colonialism that any Christians began to argue that they were not Arab (Salibi, 1988). Therefore,
regardless of confessional membership, all Lebanese women have similar experiences, including
the structure of the family. In particular, Nadia Hijab emphasizes that the family has historically
been the most important social structure in Arab societies. Arab families have traditionally been
large but extended families have not necessarily lived together in the same household, although
close connections to aunts, uncles, and cousins have been strong. Family has been the main
social security net for the elderly, the sick, and those facing difficult circumstances. An Arab
man has been expected to provide financially for his wife and their children together, as well as
for any of his female relatives in need. Within the family, the man is seen as the final decision-
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maker and head of the household, but the woman of the house, in most cases the wife, runs the
day-to-day business of the household. Moreover, within the family, women have been expected
to provide informal religious and cultural education to the next generation (Hijab, 1988).
Additionally, Roxann A. Van Dusen asserts that Lebanese women, like most women in the Arab
world, have traditionally been considered the legal and social charges of either their fathers or
their husbands (Van Dusen, 1976).
However, Judith E. Tucker, cautions that the Arab family cannot be viewed as an
ahistoric structure. She defines the family in Arab societies as consisting of specific economic,
social, and political considerations that have fluctuated throughout history. For example, Tucker
notes that socioeconomic status has played a role in defining the structure of the family. Among
elites, Arab women have had fewer rights than those women from less economically advantaged
families as far as being able to choose one’s husband or requesting divorce. Tucker also warns
that while the family has often limited women’s choices in both upper and lower class contexts,
Arab women cannot be viewed simply as victims of the family structure since families have also
provided emotional and financial support to women (Tucker, 1993).
A second defining aspect of women's lives in Lebanon is the public/private divide which
runs along gender lines. Men have historically been regarded as the public actors of the labor
force and political arena while the private sphere of the home is considered women's domain.
However, Van Dusen points out that there is a distinction between urban and rural settings within
Lebanon. In rural locations, women conventionally have not been as secluded from public life as
their female city-dwelling counterparts. This is due to the fact that rural women's labor has been
necessary for agricultural production (Van Dusen, 1976). Furthermore, even in urban settings,
women from families of lower socioeconomic status have had greater access to the public
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sphere. In fact, as Tucker points out, the very perpetuation of female seclusion as practiced
mainly by upper class Arab families depended on the work of female seamstresses and
entertainers who attended to secluded women (Tucker, 1993).
Nevertheless, Charles W. Churchill points out that while some Lebanese women have
had greater access to public spaces, these women have not necessarily had that many more
freedoms than women who remained confined to the home. He describes both Muslim and
Christian women in rural Lebanon as having to perform several hours of planting, digging, or
harvesting each day, on top of their responsibilities of managing the home (Churchill, 1968).
Additionally, as Malek Hassan Abisaab notes, even as late as 1970, Lebanese women involved in
agricultural work labored mainly on their families’ farms, either for their parents or for their
husbands, and thus did not earn a wage. Certainly some wage-earning women existed in the
agricultural sector, but even so, their earnings went mainly to supporting their families (Abisaab,
2001). This was also the case for women involved in the industrial sectors as well as for those
women who worked as domestics in the homes of the elites (Abisaab, 2001; Jureidini, 2009).
Finally, Nadia Haggag Youssef points out that Lebanese factory women were traditionally
stigmatized on a social level for working in such close proximity to men (Youssef, 1976).
This last point, that working alongside men can harm a woman’s reputation, indicates
another way in which women's lives in Lebanon have been shaped, which is by codes of honor.
Hijab notes that the family has historically defined one's status in Arab society thus explaining
why family honor has been of the utmost importance (Hijab, 1988). Evelyne Accad states that
sharaf, or honor, is a code of the Arab tribes, and is essentially tied to a young girl's virginity
(Accad, 1990). Honor is a state which can be lost, and once lost it is seen by society as bringing
shame on that person and their entire family. As Pernilla Ouis observes, actions such as
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promiscuity or any sort of behavior that is viewed by society as “loose” can cause a girl or
woman to lose her honor. This honor is considered to be saved only if the actions are not
discovered by those outside the family, or if they have been made public, then honor is seen to be
restored through certain processes. This restoration in extreme cases results in so-called honor
killings, but other forms of violence, as well as social exclusion and/or confinement to the home
are more common and also regarded as restoring family honor (Ouis, 2009).
Specifically, Amir H. Jafri notes that although honor killings are often associated with
Islam, the practice has also existed historically in non-Muslim societies. He indicates that the
notions of honor which lead to the killings are a part of tribal cultures. Most importantly, Jafri
emphasizes that honor killings are not an Islamic ritual (Jafri, 2008). For example, Robert Fisk
observes that, per capita, the Jordanian Christian community is responsible for more honor
killings than the Jordanian Muslim population (Fisk, 2010). Jafri explains that honor killings are
common in tribal societies regardless of religious factors (Jafri, 2008). In Lebanon, statistics are
difficult to come by, but according to Kim Gattas, an estimated one Lebanese woman per month
is murdered in an honor killing (Gattas, 2001). Researchers at the U.S. Department of State
estimate that it is more likely that there are two to three Lebanese women killed each month in
honor killings (“Lebanon: Country Reports on Human,” 2003). There is no breakdown by
confession available, but it appears that every Lebanese woman is affected by honor killings
regardless of religious affiliation. Lebanese Christian sects are often portrayed as more open and
Western-oriented than Muslim and Druze sects (Phares, 1995). However, single mothers in
Lebanese Christian communities are at a high risk of becoming victims of honor crimes,
including honor killings (“Lebanon: Risks for Single Christian,” 2004). In all, honor killings
have traditionally defined Lebanese women’s lives regardless of their confessional background.
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Lastly, Lebanese women's lives have been defined by the personal status codes. While
there are national laws which cover penal code, labor law, citizenship, and contract obligations,
any laws concerning individual status such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance,
are decided at a confessional level by religious authorities (Shehadeh, 2010; Accad, 1990). As
Lamia Rustum Shehadeh notes, because personal status codes vary by religious community,
Lebanese women are held at varying standards regarding their rights (Shehadeh, 2010).
According to Evelyne Accad, the personal status codes attempt to control women and keep them
exclusively for the men of their communities. For example, if two Lebanese citizens of differing
confessions wished to marry, there is no civil marriage within Lebanon, which means that one or
the other would have to convert to another religion. In practice this has contributed to people
generally not marrying outside of their confessional community (Accad, 1990).
In conclusion, patriarchy is present in all societies at some level. Mirna Lattouf asserts
that Lebanese women of all religious and socioeconomic backgrounds share much in common
(Lattouf, 2004). Overall, Lebanese women have felt the presence of patriarchy most strongly in
the structure of the family, a distinct public/private divide, the cultural notion of honor, and the
personal status codes of Lebanese law. These institutions generally affected how Lebanese
women experienced their lives during the civil war, and knowledge of these four institutions will
aid in understanding women's groups’ activism.
2.7 Lebanese Women's Experiences during the War Years
Women’s wartime experiences during the Lebanese civil conflict were diverse. However,
Julinda Abu Nassr maintains that in general, women suffered psychologically, economically,
politically, and socially as a result of the war (Abu Nassr, 1996). Obviously, regardless of
gender, sect, or ethnicity, anyone living in Lebanon during the war suffered tremendously.
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According to Edgar O’Ballance, all Christian and Muslim militias targeted civilians of opposing
religions and each confessional group suffered massacres at the hands of other militias.
Undoubtedly, the Palestinians, a group largely not discussed here due to the narrow topic of this
thesis, suffered the most of any group as they bore the brunt of Israeli raids, bombardments, and
massacres. However, the Shi’a also experienced tremendous suffering at the hands of the Israelis
in a protracted occupation and in constant Israeli attacks. And while Christians in East Beirut
experienced some heavy bombing at the hands of the Syrians, it was West Beirut, with its
majority of Muslims, which was targeted by Israel with more frequent bombardments
(O’Ballance, 1998).
Overall, as in any wartime situation, daily living conditions were harsh on all Lebanese
citizens. However, Abu Nasser insists conditions were especially difficult for women (Abu
Nassr, 1996). Women’s direct involvement in war activities will be discussed in another section.
This section will highlight women’s responsibilities for the day-to-day survival of the family
during the war which resulted in women's increased visibility in the labor force, in higher
education, and in utilizing women's rights.
Abu Nassr calls women the “basic managers” of Lebanese domestic and family affairs
(Abu Nassr, 1996). Regardless of women’s confessional affiliation or socioeconomic position,
Lebanese society views it as women’s responsibility to manage the private sphere of the home
(Hijab, 1988; Lattouf, 2004). Therefore, according to Jean Said Makdisi, it fell mainly on women
to obtain the daily necessities of candles, blankets, food, and water which were scarce throughout
the war years (Makdisi, 1997). Maha Samara describes women as risking their lives to run out in
lulls of fighting to the bakery, well, and supermarket to gather supplies (Samara, 1987a). Sending
children to school was another daily difficulty. In fact, schools across the nation had shut down
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after the initial fighting in April 1975. However, as the result of the efforts of female teachers,
schools stayed open after November 1975 which enabled children to continue their education
(Abu Nassr, 1996). Makdisi also describes women as providing emotional, psychological, and
physical comfort to their families during the war (Makdisi, 1997). In fact, women were burdened
by much care-taking. For example, it was women's responsibility to care for those who suffered
from disabilities and injuries as result of the war, along with the elderly and sick, and of course
their own children (Osseiran, 1995; Samara, 1987a). Additionally, many women also
experienced dislocation from their homes as internally displaced persons (IDPs) which only
added to their daily suffering (Ghanem and Makhoul, 2009).
Several major changes for women manifested as a result of the war, and were mainly due
to the daily challenges women faced as described above. According to Ilham Kallab, many
Lebanese women became defacto heads of household and breadwinners. Men were killed a result
of the fighting, but large numbers of men also emigrated overseas to find work in order to
support their families. This left women in charge and led to an increased female presence in the
labor force1 (“Ilham Kallab: Women and War,” 1984). In fact, even when men were with their
families, women often still sought work due to financial difficulties. According to Abu Nassr,
inflation in Lebanon was at 300 percent in the mid-1980s, and by 1992 it was at 1000 percent.
The urban cities saw a dramatic increase in the female work force as women sought jobs out of
dire economic need (Abu Nassr, 1996). Women worked chiefly as teachers, clerks, secretaries,
telephone operators, hospital orderlies, factory workers, and sales associates. As Samara
emphasizes, many women were entering the field of paid labor for the first time. Although

1

No mention in the available literature was found concerning the subject of elderly men who, presumably, were not
fighting in the war.
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women often worked menial jobs, the income which they earned supported their families
(Samara, 1987a).
Although neither Ilham Kallab nor Julinda Abu Nassr qualify in their above arguments
that it was in fact middle and upper class women who were turning to paid work for the first
time, this can be inferred from the research done by Malek Hassan Abisaab. According to
Abisaab, socioeconomically disadvantaged Lebanese women had been working for wages for
decades. He chronicles the course of female laborers in Lebanon who began working in the silk
industry in the mid nineteenth century through women’s later involvement in the tobacco
industry beginning in the early twentieth century. In fact, many women continued to work in the
tobacco industry throughout the civil war period. Working class Maronite, Shi’a, and Druze
women were involved in both the earlier silk industry as well as in tobacco production where
they mainly labored in factories but at times in the fields. Certainly for economically
disadvantaged Lebanese women, working outside of the home was not a development of the war
(Abisaab, 2001).
A second major change as a result of the war was an increase in women's education.
Samara notes that numerous women went to night school to learn secretarial, computer, and
advertising skills in order to qualify for desperately needed jobs (Samara, 1987a). Abu Nassr
observes that in rural villages young women who reached the age of marriage often had no viable
suitors as most men were either fighting or had been killed. As a consequence of this, many
women who otherwise would have ended their schooling to become stay-at-home wives and
mothers instead pursued their education (Abu Nassr, 1996). According to Aisha Harb Zureik,
education was seen as a way to obtain economic security since many parents feared that their
daughters would be unable to marry and would likely have to support themselves (“The Effects
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of the War on University,” 1991). Additionally, Valentine M. Moghadam emphasizes that the
war created a new interest in female university education. She believes that the economic crisis
caused by the war made parents of girls view a university education as a good investment.
Parents saw that such an education could help their daughter to attract a more financially well-off
husband and additionally viewed a college degree as a safety net should their daughter be unable
to marry, or become divorced or widowed (Moghadam, 2003).
Nevertheless, Samih Boustani and Nada Mufarrej reveal that most Lebanese women who
obtained a university education during the civil war studied mainly conventional feminine
disciplines, such as the arts. According to Boustani and Mufarrej, jobs traditionally available to
Lebanese women with a secondary education were limited to secretary and elementary school
teacher, both of which were low paying. However, during the war, even highly educated women
studied lower-paying fields such as nursing, midwifery, teaching, and social work. Nonetheless,
between 1975 and 1990, the percentage of women with a college degree who worked tripled
from 3.3 percent to 9.3 percent (Boustani and Mufarrej, 1995). Overall, Lebanese women went
from comprising 20.45 percent of the total working population in 1975, to composing 27.80
percent of the working population in 1990 (“World Demographic Estimates and Projections,”
1988). According to Mona Khalaf, official statistics reveal that most of the female population
worked in Beirut, with more than half of the female labor force concentrated in mid-level
positions in the public and service sectors. However, Khalaf cautions that much of the female
labor force from this time period has been underestimated as the agricultural work performed by
women for their families was largely unaccounted for. Finally, Khalaf stresses, as previously
noted, that it was economic need which pushed most women into the labor force during the war
(Khalaf, 1993).
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However, despite the increase in women’s education and women in the labor force, the
literature concerning women’s rights during and after the war reveals that Lebanese women
largely did not make long-term gains in equality as a result of the war. Nonetheless, Kirsten
Schulze maintains that women’s opportunities did open up during the war even if only
temporarily (Schulze, 1998). Makdisi echoes this sentiment by agreeing that although women
gained independence during the war as they navigated the many crises created by the fighting on
their own, this independence ultimately did not translate into new rights after the war. Makdisi
asserts that since women were never a part of the power structures of the various militias that ran
Lebanon during the war, new rights could not be secured. Therefore, initially, the war did cause
most Lebanese women to take on new roles in which they shouldered greater responsibility, thus
increasing their self-confidence and independence. However, daily survival took precedence to
demands for equality, which Makdisi argues were largely suspended during the war (Sabbagh,
1996). Hala Maksoud asserts that this narrative continued after the war. According to Maksoud,
there was so much destruction as a result of the fighting that women were preoccupied with
repairing their lives and had little time to focus on issues of gender equality (Maksoud, 1996).
Yet there have been scholars such as Abu Nassr who has pointed out that the civil war
did produce some favorable results for women such as the already noted increased enrollment in
education at all levels and an upsurge in the female work force (Abu Nassr, 1996). Additionally,
Samara argues that the war allowed many women to prove to themselves that they could
overcome hardships as well as work outside the home (Samara, 1987a). Nevertheless, a UNICEF
report confirms that Lebanese women were still left out of political leadership roles and in highlevel political decision-making even five years after the civil war (“The Situation of Children and
Women,” 1995).
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Overall, the civil war led to increased female visibility in the labor force, in higher
education, and in women's rights. These positive results of the war must be tempered with the
more negative aspects of war. Even though many women took on new responsibilities which
allowed them to grow, the war also wrought violence on women’s lives.
2.8 Wartime Violence against Lebanese Women
During the war years, Lebanese women both witnessed and experienced profound
episodes of violence. According to Nelda LaTeef, approximately 150,000 people were killed as a
result of the war, while about 425,000 were wounded. LaTeef also asserts that an estimated
875,000 Lebanese left the country to become refugees in order to avoid the fighting (LaTeef,
1997). Another nearly 1,000,000 became internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Lebanon,
mainly in Beirut, in an attempt to flee the fighting in their villages or towns (LaTeef, 1997;
Ghanem and Makhoul, 2009). The prominent themes which surround wartime gendered violence
in Lebanon include a denial of female rape victims, evidence to suggest that there were indeed
women raped, and finally, the fact that there was a great deal of general wartime violence which
women experienced.
It is unknown how the above statistics on those killed and wounded during the war break
down along gender lines. In fact, as scholars such as Lamia Rustum Shehadeh emphasize, there
are no official records of those killed or injured as a result of the war, making it unclear exactly
how many suffered (Shehadeh, 1999a). However, according to Laure Moghaizel, in a war where
kidnappings by militia fighters for ransom were commonplace, female kidnapping victims were
a rarity (Osseiran, 1995). More importantly, Adnan Houbballah contends that women were
seldom rape victims. According to Houballah, the various militias of Lebanon made a tacit pact
with one another to refrain from targeting women (Sfeir, 2003). It is striking to note how rarely
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rape is mentioned in the majority of literature concerning Lebanese women’s wartime
experiences. Even in the volume Women and War in Lebanon edited by Lamia Rustum
Shehadeh, one of the most comprehensive collections on the subject, rape is never once
addressed (Shehadeh, 1999a).
Moghaziel suggests that the main reason that women were seen off limits was due to their
status as harim, by which she means “protected” or “forbidden” (Osseiran, 1995: 16). As Sheila
K. Webster notes, when an Arabic speaker uses the term harim, he or she may be referring to the
portion of the home which is reserved for women only, the house itself, or the female members
of a family. Webster asserts that Arab societies have historically viewed women, embodied as
either wife or mother, as a man’s refuge from the outside world in much the same way that a
home serves as a haven from the public sphere (Webster, 1984). Thus, Moghaizel believes that
women were largely seen as off-limits to the fighters because they embodied this traditional
concept of a man’s sanctuary. Moghaizel has also proposed that Lebanese females were not
targeted due to the issues surrounding women and honor (Osseiran, 1995). As previously noted,
family honor in Lebanon is tied to an unmarried woman’s virginity as well as to the fidelity of
married women (Accad, 1990; Ouis, 2009). Jean Said Makdisi views this association of women
with honor as bestowing a special status on females which she argues helped to protect women
from rape during the war (Makdisi, 1997).
Nonetheless, Makdisi also admits that throughout the war, rumors of women being raped
by militiamen abounded. She notes that the rape of a man’s female relative would be considered
the ultimate humiliation to him as it would reveal his inability to protect “his” women (Makdisi,
1997). Cynthia Enloe points out that when a man fails to defend “his” women from being raped
by men of other ethnic or religious communities, it often causes him to feel intensely
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emasculated (Enloe, 2000a). Additionally, within the context of Lebanon, a man who failed to
protect his female relatives from rape would be considered by the larger society to have lost his
family honor (Accad, 1990). All of this together would likely have provided ample motivation
for militia fighters to target women from other sects. Incidentally, Samantha Wehbi’s research
also suggests that Lebanese women are hesitant to report rape. In a society where rape can result
in honor killings or loss of reputation, it would make sense that many rapes, if not most, would
go unreported (Wehbi, 2002). Finally, there is an extensive scholarly literature which links the
general concepts of rape and war (Enloe, 2000b; Farwell, 2004; Zurbriggen, 2010). Based on this
combined evidence, it is probable that rape was not unheard of during Lebanon’s civil war.
The last major point in women’s experience with wartime violence acknowledges the
extremity of the fighting. In general, the violence which gripped Lebanon over the course of the
war resulted in hundreds of kidnappings and massacres. According to Lamia Rustum Shehadeh,
after 1982, car bombings and the use of explosives also became commonplace. Car bombings
were noted for killing far more innocents than intended targets. Shehadeh observes that women
expressly suffered the most in the explosions that militias set off, as such explosions were
usually detonated near supermarkets and timed to explode when the markets would be the
busiest. Since it was mainly women who did the shopping, women were the most likely to die or
become injured in these blasts (Shehadeh, 1999a). Finally, Beiruti women in particular saw an
incredible amount of street fighting, usually involving extensive machine gun battles, between
various militias. Females living in Beirut also experienced long periods of bombardment,
especially at the hands of the Israeli military (Bryce, Ghorayeb, Kanj, and Walker, 1988).
In conclusion, gendered wartime violence during Lebanon’s civil war was defined by
denial of female rape victims, convincing signs that women were in fact likely raped, and finally
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by the general violence of war which affected women. Wartime violence caused profound
hardships for women in which suffering occurred at many levels (Abu Nassr, 1996). Women
dealt with these hardships in varying ways.
2.9 Lebanese Women's Coping Mechanisms
A study by Elie G. Karam, Sabah Saliba, and Rima Al Atrash confirms that women
experienced tremendous psychological suffering due to the war, and that they were one-and-ahalf times more likely to be clinically depressed than their male counterparts. Although both men
and women experienced depression, insomnia, changes in appetite, fatigue, the inability to
concentrate, feelings of worthlessness and guilt, and/or Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
as a result of the war, women often experienced different symptoms than men (Al Atrash,
Karam, and Saliba, 1993). For example, Leila Farhood reveals that women were more likely than
men to endure headaches, dizziness, nausea, shortness of breath, loss of appetite, and weight
loss. Additionally, more women experienced increased instances of crying, a greater loss of
interest and pleasure, and more feelings of sadness and loneliness than did most men. Women
also had more difficulties concentrating and making decisions than did the majority of men
(Farhood, 1999). Women primarily dealt with these psychological issues in three ways: by
writing, by using drugs, and by finding solace in religion (Accad, 1990; Cooke, 1988; Sfeir,
2003; Chami et al, 1999; Holt, 1999).
Scholars Evelyne Accad and Miriam Cooke have documented the prolific literature
published by Lebanese female novelists during the war. Accad claims that writing became a
healing process for many women, such as the renowned novelists Hanan al-Shaykh and Etel
Adnan. Accad believes that women wrote mainly as a way to deal with the trauma of war
(Accad, 1990). According to Cooke, the war allowed women to break out of their silence
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(Cooke, 1988). This is disputed by Hala Maksoud who maintains that many Lebanese women
were writing and organizing prior to the war (Maksoud, 1996). Ultimately, Samara concludes
that prior to the war, female writers focused on issues of gender emancipation but that during the
war, they turned to issues of suffering among the larger population (Samara, 1987b).
Additionally, many women wrote memoirs about their wartime experiences including Jean Said
Makdisi's Beirut Fragments: A War Memoir and Soha Bechara's Resistance: My Life for
Lebanon. However, as Mona Takieddine Amyuni observes, it was not only principally middle
class and upper class women who wrote about their war experiences, but it was also mainly
urban women, located almost exclusively in Beirut (Amyuni, 1993).
A second way in which some Lebanese women dealt with the war was through the use of
tranquilizers and other drugs. According to Adnan Houbballah, women's consumption of
tranquilizers, alcohol, sleeping pills, and antidepressant pills can be attributed to their desire to
find calm within the stress and turmoil of war (Sfeir, 2003). Subsequent research in the postwar
period has revealed that the number of female drug users during the war was much higher than
originally suspected. Nevertheless, men were more likely than their female counterparts to use
illicit drugs, as women mainly used tranquilizers and barbiturates. During the war, tranquilizers
were available without prescription, giving women easy access to them (Chami et al., 1999).
Lastly, another coping mechanism utilized by Lebanese women was turning to their
religion as a refuge. Houbballah noted that women who had never veiled before began to do so
during the war. He attributes this use of the hijab as both a way of deflecting possible rape as
well as a way for women to find solace in their religion. For example, many who had never
before covered would do so if a family member was killed as a result of the fighting (Sfeir,
2003). Maria Holt attributes the larger numbers of women choosing modest dress to a surge in
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religious faith. Her research chronicles the rise of religious fervor among Shi'a women. As
previously noted, Amal and Hizballah were popular movements among the Shi'a during the war
years, and inspired significant religious activism. Shi'a women enthusiastically embraced forms
of dress, behavior, and attitudes that conformed to strict interpretations of the Qur'an (Holt,
1999).
However, these rigid religious interpretations did not prohibit women’s activism. For
example, in Bouthaina Shaaban’s research, she discovered that many Shi’a women believed that
it was their religious duty to engage in activities outside of the home. To be true Muslim women,
they believed that they had the responsibility to care not only for their own families but also for
other members of Lebanese society. To complete their activities, many Shi’a women even
depended on their husbands to shoulder some of the cooking and child care. Nevertheless, these
women followed strict religious guidelines which prohibited mixing with the opposite sex and
also required them to cover their bodies so that only their faces, hands, and feet were visible
(Shaaban, 1988). Maria Holt surmises that the Lebanese Shia sought order and safety in strict
interpretation of religion as the war turned their lives into chaos (Holt, 1999).
Overall, the civil war caused unimaginable pain, stress, and trauma on all residents and
citizens of Lebanon. Women primarily dealt with these issues through writing, the use of drugs,
and in religion. These coping mechanisms often influenced the kind of roles women took on
during the war years.
2.10 Lebanese Women's Roles in the War
As previously alluded to, during the fifteen year war, most women fulfilled duties as
wives and mothers. The tasks accomplished by wives and mothers focused on providing for the
emotional, physical, and economic needs of their families. In addition to these roles, many
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Lebanese women also engaged in combat, served in logistical and other supporting positions in
militias and armies, and/or took part in humanitarian endeavors.
Although a wide segment of the literature maintains that Lebanese women did not serve
in combat roles and advocated only non-violence, there were in fact a small number of women
who did serve in militias (Al Atrash et al., 1993). According to Darine Al-Omari, regardless of
confessional or political association, women faced similar obstacles and shared similar goals as
militia personnel. For many women, the choice to fight was not only a way to preserve one's
community or to advance a political cause, but also allowed them to rebel against traditionally
prescribed female roles. Yet most parents did not want their daughters to serve in militias as it
created suspicion about them in the larger society. Rumors often circulated about young
militiawomen's sexual impurity, and militiawomen faced additional criticism for not adhering to
traditional gender roles (Al-Omari, 2003).
According to Lamia Rustum Shehadeh, more Christian women served as combatants than
any other religious group as they were already largely involved in activities outside of the home.
Most females found themselves in artillery and infantry positions as heavy weaponry was
reserved for male usage only. Moreover, those women who did fight still often found themselves
performing most of the sewing, cooking, and cleaning tasks. Shehadeh observes that most female
fighters, regardless of confession, saw their work as temporary and essentially “defensive.”
Additionally, Shehadeh emphasizes that no Lebanese militias ever encouraged women's rights or
pushed for equality between the sexes (Shehadeh, 1999c).
Another function which many women fulfilled during the war years came in providing
services of support to various militias. Women would often prepare food, sew sheets, knit
sweaters, and give first aid to fighters (Shehadeh, 1999c). Maria Holt reports that female non-
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combatants would also aid militias by hiding weapons on their person and smuggling these arms
across checkpoints to fighters (Holt, 1999). Some women have even admitted to concealing
militia fighters’ weapons in their vegetable gardens (Karamé, 1999). Additionally, among the
Shi’a, women frequently gathered in groups on hilltops and the balconies of buildings to supply
male fighters with intelligence on Israeli troops’ locations. There were also times when Shi’a
women would help militiamen escape from Israeli forces by setting tires afire in order to block
streets and thus prevent the Israelis from following Shi’a fighters. Moreover, some women
encouraged their husbands and sons to fight (Holt, 1999). As a final point, Kari H. Karamé
argues that many women, such as East Beirut's famous Maman Aida, in addition to housing
combatants, gave emotional and moral support to many fighters (Karamé, 1999).
The last area in which women were often involved during the war was in humanitarian
endeavors. Julinda Abu Nassr describes women as especially involved in basic medical first aid
to civilians. Women across Lebanon volunteered their time in the Young Women's Christian
Association (YWCA), the Red Cross, the Family Planning Association, the Child Welfare
Association, Catholic Relief Services, the Near East School of Theology, Terre des Hommes,
and the United Nations Development Program (Abu Nassr, 1996; Accad, 1989). Additionally,
many women gathered food, blankets, clothes, and medicines which they would donate to
refugee and displaced families (Abu Nassr, 1996). Rima Zankoul notes that women comprised
the majority of the staff at the Lebanese Red Cross, even at higher levels of administration. This
was due to the fact that its staff was composed primarily of volunteers, and women were
generally those most able to volunteer their time as men were expected to provide financially for
their families (Zankoul, 1991).
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While women's primary roles were emphasized as being wives and mothers, women
nevertheless fulfilled other functions during the civil war. Lebanese women engaged in combat,
served in logistical and other supporting roles in militias and armies, and/or took part in
humanitarian endeavors. Yet one of the most overlooked roles of women during the war was
their involvement in women's groups’ activism.
2.11 History of Women’s Activism in Lebanon
As noted above, there is a long history of women's groups' activism in Lebanon. Women
of all confessions have been organizing around anti-colonial, nationalist, and/or women's rights
movements since at least the time of Ottoman rule (Maksoud, 1996). It is important to
understand that the activism performed by women during the civil war was not without
precedence as scholars such as Miriam Cooke have implied (Cooke, 1988). In general, women's
groups' activism in Lebanon has been noted for its female-oriented magazines, the promotion of
women's access to public life through charity work, women’s labor organizing, and finally by the
advent of the Lebanese Women's Council.
The first major avenue of activism pursued by Lebanese women was in the form of
female-focused magazines. Bouthaina Shaaban has documented two journals founded in 1912
and 1914 respectively, by Lebanese women which focused on women's rights. According to
Shaaban, these magazines called upon its readers to learn from Western women's experiences in
fighting for rights while at the same time maintaining the positive attributes of Arab culture
(Shaaban, 1993). Elizabeth Thompson notes that after World War I, Lebanese women continued
to establish magazines focused on the suffrage movement, and which also highlighted
indigenous female Arab role models from both the pre-Islamic and early Islamic eras
(Thompson, 2000). However, Malek Hassan Abisaab emphasizes that women’s magazines
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served a literate female elite and thus dealt with issues which pertained exclusively to upper and
middle class women. Additionally, he points out that the majority of women’s magazines were
begun by and catered to Christians, although many Muslim and Druze women did contribute
articles to Christian journals (Abisaab, 2001). According to Shaaban, overall, these women’s
magazines urged women to “fight for their rights” (Shaaban, 1993: 76). The focus was indeed
political, and no other demand revealed that more so than the advocating for female suffrage
which was a major emphasis of the female-focused magazines of this time period around World
War I (Thompson, 2000).
Throughout 1920s Lebanon, there were various protests against the wearing of the veil. A
young, educated Muslim woman named Nazira Zayn al-Din published a book in 1928 called
Unveiling and Veiling in which she described the face veil as against the spirit of Islam, which
she believed promoted basic equality between the sexes. Another important moment in Lebanese
women's activism occurred in 1928 when the Lebanese Women's Union held its first major
conference (Thompson, 2000). According to Rita Stephan, the Lebanese Women's Union began
in 1920 and united both Arab nationalists and leftist parties, and thus was composed of mainly
Muslim women (Stephan, 2010). Although members of the Lebanese Women’s Union had
initially advocated for female suffrage, by 1928 their platform focused largely on social issues
such as increasing the minimum age of marriage to seventeen, ending polygamy, guaranteeing
women equal inheritance rights, and obtaining greater power for women to initiate divorce
(Thompson, 2000).
This change in demands was the result of a strategy based on a concept Thompson calls
“patriotic motherhood” which sought to promote women's involvement in the public arena
without being controversial. From this point on, women's activism shifted toward demanding
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civil and social rights that would allow women to perform charity work in order to become better
mothers. Charity work was proclaimed a patriotic service to the nation which would allow
women to prove their loyalty to Lebanon (Thompson, 2000). According to Haneefa al-Khatib,
since the early 1800s, Lebanese women had been active in charity organizing (al-Khatib, 1984;
Hijab, 1988). Nadia Hijab maintains that although it had not always been overtly political in
nature, being involved in charity programs certainly increased women's presence in the public
eye (Hijab, 1988). Stephan maintains that charity work allowed women an avenue into public life
that did not violate social norms since it reflected women's traditional caring role. Ultimately,
however, Stephan argues that the push for charity work was a feminist act since it focused on
expanding women’s role into the public sphere (Stephan, 2010).
Although Rita Stephan, Haneefa al-Khatib, Nadia Hijab, and Elizabeth Thompson do not
specifically address the issue of class or education in their analyses, Maleek Hassan Abisaab
notes that the push for charity organizing was promoted by elite Lebanese women who have
historically been the most outspoken of Lebanese female activists. Abisaab explains that elite
women lived in financial comfort, and that in addition to pushing for charity work, such women
also focused on gaining access to education. These were issues that economically disadvantaged
women had little time to consider as they barely made enough to eke out a living. Abisaab argues
that elite women lacked a clear understanding of the lives of the less financially well-off.
Essentially, two forms of female activism arose, with elite women seeking avenues which would
increase their authority within the home while economically disadvantaged women sought to
elevate their status in the work place (Abisaab, 2001).
In fact, according to Abissab, working class women specifically sought increased
bargaining power within the work place in order to gain access to better wages. Indeed, working
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women often had difficulties even preserving their jobs. Many industries practiced temporary
hiring measures in which women would be hired for a few months, only to be let go. This
allowed employers more control of their female workforce as the women were constantly new
and thus more vulnerable. Women became involved in several labor strikes which began taking
place after 1945. During such strikes, some women were central leaders in the movements.
Female laborers, both Muslim and Christian, focused particularly on the issues of equal pay for
equal work and job permanency. During the labor protests which occurred from 1946-1967,
many women were killed or permanently injured by the police sent to break the strikes up.
Working women’s greatest achievement came in 1967 when they gained the right to equal pay
for equal work and were finally awarded the minimum wage that their male counterparts had
always received (Abisaab, 2001).
Overall, Abisaab’s research indicates that issues of class have historically divided
Lebanese women significantly more so than religious issues. Socioeconomically disadvantaged
women often united across sectarian divides to work together on issues that would increase their
bargaining power within the workplace while, as mentioned above, elite women largely ignored
the plight of lower class women who regularly faced challenges in feeding and sheltering
themselves and their families. In general, class differences explain more about the divides in the
Lebanese women’s movement than do sectarian considerations (Abisaab, 2001).
Finally, another major phase of Lebanese women's activism prior to the civil war
occurred in the 1950s. In 1952, seven activists formed a committee composed of members from
the Lebanese Women's Union and the only other major women's organization, the Christian
Women Solidarity Association, which sought to unite both Muslim and Christian elite female
activists. The committee members created a permanent joint organization called the Lebanese

58

Women's Council which was an umbrella group for the country's women's organizations. Once
formed, the members of the Lebanese Women's Council pressured the government until
universal women's suffrage was declared in 1953. Additionally, the Lebanese Women's Council
achieved other successes through its members' activism, including the right of Lebanese women
to travel without their husband's written consent (Stephan, 2010). It can be inferred that these
issues largely concerned an upper class female constituency, especially since a majority of their
efforts related to charity work (Shehadeh, 1999b). As previously noted, working class women
put their energy mainly into organizing for labor rights (Abisaab, 2001).
Lamia Rustum Shehadeh contends that while the Lebanese Women’s Council came to
represent hundreds of women’s groups throughout the country and included as members of its
organization women of multifarious religious backgrounds, the Lebanese Women’s Council was
nevertheless not feminist and did not contribute to a national women’s movement. After
acquiring female suffrage for Lebanese women, the membership of the Lebanese Women’s
Council turned to social matters such as public relations efforts, holding receptions, and focusing
on the transference of cooking, sewing, and knitting skills to women. According to Shehadeh,
there was an insignificant amount of organizing done by members of the Lebanese Women’s
Council to improve women’s lower status. Furthermore, Shehadeh maintains that there has
historically been no functioning national women’s movement in Lebanon (Shehadeh, 1999b).
However, there are many scholars who disagree with Lamia Rustum Shehadeh’s
assessment that Lebanon does not have a history of women’s organizing. Rita Stephan counters
that Lebanon has indeed had a vibrant women’s movement with deep roots. In fact, she
contradicts Shehadeh’s argument that the Lebanese Women’s Council was simply about charity
work. According to Stephan, the formation of the Lebanese Women’s Council was the start of a
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shift from charity work to political activism in Lebanon’s women movement (Stephan, 2010).
Similarly, Bouthaina Shaaban insists that feminism in Lebanon can be traced back to 1912 when
women’s magazines promoting suffrage and other rights for women began being produced
(Shaaban, 1993).
Amrita Basu distinguishes between women’s movements and feminist movements on the
basis that the former encompass any social movement that is organized and performed by women
and which tackles any number of goals, while the latter includes movements in which those
participating work specifically to end gender inequality (Basu, 2010). This analysis closely
echoes Maxine Molyneux’s gender typology of practical gender interests and strategic gender
interests. This typology is used to assess whether the activism undertaken by women’s groups
addresses women’s immediate needs or whether such activism directly challenges patriarchy.
Molyneux views practical gender interests as addressing women's urgent needs in way that
female emancipation or gender equality is not necessarily required, whereas strategic gender
interests seek to alleviate women’s subordinate status (Molyneux, 1985). Basu’s distinction
between women’s movements and feminist movements embraces this same line of thinking as
she notes that certain actions which challenge gender inequality are what distinguish feminist
movements from general women’s movements (Basu, 2010).
Based on Basu’s definition, Lebanon has indeed had a women’s movement as evidenced
by the female-oriented magazines from the period around World War I, the promotion of
women's access to public life through charity work beginning in the 1800s, women’s labor
organizing which started in 1945, and the advent of the Lebanese Women's Council in 1952
(Shaaban, 1993; Abisaab, 2001; al-Khatib, 1984; Hijab, 1988; Stephan, 2010). It is obvious that
there were many organizing women involved in these various stages of Lebanese history.
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Arguably, the women’s magazines from the period around World War I do qualify as seeking to
promote women’s strategic gender interests since these magazine authors sought to promote
women’s suffrage (Shaaban, 1993; Thompson, 2010).
However, once activists adopted the tactic of “patriotic motherhood” which sought to
increase women’s involvement in the public sphere through charity work, practical gender
interests took the forefront as they turned increasingly to social issues. Nevertheless, gaining
access to the public sphere certainly did challenge gender inequality, although, as Elizabeth
Thompson points out, women’s groups were no longer calling for female suffrage by the late
1920s (Thompson, 2000). Additionally, the labor organizing performed by working class women
also promoted practical gender interests as these women sought improvement in their daily lives
in the workplace (Abisaab, 2001). Finally, as Lamia Rustum Shehadeh contends, while members
of the Lebanese Women’s Council did pressure the government into granting female suffrage
along with other achievements, overall, the focus was on practical gender interests since the
Council’s activism did not extensively focus on ending gender inequality (Shehadeh, 1999b;
Stephan, 2010). Therefore, while Lebanon does boast a women’s movement with deep roots, it
has not, however, been overtly feminist or even arguably feminist the majority of the time.
Thus, prior to the civil war, women's activism in Lebanon was defined by women's
magazines, charity work as an avenue to public involvement, female labor organizing, and
finally by the advent of the Lebanese Women's Council in the 1950s which led to women's
suffrage. While the progress of the women's movement was slowed as a result of the civil war,
women's groups nonetheless did not fade from the scene. In fact, several women's groups
emerged during the war years. The wartime activism of women developed from a clear history of
female organizing in Lebanon.
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2.12 Lebanese Women's Activism during the War
As noted, Lebanese women were active during the civil war although this has not always
been acknowledged. Three main events define women's activism during the war: the demands
made by members of the Lebanese Women's Council in 1975, the first national Lebanese
women's conference during the war in 1983, and the 1984 march for peace in Beirut. The second
portion of this section will describe two highly active women's groups, the Women's Renaissance
Gathering and a disability rights group. Lastly, the final third of this section will address some of
the criticism faced by female activists.
Major Events in Women’s Wartime Organizing
The first activist stance taken by women's groups was under the aegis of the Lebanese
Women's Council. According to Haneefa al-Khatib, on May 31, 1975, a ten-woman delegation
from the Lebanese Women's Council presented a request to the prime minister-designate Rashid
Karamé. The women demanded that the Lebanese government condemn violence as an
acceptable form of political action, impose security measures, and form a new cabinet with
members noted for their morality and scholarship who could then perform a study to seek the
causes of the violence which began on April 13, 1975. Members of the Lebanese Women's
Council followed this action with a series of demonstrations calling for peace which were held
throughout Lebanon. From September through October of 1975, the Lebanese Women's Council
hosted rallies in Beirut, Zahlé, Baalbeck, Tripoli, and Aley calling for an end to the fighting (alKhatib, 1984; Shehadeh, 1999a). While this series of activists’ stands taken by the Lebanese
Women’s Council was neither successful in ending the violence nor overtly feminist, these
actions did involve a great deal of women’s organizing.
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The second major event in the realm of women’s wartime organizing occurred in April of
1983 when the Lebanese Women's Council hosted a national conference entitled the “Role of
Women in the Save Lebanon Campaign,” which focused on many feminist issues (Ghurayyib
and Stephan, 1983: 9). According to Rose Ghurayyib and Wafa Stephan, more than 1,000
women attended the event, hailing from diverse political, literary, and diplomatic fields, who
were clearly privileged professionals belonging to elite organizations. At the conference, the
women of the Council cited their commitment to national unity as well as to the dedication of
their services to the Lebanese government in order to ensure female integration into government
policies, and specifically into the reconstruction process (Ghurayyib and Stephan, 1983).
The recommendations which came out of the 1983 Lebanese Women's Council's
conference can be divided into two categories. The first category consisted of feminist demands
for the integration of women into the political and social fabric of Lebanon, while the latter
focused on more general demands for peace and national unity. The first recommendation under
the category of female integration was a request for the creation of an official committee which
would oversee the involvement of women in planning governmental policy and which would
work in cooperation with various women's organizations. Additionally, another request called for
a new policy to govern Lebanon which would consider women’s issues. As part of this demand,
the attendants of the conference noted that the needs of elderly, rural, single, and widowed
women should be of particular concern to the government (Ghurayyib and Stephan, 1983).
Furthermore, the conference attendees stressed the need for a policy which would
eliminate all forms of discrimination against women. In particular, they highlighted the need for
the mass media to be required to portray women in a more positive light in order to help society,
and women themselves, to view women more positively. The conference attendees also
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demanded amendments to the penal code and civil law which would end discrimination against
women in all legal fields, as well as in the labor force. Additionally, scholars and activists at the
conference called for actions that would help women to acquire the training and education
needed to allow them to participate in leadership roles in both the public and private labor
sectors. Lastly, as part of their feminist demands, the Lebanese Women's Council recommended
a policy which would end female illiteracy while simultaneously build up female legal literacy so
that women would be aware of their rights (Ghurayyib and Stephan, 1983).
In the latter category of demands for national unity and peace, the attendants of the
Council's conference advocated for the adoption of a national system of education which they
hoped would end sub-state loyalties to confessional groups. Rather than allowing confessional
histories be taught in schools, these women urged a teaching of the history of Lebanon which
would include an account of all Lebanese groups. Additionally, the female conference attendees
also requested a unified personal status code which they believed would be a step toward true
national unity (Ghurayyib and Stephan, 1983). This was seen as necessary because different laws
existed regarding a woman’s ability to divorce or obtain child custody. Additionally, there
existed variances concerning women’s inheritance rights as well as the age of marriage. Such
laws were all dependent on a woman’s confessional affiliation (Accad, 1990). Attendees of the
conference felt that the Lebanese could not view themselves as a unified people if different laws
existed for different people (Ghurayyib and Stephan, 1983).
These issues surrounding the personal status laws in Lebanon have long been a
mobilizing call for feminists (Accad, 1990; Khouri, 2004). Ghada Khouri points out the inherent
unfairness of the personal status laws as discussed above, in which, for example, Christian,
Druze, and Shi’a Muslim women are able to receive the same portion of inheritance as their male
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relatives, while Sunni Muslim women receive half the portion of their male counterparts
(Khouri, 2004; El-Cheikh, 2001). Najla Hamadeh observes that the government’s insistence on
allowing religious courts to control family law has undermined the state’s authority to ensure the
equal treatment of all Lebanese citizens. Furthermore, Suad Joseph argues that the confessional
system allows patriarchy to flourish as male religious authorities ensure male-dominance in the
home life of most Lebanese women (Khouri, 2004). Thus, conservative elements of society want
to keep the religious courts in place, and often put tremendous pressure on any initiatives that
seek to take power from them (El-Cheikh, 2001).
According to Elias Muhanna, efforts to end confessionalism have long been an integral
part of Lebanon’s civil society (Muhanna, 2010). However, as already noted, one of the major
causes of the civil war was confessionalism (Jabbra and Jabbra, 2001). Hilal Khashan reports
that most Lebanese believe that their own sect deserves a special status as compared to other
groups. Moreover, he also argues that because the civil war caused people to be isolated from
those outside of their own communities, the war further entrenched confessionalism (Khashan,
1992). Ghurayyib and Stephan only record one concrete action that the participants of the
Lebanese Women’s Council’s conference recommended to end confessionalism which was to
promote the teaching of a shared history of Lebanon (Ghurayyib and Stephan, 1983). This alone
clearly would not have been enough to end confessionalism which the war only further
cemented, and there also would have been widespread opposition to such a policy by more
conservative religious elements of society (Khashan, 1992; Khouri, 2004).
A second recommendation to come out of the 1983 Lebanese Women’s Council’s
conference in the category of peace and unity was a nationalist call for the evacuation of all
foreign troops from Lebanon. This demand came as the women looked for ways to end the
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fighting, which as previously noted was exacerbated by foreign interventions (Fisk, 2002).
Overall, the Lebanese Women's Council’s conference the “Role of Women in the Save Lebanon
Campaign,” was an opportunity for women's groups across the country to reconnect with one
another. According to Ghurayyib and Stephan, attendees shared mixed feelings concerning the
outcome of the conference. More progressive women had hoped that a plan of action would have
resulted from the conference. However, the list of recommendations was simply a reiteration of
what the Lebanese Women’s Council had demanded in the past. Nevertheless, the conference
was deemed a success by many of the participants as it was the first time members of several
women’s groups had had a successful dialogue since the beginning of the war (Ghurayyib and
Stephan, 1983).
Although this conference appears to have been off the mainstream radar, feminist
activism in Lebanon generally faces criticism. For example, even as recently as 2009, Jean Said
Makdisi indicated that many Lebanese women were hesitant to refer to themselves as feminists
due to the stigma attached to the term. She also notes that Lebanese women labeled as feminists
are often accused of siding with Western imperialists or are denunciated as sell-outs to their
culture or nation. While Makdisi points out that this only goes to show the paternalistic attitudes
of their accusers who think that women have no minds of their own, it can nonetheless make
Lebanese women wary of identifying with feminism. Additionally, Makdisi argues that feminists
in Lebanon are often faulted for trying to destroy the family or for attempting to turn women
against men (Mahdawi, 2009). While there is no evidence of what the reaction was to the
Lebanese Women's Council's 1983 conference, it was likely ignored, mocked, or denigrated by
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much of the rest of the Lebanese media as most feminist activism in Lebanon has been and
continues to be.2
The third major event of women’s wartime activism was the 1984 demonstration for
peace held in Beirut. Feminist activist Laure Moghaizel described the May 6, 1984 peace march
as a united front composed of women and men of multiple confessional backgrounds, coming
from across Lebanon to demonstrate together. The peace rally took place on the campus of
Beirut University College, since renamed the Lebanese American University. Activists from
labor unions also joined the rally (Osseiran, 1995). The peace march was the brainchild of Iman
Khaliefeh, who was a kindergarten teacher as well as a researcher at the Institute for Women's
Studies in the Arab World at Beirut University College. Khaliefeh, who studied how the war
affected the lives of children, was writing poetry in the days leading up to the ninth anniversary
of the start of the war. One of her poems ended with the lines, “Let us walk out of our silence
and scream in one voice.../No to the war... No to the 10th year” (“No to the War, No to the 10th
Year,” 1984: 4). This poem inspired her to devise a plan for a mass demonstration against the
war. The slogan for the march would be “No to War.” Khaliefeh called her contacts in Beirut to
inform them of her planned demonstration which she envisioned as cutting through the political
boundaries of Beirut's East/West division (“No to the War, No to the 10th Year,” 1984;
“Participation of Women in Politics during,” 1990).
The event was organized by a nonpartisan committee comprised of both Muslims and
Christians. The planning committee envisioned the peace rally as a silent demonstration in which
concerned citizens from both sides of Beirut would march toward one another. Since Beirut was
divided by the so-called “green line” which separated Christian East Beirut from Muslim West
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Despite a thorough review of the literature available in English, there was no indication of what the mainstream
reaction to this conference was.
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Beirut, the demonstration was to show the symbolic union of the two sides as both Christians and
Muslims would demand the disarmament of Lebanon’s many militias (“No to the War, No to the
10th Year,” 1984; Aghacy, 1998; Friedman, 1984). Unfortunately, the march was brought to an
end by shelling from unidentified militia fighters which caused at least twenty-two civilian
deaths and wounded approximately 130 civilians (Accad, 1989; Friedman, 1984). Reportedly,
the organizers believed that thousands of Beirut’s citizens of all confessions and ages, and
women as well as men, were expected to join together alongside one another in the march. In
fact, approximately 50 committees associated with local high schools, universities, and hospitals
were formed in the lead up to the march in order to provide transportation (“No to the War, No to
the 10th Year,” 1984; Friedman, 1984; Osseiran, 1995).
While the peace march was canceled, the rally did conclude with a successful sit-in in
front of the parliament building in order to make the government aware of activists' demands for
peace (Osseiran, 1995). The events of May 6, 1984 were intended to be as much of an indictment
of the militias as of the politicians. Both ordinary citizens and activists held politicians equally
responsible for Lebanon’s long war (Friedman, 1984). Additionally, many activists plastered the
infamous “green line,” which divided Beirut, with posters demanding peace. Moreover, a
circulated petition begun by Khalifeh produced over 70,000 signatures from ordinary women and
men of all confessional backgrounds calling for peace (Osseiran, 1995). While Khalifeh never
specified precisely what she meant in her call for peace as embodied by her slogan, “No to War,”
it is obvious that she meant at a bare minimum the disarmament of all militias as well as a
concerted effort by the politicians to compromise with one another in order to bring an end to the
fighting (Osseiran, 1995; Friedman, 1984).
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In a speech made by Khalifeh in December of 1984, she indicated that her inspiration for
designing the peace march centered on her concern for children. She stated, “The war robbed
these children [of] their childhood as it robbed many others like myself [of] the chance to plan
for a future” (“The Right Livelihood Awards 1984,” 2012). Khalifeh cited that what ultimately
moved her to compose her poem “No to War” was witnessing one particular instance when some
children on a playground were carried to safety by their parents during an outbreak of fighting
(“The Right Livelihood Awards 1984,” 2012). Based on this speech, it is evident that
maternalism played a role in Khalifeh’s activism. However, it remains unclear how many women
were also inspired based on their identities as mothers to join in the demonstration.
While the three major women’s activist events of the war were the demands made to the
government by the Lebanese Women’s Council delegation in 1975, the first national women's
groups' conference during the war which occurred in 1983, and lastly, the 1984 march for peace
in Beirut, women nevertheless participated in other public events. For example, Wafa Stephan
notes that female activists held a press conference in August of 1983 as participants of a coalition
of various women's organizations in order to call for the re-establishment of the Lebanese
League of Human Rights (Stephan, 1984). Additionally, Evelyne Accad has documented the
many international conferences in which elite Muslim and Christian women participated. In
particular, female professionals and activists attended the 1980 World Conference of the United
Nations Decade for Women in Copenhagen, the Twenty-first Triennial Congress of the World
International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in Connecticut, and the Seventeenth
Congress of the International Board on Books for Young People in Prague (Accad, 1989).
Attendees of the International Board on Books for Young People conference in Prague included
Rose Ghurayyib, a novelist and researcher, as well as Julinda Abu Nassr, then director of the
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Institute for Women’s Studies in the Arab World (Accad, 1989; Ashour, Ghazoul, RedaMekdashi, 2008; “Long-Time Colleague Nuha,” 2008). Likewise, attendees of the Decade for
Women conference in Copenhagen were also privileged scholars and activists (Zinsser, 2002).
Additionally, Maha Samara observes that fifteen well-known professional women
attended a conference in Paris on October 22, 1987 in which these academics and activists
described women’s wartime experiences to an international audience. Specific attendees of the
Paris conference included Illham Kallab, a professor whose research focused on education; May
Hazzaz, a professor of social work; Laure Moghaizel, the celebrated feminist activist; and
Marie-Thérèse Khair-Badawi, a professor of psychology (Samara, 1987b; “Ilham Kallab, Arab
Thought,” 2009; Stephan, 2010; “May Hazaz, Who Is,” 2012). While Mona Takieddine Amyuni
points out that May Hazzaz’s presentation at the conference focused on women of lower
socioeconomic status, specifically on their particular experiences during the war, the conference
was only attended by educated women of privilege (Amyuni, 1993; Samara, 1987b).
Case Studies
The second portion of this section on women’s organizing during the civil war will
provide a detailed account of two highly active women's associations that were created during
the war years, which were the Women's Renaissance Gathering and a disability rights group.
Abir Ward describes the women's group known as Tajamu’ al-Nahda al-Nisa’iya (Women’s
Renaissance Gathering), as forming in 1979 in Beirut, where it continued to function throughout
the remainder of the civil war. It was an inter-ethnic organization that eventually established
chapters throughout Lebanon, all of which worked in coordination with the main branch in
Beirut. The Women's Renaissance Gathering sought to help women and their children find
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normalcy in war, promote efforts to end the war, and advocate for women's rights through social,
economic, and educational activities (Ward, 2009).
Although the Women's Renaissance Gathering was created by a group of female
members of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), most of its membership hailed from
outside the party. Moreover, the Women's Renaissance Gathering members belonged to various
confessional sects, and although founded by elite women, its members came from diverse
socioeconomic backgrounds. Specifically, the Women’s Renaissance Gathering was composed
of female socialites, farmers, and artisans, as well as Christian, Muslim, and Druze women. In
order to overcome the many social divisions which separated them, the Women’s Renaissance
Gathering required that all members perform the same work so that no one was viewed as
receiving special treatment (Ward, 2009).
One of the main tenets of the organization was to help Lebanese children. Members of
the Women's Renaissance Gathering believed that the war was forcing children to grow up too
quickly, and that children were experiencing negative effects due to the war's violence. For
example, the Baakleen chapter of the organization turned a small building into the House of the
Child where women hoped to give their children respite from the war by offering music, art, and
martial arts classes, as well as a scout's club. Members wanted to provide their children with
some sense of stability despite the chaos of the war. Branches of the Women's Renaissance
Gathering throughout Lebanon offered activities for mothers to do with their children, including
attending carnivals, theatrical performances, and poetry readings (Ward, 2009).
Another aspect of the Women's Renaissance Gathering's mission was to help their
communities. Members generally viewed such service to their communities as exemplifying their
roles as mothers, sisters, and daughters. The Women's Renaissance Gathering branches would
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often partner with local humanitarian and social organizations to help bridge divides in their
towns and villages. In the Baakleen chapter, one of the better known chapters of the group
because it published a magazine which chronicled its activities, members realized that many
women were facing financial difficulties as a result of the war. Therefore, the organization
instituted a project which trained women to make handicrafts which the Women's Renaissance
Gathering then helped bring to market. Another manner in which women served their
communities was during the Israeli invasion when the Baakleen chapter's membership wanted to
resist the assault on their community without resorting to violence. Women's activism thus took
the form of a community kitchen where women prepared food for the men of their town who
spent long shifts guarding the borders from Israeli attack (Ward, 2009).
The final major area of the Women's Renaissance Gathering's activism related to
women's rights. Part of their mission statement was “to elevate the educational, occupational,
and social stature of women, as well as to defend and protect her rights in all domains” (Ward,
2009: 389). One way in which the Women's Renaissance Gathering worked toward this goal was
by changing the way that Lebanese women usually defined themselves, which was almost
strictly in relation to men, as their wives, mothers, and/or daughters. According to Ward, a
Lebanese woman is usually known by the term Um (mother) followed by the name of her eldest
son. In fact, a common saying in Lebanon relates that a woman without a man, exemplified as
father, husband, or son, is “like an insignificant bark of wood which does not belong to a tree”
(Ward, 2009: 390). The Women’s Renaissance Gathering tried to challenge the practice of
women deriving their identity only terms of their relationships to men by turning one of the
group’s main focuses to women. They did this by holding meetings in which they analyzed
women's social status in order to raise awareness of this issue as well as to encourage women to
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look beyond their roles as housewives and mothers. For example, the group pushed women to be
leaders in their communities. By advocating working outside the home, especially in positions
such as vendors and bank tellers which opened up during the war, but also through volunteer
work such as associated with the Women’s Renaissance Group, the organization tried to push
women to the center of Lebanese society (Ward, 2009).
Another way in which the Women’s Renaissance Gathering promoted women’s rights
was through its magazine which showcased the organization’s efforts. As previously mentioned,
the Baakleen branch of the Women's Renaissance Gathering published a magazine which was
sent to the other chapters, and which was also sold in local bookstores and mini-markets across
Lebanon. The magazine was entitled Abeer (fragrance) and featured articles describing the
activities of the group as well as poems and short stories written by members. Since it was a
multi-author platform open to all members of the Women’s Renaissance Gathering, it was an
opportunity for women to write as a way to both vent and reflect on their wartime experiences. In
addition, Abeer included interviews with local leaders of the Baakleen community, as well as
with the leadership of the Women's Renaissance Gathering. Articles on music and art were also
prominent in the magazine. Overall, the Women’s Renaissance Gathering organized to provide
women and their children with some normalcy during the war, promote efforts to end the war,
and advocate for women's rights (Ward, 2009).
Likewise, another highly active group that also began during the war was one dedicated
to women living with disabilities. Unlike the Women’s Renaissance Gathering which
concentrated on not only women but also children, and particularly women’s relationships to
their own children, this organization was more narrowly focused on women’s issues, specifically
women with disabilities. Samantha Wehbi's study on this unnamed grassroots disability rights
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organization, which was founded in 1981, reveals that women with disabilities were involved in
activism during the war (Wehbi, 2010).
In fact, according to Wehbi, these women with disabilities were active in front-line
emergency medical relief services across Lebanon, at which time they went into areas being
shelled in order to ensure that those with disabilities were properly evacuated. In the terror and
panic of a bombing, able-bodied people often left their family members with disabilities in the
house. Therefore, the disability rights groups’ members would enter such locations to ensure that
everyone was safely vacated from targeted areas. Moreover, these female disability rights
activists distributed supplies to those living in displacement centers. Through their medical relief
services, the group also ensured that those with disabilities in the displacement camps were both
being respected as well as having their needs met. Interestingly, no other organization in
Lebanon focused on individuals with disabilities during the civil war period. Lastly, in addition
to helping those on the ground, female members also helped to raise awareness around disability
rights issues through not only their active participation in the organization, but also by using the
war's many victims to demonstrate the difficulties faced by those living with disabilities (Wehbi,
2010).
In Wehbi's study of this unnamed organization advocating for disability rights, she
describes the group as dedicated to on an on-going analysis of the intersections of disability,
gender, and neocolonialsim. Only those women living with disabilities could become official
members of the organization, although women without disabilities were allowed to be either staff
members or volunteers. Additionally, membership included women from across Lebanon, from
various religious affiliations, and also from multiple socioeconomic backgrounds. Furthermore,
Wehbi argues that this particular group helped its female members to realize that as women
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living with disabilities, they had many options and were not reduced to staying at home. In
interviews which Wehbi conducted with members, many women reported that prior to joining
this organization they were resigned to their homes. This group helped Lebanese women with
disabilities to find an outlet. For example, a member named Laila indicated that after she
received a permanent war-time injury as a young woman, she felt that she could no longer attend
college or become employed, believing she was homebound. However, upon joining the
organization, she realized that she was capable of organizing, working, and helping others.
Members learned self-reliance through their activism which was especially significant because
mainstream Lebanese society viewed women with disabilities as unable to take care of
themselves, much less capable of active involvement in society (Wehbi, 2010).
The two associations, the Women’s Renaissance Gathering and the unnamed disability
rights group which Samantha Wehbi chronicled, provide excellent examples of what women’s
activism was like during the war years. The organizations were similar in many ways, yet also
quite different from one another. A conspicuous note of divergence between the Women’s
Renaissance Gathering and the disability rights group, as alluded to above, is that the latter did
not concern itself with the issue of children, whereas the former devoted a substantial amount of
its time and resources to children’s interests. However, some members of the disability rights
group did express that their motivation for activism was rooted in motherhood. The issue of
motherhood will be discussed in the final section of this chapter, but as Wehbi notes,
motherhood is an important part of many Lebanese women’s lives (Wehbi, 2010). Another
difference between the two organizations was in their approach to women’s activism. Clearly
members of the Women’s Renaissance Gathering seemed concerned that they not portray
themselves as overly feminist. For example, member Hitaf Narsh promoted the idea that phrases
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such as “women’s rights” and “women’s liberation” lacked objectivity. She campaigned for
improving the status of women in Lebanese society, but carefully avoided language that might be
considered provocative or controversial (Narsh, 1981; Ward, 2009). In contrast, the disability
rights group’s members used the term “patriarchy” frequently in describing their lives and
analyzing their treatment in society (Wehbi, 2010). This usage of the term indicates these
women’s familiarity with feminism as well as their embracing of feminism.
Overall, the Women’s Renaissance Gathering and the disability rights group shared much
in common, such as their desire to help women become more active in the outside world and in
their efforts to increase women’s social status. Additionally, the membership of both groups was
diverse, with women hailing from multiple confessional and socioeconomic backgrounds.
However, there were significant differences in their approaches such as the Women’s
Renaissance Gathering’s efforts to downplay controversial stands while the disability rights
group was more willing to openly confront sexism by using such terminology as patriarchy.
Societal Reactions to Women’s Organizing
The final portion of this section on women’s wartime activism will address some of the
criticism faced by female activists. In addition to the Lebanese Women’s Council which sent the
ten-member delegation to the government in 1975 to make demands for peace and which also
held the major conference in 1983, as well as Ilham Khalifeh’s 1984 peace march, the Women’s
Renaissance Gathering, and the disability rights group, there were many smaller women's groups
whose membership was also highly involved in activism throughout the civil war period. For
example, according to Ghena Ismail, a committee of the Islamic Orphanage helped war widows
to support themselves by training them to sew. Although this epitomized traditional gender roles,
it nevertheless provided much needed skills to women so that they could financially support
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themselves. For example, following their completion of the program, a lunch would be hosted in
honor of each woman. Those attending the lunch were required to pay a fee which was in turn
used to purchase a sewing machine for each graduate in order to ensure a greater probability of
her economic success. Other organizations such as the Social Reconstruction Center in Burj ElBarajneh provided female activists with the means to help other women find access to family
planning. Additionally, the activists at the Center also helped to end female illiteracy through its
class offerings (Ismail, 1996).
Furthermore, Julinda Abu Nassr describes the work performed by activists at the Institute
for Women's Studies in the Arab World as helping other women to obtain access to the labor
force as well as to balance their workload at home. Women at the Institute provided training in
embroidery, knitting, and operating machinery, along with workshops on home management,
child care, family planning, health, and nutrition. Importantly, the Institute also offered
workshops on women's legal rights. Abu Nassr estimates that between 500 and 1,000 women
benefited from the offerings of the Institute during the war (“The Effects of the War on
University,” 1992). Such efforts on the part of the Institute included a mix of both more
traditional roles for women, as well as ways for women to transcend such stereotypical gender
roles.
In contrast to the more traditional methods of helping women, such as training in sewing
or embroidery, services such as the Social Reconstruction Center’s family planning offerings
likely faced criticism from more conservative elements of society. Certainly, the debate
surrounding birth control in Lebanon has been controversial, and it is due to two main reasons.
The first is a fear based on the falling population rates of one’s community, and the second is
patriarchal notions of a woman’s place. As the Lebanese Family Planning Association (LFPA)
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indicates on its website, from the organization’s inception in 1969 it has had to defend its
existence by explaining that family planning includes more than simply contraception. In
addition to the usual patriarchal concerns, controlling, or limiting, the rate of births is contentious
in Lebanon because of the sectarian nature of society. In every confessional community, there
are those who fear being overtaken by other communities if they fall behind in population rates
(“About Us: History and Studies,” 2013).
The second reason for the controversial nature of birth control relates to traditional
notions of a woman’s ability to control her life. According to Roxann A. Van Dusen, in her 1973
study of rural Lebanese Muslim and Christian women, her subjects were either afraid to inquire
about contraceptives due to the stigma attached to it, or had no idea such technology was
available. For those women who were aware of modern birth control, they believed that their
husbands would disapprove of them using modern contraceptives (Van Dusen, 1973). Certainly,
fears of being viewed as “loose” made women leery of utilizing birth control as it could
compromise society’s view of their honor (Sikimic, 2010; Ouis, 2009).
Nevertheless, Nazy Roudi argues that traditional teachings of Islam do not view
contraception as immoral. However, Roudi admits that it is the subordinate status of women in
Islamic societies which prevents them from fully using family planning services such as birth
control. Additionally, Roudi points out that traditional Christian teachings do label contraception
as immoral (Roudi, 1988). While both the using and selling of birth control were legalized in
1983 with the overturning of articles 537 and 538 of the Lebanese penal code, even more
recently, women are still socially stigmatized for using the birth control pill (“About Us: History
and Studies,” 2013; Stephan, 2010; Sikimic, 2010). According to Simona Sikimic, even in 2010,
only about fifteen percent of Lebanese women use the pill, and even usage rates for all forms of
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modern birth control is only at thirty-seven percent. Messages about how the pill promotes
promiscuity are widely circulated and thus most women feel too ashamed to take it (Sikimic,
2010).
While activists have had to deal with societal resistance against family planning, there
has been less resistance to the promotion of female literacy. According to the Integrated
Regional Information Networks (IRIN), Lebanon presently has one of the highest literacy rates
in the Arab world, including female literacy rates. Although both in the past and currently,
women have been and still are more likely to be illiterate than males, female illiteracy is more
prominent in the poverty-stricken areas of Lebanon such as the Bekaa Valley and Nabatieh
where people often leave school at an early age in order to work to help support, and/or aid in
raising, their families. Not surprisingly, there is a strong connection between illiteracy and
poverty (“Lebanon Fight against Illiteracy,” 2006). Anita Nassar points out that when parents are
financially capable of educating only some of their children, they choose their sons over their
daughters. Nassar believes that this is due to the patriarchal nature of Lebanese society. Since it
is the men who are expected to provide financially for their families, males are seen as needing
education more so than females (Galey, 2009; Hijab, 1988). Even in 2009, Lebanese activists
were still working against such patriarchal attitudes. For example, Nassar explains that more
conservative elements of society have feared that female literacy is about women’s
empowerment over men. Nassar, as assistant director of the Institute for Women’s Studies in the
Arab World, has had to defend the Institute’s program to combat female illiteracy by
emphasizing that the literacy program is meant to provide for the partnership of women and men
rather than the elevation of women over men (“Empowering Women through Literacy,” 2009).
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In fact, during the civil war, women’s literacy rates continued to rise (“The Situation of Children
and Women,” 1995). Thus, female literacy is less controversial in Lebanon than family planning.
Lastly, in general, Lebanese female activists faced criticism for their work, whether it
was overtly feminist or not. Hitaf Narsh, a leader in the Women’s Renaissance Gathering, wrote
in an essay that the group’s work should stay within the Lebanese context when it came to
women’s rights. According to Narsh, it was a false dilemma to propose either women’s liberation
or the confinement of women to traditional roles. Instead, she believed that women and men
should work together as equal partners to address problems in society, whether that was in efforts
to end the war or working for the betterment of women’s lives (Narsh, 1981; Ward, 2009).
Implied in her argument is the idea that the subject of women’s rights is a controversial topic
which could bring about significant resistance from the general public. Narsh’s opinions are a
clear attempt to defend against any critics who would find fault if women’s activism became
aggressive. As previously mentioned, Jean Said Makdisi observes that feminists in Lebanon are
frequently accused by mainstream society of trying to destroy the family, attempting to turn
women against men, and/or of siding with Western imperialists (Mahdawi, 2009).
Female activists surely faced criticism and particular groups more than others, depending
on how far the group pushed the boundaries of acceptability. As Anita Nassar has noted, many
mainstream Lebanese fear that if women gain rights they will seek to control or rule over men
(“Empowering Women through Literacy,” 2009). This is why during the war many activists such
as Hitaf Narsh played down the phrases “women’s rights” or “women’s liberation,” focusing
instead on discussions of the need for men and women to cooperate and work together (Narsh,
1981; Ward, 2009).
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Nevertheless, despite the disapproval of many of the projects undertaken by women’s
groups, it must be stressed that women's organizing was prolific throughout the Lebanese civil
war. The three defining activist events put on by members of women's groups during the war
made demands of the government in 1975 to end the violence, reiterated requests for female
inclusion in the government as well as an end to the fighting during a 1983 conference, and in
1984, made an unprecedented demand to end the fighting which was so harmful to women and
the rest of society. Additionally, this section highlighted two highly engaged groups, the
Women's Renaissance Gathering and a disability rights group, and also discussed some of the
criticisms faced by the women involved in organizing. The following section will provide an
analysis of the general form of women's groups' activism during the civil war based on Maxine
Molyneux's typology of gender interests.
To briefly reiterate, in 1985, Maxine Molyneux developed a tool of analysis that sought
to define the form that gender interests take in women's activism. Molyneux defines gender
interests as those interests which derive from a person's social standing as it relates to their
gender. According to Molyneux, gender interests break down into two categories which are
strategic gender interests (SGIs) and practical gender interests (PGIs). Strategic gender interests
seek to alleviate women’s subordinate status while practical gender interests address women's
urgent needs which usually do not entail immediate female emancipation or gender equality.
Molyneux cites strategic gender interests as those issues and actions which are deemed by many
feminists as the most legitimate form of women's interests as they immediately and directly
challenge patriarchy (Molyneux, 1985).
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2.13 Gender Interests Typology
This next section will analyze the form of activism taken by Lebanese women during the
civil war, through the use of Maxine Molyneux's gender interest typology. This tool will help to
determine whether the overall form of women's activism during the civil war was overtly
feminist on the basis that strategic gender interests directly challenge patriarchy and are thus
distinctively feminist. Since the ultimate goal is to understand whether it is the form of women's
groups' activism, motherist or feminist, which affects gains in women's rights, it is important to
clearly define what is feminist in the work performed by Lebanese female activists. Obviously,
the organizing performed by such individuals during the war was diverse. However, the two
main goals of almost all those involved in women's groups was to end the fighting between the
various militias in order to end the war, and the other was to increase women's involvement in
public life. A third goal of many was to improve the status of women both socially and
politically.
By approaching the prime minister-designate Rashid Karamé to demand that the
government end the violence which had broken out across Lebanon, members of the Lebanese
Women’s Council were addressing women's practical gender interests. These activists were
concerned with the increasing levels of violence and thus held peace rallies in several cities
calling for an end to the fighting. Through their plea to prime minister-delegate Karamé,
members of the Lebanese Women’s Council demanded that the government end the violence.
However, these actions did not directly address female subordination to men. Specifically, the
women were not protesting particular forms of violence against women such as intimate partner
violence or the targeting of women for rape. Nevertheless, an end to the general militia violence
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would have dramatically improved women's lives, along with the rest of the Lebanese
population.
This initial call for peace taken by the Lebanese Women's Council's delegation would be
echoed in the activism taken by women's groups throughout the rest of the war. Attendees of the
1983 Lebanese Women's Council's conference also demanded an end to the fighting among the
militias as well as the targeting of civilians by various armed groups. So too did the protestors in
the 1984 peace march as called for by Iman Khalifeh. These appeals for peace were also
apparent in the Women's Renaissance Gathering's work where members attempted to bring peace
to their communities through children's activities as well as in art and poetry events. Similarly,
the disabilities rights group's humanitarian efforts were also an extension of bringing peace to the
community. In each of these examples of activism, female subordination was not directly
challenged. Of course, an end to the fighting would have benefited women, along with the rest of
society. Nonetheless, peace was ultimately grounded in practical gender interests.
The second major goal of Lebanese women activists during the war was helping to insert
a female presence into public spaces. Whether in demonstrations for peace or other public events
such as conferences, poetry readings, or in areas of shelling to provide civilians with medical
attention, Lebanese women were making their presence felt. For example, members of the
Women's Renaissance Gathering cooked meals in a communal kitchen which enabled them to be
involved in public life, even if they were performing a traditionally female task. Likewise,
women involved in humanitarian medical relief services to civilians, as well as those who
provided training in sewing or other handicrafts, still encouraged women to be active outside of
their homes. This type of activism may not have overtly challenged women's subordination to
men, but it did lead Lebanese women to view themselves in a different light. As Lori Hartmann-
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Mahmud and Gerard Huiskamp have argued, furthering women's practical gender interests have
indeed empowered women and helped them to become self-actualized (Hartmann-Mahmud and
Huiskamp, 2006). Yet, the above examples of women’s activism did not openly challenge
women's subservient position to men and thus the promotion of women in public spaces only
qualifies as addressing practical gender interests.
The third major goal of many, although not all of, Lebanese female activists during the
war, was to improve the social and political status of women. This is most evident in the
Lebanese Women's Council's 1983 conference which produced a series of demands that openly
acknowledged female oppression in Lebanon and also made specific recommendations to
combat the situation. Attendees of the conference specifically cited the need to address the
discrimination that women faced in the labor force and in political spaces. Participants in the
conference called for a governmental policy that would challenge patriarchy by calling for an
end to the male privilege which precluded women from many employment opportunities as well
as a prominent voice in government. Additionally, women at this conference focused on
improving female legal literacy so that women were aware of their rights. According to
Molyneux's analysis typology, actions such as these are a way of addressing women's strategic
gender interests because they not only highlight women's inferior status to men, they furthermore
seek to change this status.
In addition to the Lebanese Women’s Council’s 1983 conference, the Women's
Renaissance Gathering also focused on women's strategic gender interests. The Women’s
Renaissance Gathering’s members were noted for holding book clubs and workshops in which
they analyzed the position of women in Lebanese society. For example, Hitaf Narsh, a leader in
the Women’s Renaissance Gathering, voiced her belief that Lebanese women should work
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alongside men to address the problems of society, particularly the violence of war, but also
women’s rights (Narsh, 1981; Ward, 2009). Narsh’s proposition that women work alongside men
as their partners to address problems that lay outside the private sphere suggests that the
Women’s Renaissance Gathering sought a dramatic improvement in the social and political
status of women. This group advocated for women to not only have opinions on political issues
such as human rights, but also proclaimed that women were the equals of men and should be
making decisions and policies alongside them. While Narsh clearly tried to tone down her
rhetoric by declaring that phrases like “women’s rights” and “women’s liberation” lack
objectivity, it is obvious from her recommendation that women and men should work together
that Narsh sought to dramatically improve the social and political standing of women and openly
challenged women’s subordinate position (Narsh, 1981; Ward, 2009).
Overall, according to Abir Ward, the Women’s Renaissance Gathering promoted a
message about improving women’s status by bringing women from the margins of society to its
center. The group put the category of woman at the heart of all discussion topics and also
promoted the idea of women transgressing traditional gender roles. Specifically, the Women’s
Renaissance Group encouraged all women to work outside the home, whether there was a
financial need or not, as well as to take the lead in educating society about women’s issues and
other issues which they found important. Taken as a whole, these actions show that the Women’s
Renaissance Gathering urged women to stake a claim in Lebanese society, and not to remain at
its margins, by working alongside men as equals (Ward, 2009). Following Molyneux’s
guidelines, these actions are feminist since they sought to challenge women’s less valued social
status.
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Furthermore, since the grassroots disability rights group studied by Samantha Wehbi led
women to consider their position in society based on both gender and abilities, it too promoted
women's strategic gender interests. During interviews conducted by Wehbi with several
associates of the disability rights group, Wehbi discovered that the women were well-aware of
the term patriarchy and used it with ease. In fact, it featured heavily in the analyses that group
members gave of their lives and their work. For example, members mentioned their frustration
when they were praised for their emergency medical relief efforts by being called a “sister of
men” (Wehbi, 2010: 459). According to Wehbi, the Arabic expression “sisters of men” is used to
describe women who perform tasks well or who gain important achievements. Wehbi argues that
it is a way of associating any great feat, even when performed by a woman, with masculinity and
men. Clearly, women in the group found such an expression to be problematic since it
downplayed women’s achievements. The organization’s members fully believed that as women
living with disabilities, they were as capable as any man or able-bodied person (Wehbi, 2010).
The disability rights group fostered a direct challenge to patriarchy by disagreeing with the
notion that women were less worthy or less capable than men.
Nonetheless, despite all such efforts, including the Lebanese Women's Council's
recommendations of increasing women’s role in the government and the workforce, and the
Women’s Renaissance Gathering and the disability rights group’s analyses of women’s social
and political position, the total effect of the majority of the activism organized by Lebanese
women's groups during the civil war was aimed at addressing practical gender interests. As Hala
Maksoud argues, Lebanese women were naturally concerned about their own survival and that of
their loved ones during the war. Maksoud notes that the majority of women did not coalesce
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around a politically conscious agenda but instead spent most of their time demonstrating for an
end to the fighting because the need for survival outweighed all other concerns (Maksoud, 1996).
The primary goals of almost all female activists were to end the fighting between the
various militias in order to end the war and to increase women's involvement in public life. A
third goal of some activists was to improve the status of women both socially and politically.
While it must be acknowledged that several women's groups did focus on strategic gender
interests, the majority of female activism took the form of work which addressed women's most
urgent needs, mainly concerning the desire to bring an end to the war which was causing women
physical, financial, emotional, and psychological suffering. Overall, Lebanese women's groups'
activism focused on practical gender interests which would improve women's lives by ending the
violence of war.
In conclusion, Maxine Molyneux developed the gender interests typology in order to
assess whether activism undertaken by women’s groups was directly challenging patriarchy or
whether it was addressing women’s immediate needs. Molyneux views strategic gender interests
as seeking to alleviate women’s subordinate status while she considers practical gender interests
as addressing women's urgent needs in way that female emancipation or gender equality is not
necessarily required (Molyneux, 1985). Certainly, as Karina Barker, as well as Lori HartmannMahmud and Gerard Huiskamp have noted, activism centered on practical gender interests does
not preclude the empowerment of the women involved in organizing (Barker 2007; HartmannMahmud et al., 2006). Nevertheless, Molyneux’s typology is helpful in identifying exactly what
actions taken by Lebanese women during the 1975-1990 civil war were undeniably feminist. The
Lebanese Women's Council's 1983 conference the “Role of Women in the Save Lebanon
Campaign” produced an analysis of what forms of oppression Lebanese women faced as well as
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a series of policy demands which addressed female subordination and discrimination.
Additionally, both the Women’s Renaissance Gathering and the disability rights group focused
on female gender equality. In each of these cases, it is apparent that some feminist activism was
occurring during the war period. However, it is equally apparent that overall, the majority of the
efforts of women’s groups’ organizing in the Lebanese civil war was focused on ending the
fighting between the various militias in order to end the war, and on increasing women's general
involvement in public life. In both cases, this type of activism addressed mainly practical gender
interests. The following table (Table 1) illustrates this point:

Table 1: Molyneux’s Typology Applied to Liberian Women’s Groups
Strategic Gender Interests
Sought to integrate women
into the public sphere and
pushed to increase female
literacy and legal literacy
n/a

Women’s Actions
Lebanese Women’s Council

Practical Gender Interests
Demanded government
officials end militia fighting

1984 Peace March

Conducted book clubs and
workshops which addressed
women’s inferior status in
society and encouraged
women to work outside the
home
Taught feminist concepts such
as the meaning of patriarchy
and analyzing women’s
inferior status

Women’s Renaissance
Gathering

Demanded an end to the
fighting from both militias
themselves and the
government
Held poetry readings, plays,
and other events to provide a
sense of normalcy to the
community

Disability Rights Group

Provided emergency medical
relief services to civilians

In conclusion, defining what counted as feminist activism is important. However, female
Lebanese wartime activism must also be analyzed to determine whether it was overtly motherist.
The final section will highlight any women’s organizing based on maternalism.
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2.14 Motherhood as Mobilization for Activism
As previously mentioned, it was common for many Lebanese women to become
politically mobilized based on their maternal identity. Motherhood is an important concept in
Lebanon. According to Hussain Hamzah, a woman’s role as mother embodies the highest ideal
of female perfection in Arab societies. Hamzah argues that in contrast to the word “woman,” the
term “mother” has no negative connotations in Arabic, and is instead purely positive. When an
Arab woman becomes a mother, she is awarded a certain level of legitimacy by society. This
form of legitimacy bestowed upon women by men is significant in male-dominated cultures such
as those found in Arab societies (Hamzah, 2009). In fact, the importance of motherhood is so
ingrained in Lebanese women that during Roxann A. Van Dusen’s interviews with Muslim and
Christian women in rural Lebanon, she discovered that the women could not distinguish any
differences between the duties of a wife and a mother. To the women, wife and mother were one
in and the same, as any married woman was fully expected to become a mother. The naturalness
of motherhood went unquestioned (Van Dusen, 1973). Moreover, Mirna Lattouf notes that
regardless of religious affiliation or of socioeconomic class, Lebanese women are socialized to
believe that the primary role of a woman is to be a wife and mother. According to Lattouf, in
Lebanon, women are valued strictly for their “biological and sexual services to men” (Lattouf;
2004: 134).
In fact, both Mona Khauli and Jean Said Makdisi argue that it was women’s status as
mothers which often protected women from many horrors during the war. Khauli asserts that she
remained safe throughout the war even as a Christian living in Muslim-controlled West Beirut
because she was respected by the young Muslim militiamen as a mother figure. According to
Khauli, she would even scold the fighters without being “talk[ed] back to” or, more importantly,
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endangering her own safety (King-Irani, 1995:27). Similarly, Jean Said Makdisi concludes that
she was able to save both herself and her son from an uncertain fate when they were stopped at a
roadblock by a heavily armed young militiaman. Makdisi claims that she spoke to the fighter
using the title hajjeh (my son) and that the fighter felt uncomfortable insulting an older woman
and thus let Makdisi and her son go (Makdisi, 1997). Instances such as these highlight the
importance of mothering in Lebanon.
During the civil war, it was obvious that many women were motivated to become
activists based on their maternal identity. As previously noted, Elizabeth Thomas has
documented the long history of motherist mobilization which has existed in Lebanon
(Thompson, 2000). This pattern continued throughout the civil war period. For example, in the
Women’s Renaissance Gathering, members felt that they were serving their communities as
mothers. This was especially apparent as the Women’s Renaissance Gathering devoted at least of
third of its platform to children. The women sought to lessen children’s pain, fear, and the
disruption of their childhood due to the war through various activities and projects such as the
House of the Child. Members of the Women’s Renaissance Gathering devoted significant
resources to ensuring that mothers and children would be able to spend time doing activities
together, such as attending poetry and theater events. Thus, even as the organization encouraged
women to view themselves beyond their roles as wives and mothers, motherhood nevertheless
remained a central aspect of the women’s mobilization (Ward, 2009).
Likewise, several female activists in the disability rights group emphasized the
importance of motherhood in their activism. For instance, one member, Samah, reported that her
decision to become an activist was based on her experiences as a mother. Samah believes that
only as a mother was she able to fully comprehend the cruelty and danger associated with war. It
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was these unique feelings of a mother wanting to help deal with the violence of war which
ultimately pushed her into activism. Additionally, Samah indicated that although she had been an
activist for years, she felt that her most memorable time in organizing was when she served as a
team leader to a group of younger women as part of her work in the disability rights
organization. According to Samah, she felt that she was like a mother to these young women,
and that she had tried to do everything within her power to protect them when they were under
her care (Wehbi, 2010). In addition, Iman Khalifeh, who developed the 1984 Peace March,
indicated that her activism was rooted in concern for children, clearly of maternal origin (“The
Right Livelihood Awards 1984,” 2013).
In fact, in Lebanon, even declared feminists such as Laure Moghaizel are celebrated for
being wonderful mothers. An article by Samira Aghacy which discusses Moghaizel’s life
documents not only her feminist activism but also highlights her achievements serving as a
mother to her children. Tellingly, Aghacy writes that Moghaizel was as devoted to her role as a
mother as she was to her activism (Aghacy, 1998). This example serves to emphasize the point
that a woman can be both motherist and feminist at the same time. As noted in chapter one, this
is a common occurrence in much of the non-Western world (Oyewùmí, 2003).
Nevertheless, in general, Lebanese motherists are critical of feminists. According to
Mirna Lattouf, Lebanese women who seek to expand their rights are made to feel guilty, usually
by being accused of abandoning their duties to their children (Lattouf, 2004). Zeina Zaatari
notes that most Lebanese women who attempt to break free from the idea that a woman’s value
is based solely on her mothering capabilities, a typical feminist tenet, run into conflict with
motherhood discourses from the media, as well as from neighbors, friends, and relatives (Zaatari,
2006). Additionally, Bouthaina Shaaban has conducted several interviews with female Amal
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members whose activism is rooted in motherhood. They promoted the idea that women play a
substantial role in raising their children to be responsible citizens, but also have a duty to serve
the larger community. The wife of an Amal leader explained that women should not simply stay
at home but become active in organizing. However, she stated, “…though I believe, of course,
that every woman has a duty towards her home and children” (Shaaban, 1988: 102). Women
mobilized based on their maternal identity praise women for being activists who expand their
maternal duties outside of the home, but who also continue to fulfill the traditional duties
associated with motherhood. Motherists are critical of women who neglect what they consider
the duties of motherhood, which feminists are routinely accused of (Lattouf, 2004; Mahdawi,
2009).
Overall, this section sought to highlight the motherist mobilization in Lebanese women’s
groups’ wartime activism. Motherhood is an immensely valued concept in Lebanon where
women even receive admiration from men for their work as mothers. Many women were
inspired to become activists during the civil war based on maternal feelings of wanting to protect
and nurture. Within Lebanon, feminists are celebrated not only for their push for women’s rights,
but also for their roles as mothers. Finally, motherists, like most of Lebanese society, are
generally critical of feminists.
In general, the activism performed by women’s groups during the civil war period in
Lebanon was not overtly feminist. Additionally, this section provides evidence that much of the
activism during the war was motherist. These are two of the most important inferences to be
drawn from this chapter which will be crucial factors in the process-tracing. The other crucial
piece to draw from this chapter is an understanding of the gains toward equality made by women
in the aftermath of the civil war.
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2.15 Gains in Women’s Rights Following the War
The final portion of this chapter will measure the changes in the dependent variable,
women’s rights, as a result of the war. To do so, five indicators that are widely accepted measures
of equality are employed: female literacy rates, the availability of birth control, the rate of
maternal mortality, the number of women in parliament, and changes to the family code (Issan,
2010; Lovenduski and Norris, 2003; Pezzini, 2005; Bianco and Moore, 2012).
As described in chapter one, the dependent variable will be explored five years prior to
the war and five years following the war in each country in order to ascertain whether women’s
rights increased following each war. Thus, in the case of Lebanon, the years 1970 to 1975 will be
compared against the years 1990 to 1995. The first indicator, the rate of female literacy, is
difficult to determine in Lebanon in both the prewar and postwar years due to the lack of
systemic data. However, according to Bahia Hariri3, in 1970, Lebanon had a female literacy rate
of 56.7 percent that by 1995 jumped to 82.2 percent (Hariri, 1996).
In fact, Lebanese women have some of the highest rates of literacy in the Arab world and
the Middle East. The worldwide female literacy rate stood at 69 percent in 1990, but within the
Arab world, the average rate was 41 percent. In comparison to the entire Middle East and North
African region in 1990, which had an overall female literacy rate of 46 percent, Lebanon had a
female literacy rate that was over 10 percent higher even in 1970 (“Data, World Bank,” 2013).
Thus, while female illiteracy is higher than male illiteracy in Lebanon, significant progress was
made during the war years, which was mainly attributable to girls and women’s greater access to
education which expanded significantly during the course of the war (Abu Nassr, 1996;
Moghadam, 2003).

3

Hariri has numbers for only one year in each time frame (Hariri, 1996).
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As far as the second indicator, the availability of birth control, according to the World
Bank, contraception4 was utilized by 53 percent of the Lebanese population between the ages of
15 and 49 in 1971 (“Data, World Bank,” 2013). As previously mentioned, both the use and sale
of birth control was officially illegal until 1983 with the overturn of Articles 537 and 538 of the
Lebanese penal code (“About Us: History and Studies,” 2013). However, George Dib notes that
despite legal prohibitions against contraception, several methods including the pill, condoms, and
vaginal aspros were sold in pharmacies throughout the country before legalization in 1983 (Dib,
1977). After the war, by year 19965, the rate of contraception use rose to 61.1 percent among the
Lebanese ages 15 to 49 (“Data, World Bank,” 2013). It is important to note that there remains,
even today, a societal stigma against women using birth control (Sikimic, 2010).
In comparison to the rest of the Middle East and North Africa, Lebanese women appear
to have had high rates of contraceptive use throughout the 1970s and the 1990s. On average, 36
percent of all women across the Arab world were using contraception in 1990 and 43 percent of
women used birth control in the entire Middle East and North African region in 1990, while even
in 1971 over 50 percent of Lebanese women were.6 Yet, worldwide, rates for Lebanese women
were lower than for women in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other developed
countries. In 1995, U.S. and U.K. women used birth control at a rate of 76 and 82 percent
respectively to Lebanese women’s 61.1 percent rate.7 The world average for contraceptive use
stood at 69 percent in 1990, which was nearly 8 percent greater than Lebanese women’s usage of
birth control even in 1996 (“Data, World Bank,” 2013).

4

Contraception is defined as any method which attempts to prevent pregnancy (“Contraception Prevalence, World
Bank,” 2013).
5
Due to lack of data for the years 1990 to 1995, the year 1996 was used instead.
6
Data for Lebanese women’s use of birth control in 1990 unavailable as were for Arab women and the Middle East
and North Africa for the year 1971.
7
Data for 1971 unavailable.
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The Lebanese Family Planning Association, the first organization dedicated to the idea of
family planning, was founded in 1969 by health experts and policymakers who saw a need for
increasing Lebanese women’s access to contraception and maternal healthcare (el-Kak, 2012).
Thus, it appears that much of the move toward greater access to birth control was largely topdown. However, many female activists, such as Laure Moghaizel, became involved in the
Lebanese Association for Human Rights, which, established in 1985, advocated for legal changes
to improve women’s lives, particularly the legalization of birth control (Stephen, 2010).
As is the case with the other indicators, maternal mortality rates are not available for most
of the years under review. However, according to a study produced by the American University
of Beirut Hospital, from 1971 to 1981, the maternal mortality rate in Lebanon stood at 128
deaths for every 100,000 live deliveries (“The Situation of Children and Women,” 1995). Yet, as
reported by the World Health Organization, by 1990, there was an average of only 52 maternal
deaths per 100,000 live births. By 1995, that rate had dropped to an average of only 46 per
100,000 live births (“Global Health Observatory Data,” 2013).
Certainly, while only 12 out 100,000 women died in childbirth on average in North
America in 1990, worldwide the maternal mortality rate stood at 400 per 100,000 women. Thus,
Lebanon, even in 1971, had a much lower maternal mortality rate than the world average for
1990. Likewise, Lebanon’s 1990 level of 52 deaths per 100,000 births was far lower than the
Arab world’s average of 360 deaths per 100,000 live births and the Middle East and North
African region’s 200 deaths per 100,000 live births (“Data, World Bank,” 2013). While the
public health sector was fragmented and weakened by the war, the private sector did expand
which helped those who could afford it (el-Kak, 2012). Following the war’s conclusion, the
Ministry of Public Health resumed health services provided prior to 1975, such as running
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government hospitals, which helped to lower the national maternal mortality rate in the postwar
period (“Health during the Postwar Period,” 2013).
Concerning our fourth indicator, Nijmeh Hajjar notes that it was not until 1992 that
women were elected to the Lebanese parliament, despite women being legally permitted to run
since 19538 (Hajjar, 2003; “Lebanon: Majlis Al-Nuwwab,” 2013). The first postwar general
elections held in 1992 elections in accordance with the Ta’if Agreement, resulted in the election
of three women out of 128 seats in parliament (“Lebanon: Parliamentary Chamber
Majlis…1992,” 2013). Although Farid el Khazen argues that new voting districts were drawn too
late for those running to have adequate time to campaign and thus were disadvantageous to
newcomers, even in 1996, only three women served as members of parliament (Khazen, 1994;
“Lebanon: Parliamentary Chamber Majlis…1996,” 2013). All three women who won in 1992
came from politically connected families or had politically connected male relatives, and the
same was true of the 1996 elections (al-Rahbani, 2009). In fact, a common saying in Lebanon
goes, “The only woman you’ll see in parliament is the one wearing black, mourning for the death
of her husband or brother, whose political mantle she has inherited” (“Lebanon: Women NonLebanese Children,” 2008). Likewise, even now, politics through kinship remains the standard
method for Lebanese women’s entrance into politics (Stamadianou, 2012).
Despite the fact that Lebanese women were the first Arab women to receive the right to
vote, they actually have some of the lowest political participation rates in the Middle East
(Stamadianou, 2012). As evidenced in the discussion of Lebanese women’s wartime activism,
most of their focus was on practical gender interests, mainly in striving toward regional security.
Thus, issues of strategic gender interest, such as securing greater numbers of women in
8

Between 1952 and 1962, two women had served as members of parliament to finish out the respective terms of
their deceased male relatives (“Participation of Women in Politics,” 1990; “Lebanon: Women Non-Lebanese
Children,” 2008).
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parliament, were not prioritized. Even in more recent years, little progress has been made in
increasing women’s political participation (Stamadianou, 2012; al-Rahbani, 2009).
The final indicator used in this study is the rate of changes to the family code which
benefited women. In Lebanon, two sets of laws exist. The first set includes civil and secular laws
which cover everything except matters relating to the family. The other set of laws are called the
personal status code and address issues such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and the custody of
children. Laws for these various family issues differ according to each religious community and
are governed by religious authorities in each of the officially recognized sects (Shehadeh, 2010;
Accad, 1990). Nisrine Mansour argues that these courts interpret religion to uphold patriarchy
through the melding of government bureaucracy to sectarian networks based on kinship. Judges
claim to follow a religious mandate that is then backed up by the powers of the state (Mansour,
2005). Thus, this religious mandate makes it incredibly difficult to change the personal status
laws as they supposedly derive from sacred texts (Hamadeh, 2005/2006).
Nevertheless, changes to the family code did occur throughout the war and in the five
year period following the war. One of the most important modifications to the law has already
been mentioned, and this was the 1983 decision to legalize birth control. Another major change
occurred in 1987, which was the raising of the retirement age for women from age 54 to 64, the
same retirement age as men (Shehadeh, 2010). As far as the five year period following the war,
several beneficial changes occurred. In 1993, there were two major alterations to the family
code. First, the law was amended to count the testimony of men and women in court equally.
Prior to this, testimony from two women was needed to match the quality of one man’s
testimony (Suad, 1997). Another improvement was that women were deemed legally competent
enough to testify in court in real estate matters, something they were previously prohibited from
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doing (Shehadeh, 2010). In 1994, the law was amended to permit women to go into business
without the need to first secure their husband’s permission to do so. In 1995, the last year that
this paper will address, two more significant changes took place regarding the status of women.
The first allowed female diplomats to continue working if they married non-Lebanese men. The
second and far more noteworthy change was that women no longer fell under the legal
categorization of “incompetent” and “underage” (Shehadeh, 2010; Lattouf, 2004).
According to Mirna Lattouf, those in women’s associations and other human rights
groups had been advocating for all these changes to the family code and further changes,
especially around the issue of citizenship, which will be addressed below (Lattouf, 2004). Rita
Stehpan directly attributes the changes in the family code that benefited women to the demands
of activists in the Lebanese Association for Human Rights, many of whom were women
(Stephan, 2010). However, the government implemented these changes only to bolster Lebanon’s
standing with the international community. As Lattouf notes, despite the existence of the laws,
they were not always followed. For example, judges, even in 1996, three years after the law was
updated to give men and women’s court testimony equal weight, would not even permit women
to testify because they deemed women too incompetent to be trusted. There were no penalties for
ignoring the law (Lattouf, 2004).
Furthermore, despite these changes, Lebanon’s family code continued to maintain many
laws which were disadvantageous to women. One of the most discriminatory was that of
citizenship. The Lebanese government recognizes citizenship strictly through the male bloodline.
Thus, if a Lebanese woman marries a non-Lebanese, he is not permitted to become a Lebanese
citizen through the marriage, nor any children as a result of the union (Abou-Habib, 2003).
However, in 1994, the law was altered so that those born to Lebanese women and non-Lebanese
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men were allowed to secure Lebanese citizenship after reaching adulthood on the condition that
they married a Lebanese citizen (“Lebanon: Women, Non-Lebanese Children,” 2008). The
majority of those in the government justify differing citizenship laws based on gender by arguing
that if women could pass their citizenship onto their spouses and children it would upset the
confessional balance. However, men already do so, rendering such an argument invalid (AbouHabib, 2003). The citizenship law has been and remains a longstanding feminist issue in
Lebanon (Livingstone, 1992; Accad, 1990; Azzi, 2008).
Other discriminatory issues in the family code which continued after the war were
inheritance laws, polygamy, and divorce. Within the Sunni code, women were only allowed to
inherit half of what their brothers inherited. Additionally, both the Sunni and Shia communities
allow polygamy and, furthermore, divorce was unobtainable for Catholic women. Finally, Sunni
and Shi’a women were still vulnerable to divorces that did not have to be performed in court, but
instead could occur through repudiation rituals (Livingstone, 1992). Additionally, in cases of
divorce where children were affected, women were awarded custody only when the children
were young. For example, in Muslim sects women must renounce custody once a child is two
years old and in Christian sects, women must renounce custody when a child turns seven years
old (Thomas, 2013).
Overall, Nijmeh Hajjar argues that the very language of the Lebanese constitution
precludes women by using only male pronouns, which she believes was a purposeful attempt to
exclude women as the Arabic language provides ways to include references to women. In
general, Hajjar maintains that those in politics have traditionally been more focused on ensuring
equality among the various religious sects rather than equality between the sexes (Hajjar, 2003).
Thus, the Lebanese family code, or personal status laws, remain biased against women.
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By comparing the five indicators of female literacy rates, the availability of birth control,
the rate of maternal mortality, the number of women in parliament, and changes to the family
code, in both the prewar and postwar contexts, it is clear that there were improvements in
women’s rights following the Lebanese civil war. Female literacy and maternal deaths saw a
drastic improvement with the former increasing by 44.9 percent and the latter decreasing by 64.1
percent. Likewise, it was certainly positive that birth control was legalized and that its use
increased by 15.3 percent. Nevertheless, contraception was still a controversial issue in Lebanon
in the aftermath of the war (Sikimic, 2010). Likewise, even after the war, the number of women
in parliament did not jump substantially, only by 2.3 percent and although some changes
occurred in the family code to benefit women, women still faced many discriminatory laws, such
as polygamy, inheritance rights, and divorce, and were at the mercy of religious judges, often
quite patriarchal (Mansour, 2005; Livingstone, 1992).
In conclusion, Lebanese women’s wartime activism, with its focus on practical strategic
interests and use of maternalism, did lead to improvements in women’s access to birth control,
the number of women in parliament, and changes to the family code that benefited women.
However, the rise in female literacy is likely due to the effects of the war which led to increases
in women’s education (Abu Nassr, 1996; Moghadam, 2003). Likewise, in the case of decreased
maternal mortality rates, it appears to have been the result of top-down efforts by policymakers
and other professionals. For example, the Lebanese Family Planning Association was begun by
health experts and policymakers who believed that women needed better access to maternal
healthcare, which was further improved due to efforts by the Ministry of Health (el-Kak, 2012;
“Health during the Postwar Period,” 2013).
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Nevertheless, women’s groups such as the Lebanese Women’s Council and civil society
groups like the Lebanese Association for Human Rights, in which many women were active,
advocated for such improvements to female literacy and women’s maternal healthcare. Similarly,
these activists attempted to influence those in government to legalize contraception and to make
changes to the family code that benefited women, such as obtaining laws which raised the
retirement age for women from age 54 to 64, gave equal weight to men and women’s testimony
in court, allowed women to testify in real estate matters, allowed women to work in business
without their husband’s permission, allowed female diplomats to maintain Lebanese citizenship
upon marrying a non-Lebanese, and recognized women as a separate legal category from the
“incompetent” or “underaged” (Stephan, 2010; Lattouf, 2004; “Achievements and
Implementation Methods,” 2013).
2.16 Conclusion
Thus, in conclusion, this chapter provided a description of women's groups' activism
during Lebanon's civil war as well as an assessment of whether this activism was overtly
feminist through the use of Maxine Molyneux's gender interest typology. In order to understand
the context in which women's groups acted during the war years, this chapter provided
background information on Lebanon, a summary of its civil war, and finally, a depiction of
Lebanese women's experiences both prior to and during the war. Overall, women's groups were
active during Lebanon's civil war for several reasons. Some women sought to improve the
general status of women in society, while others organized strictly for humanitarian efforts such
as giving medical aid to those in need or by protesting fighting between the militias. Other
women were active in all these areas. While some women’s groups sought certain measures to
improve women’s strategic gender interests, overall, women’s groups focused their efforts on
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mainly practical gender interests. Even many feminists focused their energies on activities that
did not directly challenge patriarchy as the majority of women found themselves busy simply
trying to endure the fighting between the militias, and the lack of food and other resources. Daily
living was a struggle and thus many women put aside their political agendas in order to focus on
mere survival (Maksoud, 1996). Additionally, Lebanese women were often mobilized into
organizing based on their maternal identities. Thus the two most significant conclusions to be
taken from this chapter are that the majority of Lebanese women’s groups’ wartime activism was
not overtly feminist, and that there was a significant amount of activist mobilization based on
motherhood. These two conclusions will prove crucial in chapter four.
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Chapter 3: Women's Activism during Liberia’s Civil War
3.1 Introduction
In stark contrast to Lebanon’s postwar appraisal, since the Liberian civil war, there has
been a dominant refrain in the literature declaring the significant strides made in women’s rights
(Steady, 2011; Casimiro, et al., 2009; Fuest, 2008). For example, Veronika Fuest documents
women’s gains in government, education, and the economic sphere since the war (Fuest, 2008).
In addition, in 2005, Liberians elected Africa’s first female head of state which is a major
achievement in a country where women have historically been second class citizens (Adams,
2008; Fuest, 2008). Moreover, one of the first postwar projects undertaken by the Liberian
Ministry of Gender and Development was to partner with the United Nations Development
Programme for the “Giving Women a Voice and Leadership Role in Decision-Making and
Peacebuilding in Liberia” initiative. This project is part of Liberia’s larger goal of mainstreaming
of women’s empowerment (“Joint Press Release: Gender,” 2007). Likewise, news reports
continue to document women’s gains in Liberia in the postconflict period (Bhatia, 2011;
Golakeh, 2011).
Certainly, gains for Liberian women have not been as extensive as those documented in
other postwar sub-Saharan African countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique, and South
Africa (Steady, 2011). Furthermore, the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), a country
by country ranking of gendered discrimination within social institutions, indicates that postwar
Liberian society is discriminatory against women. The Index takes into account the prevalence of
early marriage, violence against women, women’s access to land and credit, inheritance, son
preference, and how restricted women are from public spaces (“What Is the Social Institutions,”
2013). In 2009, Liberia ranked 87 out of 102 countries in the Social Institutions and Gender
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Index9 (“Liberia, Social Institution and Gender Index,” 2013). However, Liberian women in
comparison to Lebanese women came farther much faster in the aftermath of their civil war.
3.2 Background on Liberia
To fully understand the civil war and progress in women’s right since then, the context of
the unique history of Liberia is first necessary. Liberia is a country in West Africa, along the
coast of Atlantic Ocean, with a population of about 3,900,000 (“Liberia, World Factbook,”
2012). Founded on April 25, 1822 as a colony for emancipated slaves and free blacks from the
United States, Liberia was established by a body known as the American Colonization Society
(ACS) on land that was already occupied (Akpan, 1973; Barnes, 2004). The majority of the
population living in what would become Liberia belonged to sixteen major ethnic groups
including the Kpelle, Bassa, Grebo, Gio, Mano, Kru, Loma, Kissi, Gola, Dey, Belle, Gbandi,
Krahn, Mandingo, Mende, and Vai (Boas, 2005). According to Amos Sawyer, these sixteen
groups fall under three main ethnolinguistic categories known as the Mel, Mande, and Kwa
groups. Included in the Mel-speaking group are the Gola and Kissi while the Mande-speaking
group consists of the Vai, Mende, Mandingo, Gbandi, Kpelle, Loma, Mano, and Gio. The Dey,
Belle, Bassa, Kru, Krahn, and Grebo groups are Kwa-speakers. In general, the Mel and Mande
groups were concentrated in the densely populated west and northwest of what is today Liberia,
while the Kwa groups predominated in the more sparsely populated east and southeast. There is a
history of intermarriage between the subgroups falling under each ethnolinguistic category as
well as a long history of contact and interaction between the three ethnolinguistic groups
(Sawyer, 1992).

9

SIGI was developed only in 2009 and thus is not applicable to the Lebanese case study (“What Is the Social
Institutions,” 2013).
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Sawyer argues that the area which would become Liberia was already highly complex
prior to the arrival of U.S. black settlers, and only became more so with the influx of those
involved in the back-to-Africa movement. Before colonization, the terrain, mainly rainforest,
was just beyond the periphery of such major West African empires as Ghana, Mali, and Songhai
(Sawyer, 1992). The oldest inhabitants of the area were the Gola, Kpelle, Mende, Mano, Loma,
and Gbandi, who began settling the area as far back as 6000 B.C.E. (Olukoju, 2006). Later
Mande-speakers, likely beginning with the Vai, began arriving in the rainforest regions in the
fifteenth century, and these Mande groups would eventually become the largest of the three
ethnolinguistic groups. Likewise, although Kwa-speakers were already present in the area,
further waves of Kwa groups settled in the region beginning in the fifteenth century. Around this
same period, the western coastal region, as well as inland area just north of it, became a nexus
for trade as individuals from the three ethnolinguistic groups interacted frequently. Later, in the
sixteenth century, Europeans began arriving in the area and also engaged in trading. Trade
initially centered on kola nuts and salt, but after the arrival of European traders, gold, camwood,
handmade cloth, ivory, and slaves took over (Sawyer, 1992).
Traditionally, in all three ethnolinguistic groups, the household, made up a man, his
wives, their children, other relatives, and non-kin dependents, was the starting block of society.
Each household had at least one farm which was used to produce enough food for all members of
the household. Often, each wife had her own farm which she and her children would cultivate.
Typically, the man and older male children, and any male dependents in the household would
clear the land for planting. In addition, males would also hunt to supplement the household’s
food supply while women fished in inland streams. However, among coastal Kwa groups, men
would fish the oceans, which provided a major source of food (Sawyer, 1992).
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Households formed units labeled by anthropologists as quarters, which were often based
on blood ties or other distinctive social categories such as strangers, distant relatives, or servants.
Quarters that became too large would split off and form a half-town, which was a satellite to a
village. If a portion of the quarter was even larger, it could become its own village. Amos
Sawyer stresses that the quarter was the most important political and social unit for Mel, Mande,
and Kwa groups. Similarly, for all three groups, the eldest male of the quarter, who was the
closest relation of the founder of the quarter, was the leader of the quarter and governed in
consultation with other senior men. Each village or town was affiliated with other villages to
form confederacies, which often shared larger real or fictive patrilineal ties. Such affiliations
were not always based on shared territory, but rather shared history (Sawyer, 1992).
Mel and Mande-speakers were more similar to one another than Kwa-speakers were to
either group. Most Mel and Mande groups were patrilineal, and both the social and political
hierarchy in these groups derived from association to the founding ancestor. For example, a
quarter’s influence in a confederacy depended on its relationship to ancestral lineage (Sawyer,
1992). Clarence E. Zamba Liberty notes that although it was Mel-speakers who originated the
Poro and Sande secret societies, which provided for economic, political, and social needs in the
community, these institutions were adopted by most Mande-speakers, although never Kwaspeakers (Liberty, 2002; Ellis, 2006). Sawyer explains that Poro was for men and Sande for
women, and that it was members of the Poro who sat on the village councils and selected secular
leaders. Notably, the Poro of various villages kept in contact with one another, often working to
resolve inter-ethnic interests. If a decision within the quarter could not be reached by consensus
with the quarter’s leader and council of male elders, then it was sent to the Poro and decided
there (Sawyer, 1992).
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Kwa-speaking settlements were typically smaller than Mel or Mande ones. Kwa-speakers
also differed from these other groups because many settled along the coast and thus were
seafaring. Additionally, in contrast to Mel and Mande groups who defined social and political
life through a founding ancestor, Kwa-speakers, who did acknowledge family lineage, instead
used membership in age-sets to define political and social hierarchies. Thus, political matters
rested with a council of elders, and age determined economic and political roles and as well as
hierarchies of social relationships with the more senior individual having the most authority and
status. Another difference between Mel and Mande groups, Kwa groups, which certainly
employed a council of male elders, also involved women and children in decision-making,
although wars were never the prerogative of anyone but men (Sawyer, 1992).
In all three major ehthnolingistic categories, lineage, which was patrilineal, was an
important but flexible concept which allowed individuals to claim ties to several households at
once. These connections created multiple avenues of support and also allowed ample paths to
opportunity for young men. For example, a young man just starting out frequently left his natal
village to find better opportunities by relying on connections to male relatives in other towns and
villages, such as an uncle or older brother. People sometimes even adopted another person’s
ethnicity in order to create stronger bonds between them. Thus, historically, ethnicity was fluid
rather than rigid (Sawyer, 1992).
The social landscape of what would one day become Liberia was in constant flux prior to
the arrival of African-American settlers. Political communities would form, merge with other
communities, or dissolve such unions. Notably, most villages and towns were multiethnic and
multilingual, especially in the populated west and northwest where Mel and Mande groups
dominated, as Kwa political communities tended to be much more homogenous. Thus, what

107

would be described as say a Vai village would be a village that traced its foundation to a Vai
ancestor. However, inhabitants could be from a number of ethnic groups, not simply Vai.
Likewise, households often contained members from different ethnic groups who were
dependents or client (Sawyer, 1992).
The arrival of African-Americans in what would become Liberia began with the
American Colonization Society. According to Kenneth C. Barnes, in 1816, Virginian state
legislators called on the U.S. Congress to create a territory in Africa for former slaves and free
blacks. These bigoted whites, who feared that free blacks would threaten the U.S. system of
slavery based on racial identity, were supported by a subset of white and black antislavery
activists who envisioned an African colony as a refuge for blacks. Together these diametrically
opposing proponents formed the American Colonization Society in order to purchase land for a
colony on the West African coast. The name of the colony, Liberia, derived from the Latin word
liber, meaning “free man” (Barnes, 2004: 4). Members of the American Colonization Society, a
private organization, appointed white American governors who oversaw the colony until 1841
when the settlers, those former slaves and free blacks, took control of the governorship. Later, on
July 26, 1847, the settlers declared Liberia an officially independent nation (Akpan, 1973;
Barnes, 2004).
Yet while Liberia became independent in 1847, what physically constituted the new state
was not immediately clear. According to Yekutiel Gershoni, none of Liberia’s earliest
constitutions defined its borders (Gershoni, 1987). From the original settlement of Monrovia
along the coast, the settler population slowly expanded their control toward the interior.
However, the hinterland’s thick rainforests, as well as the risk of malaria, initially kept the
settlers in Monrovia until they became aware of both the British and French governments’ desire
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for territory in the region (Akpan, 1973; Waugh, 2011). Gershoni explains that settler officials
then made treaties with indigenous leaders who conceded land rights to the Liberian government.
Following the Berlin Conference in 1884, Liberian state officials became increasingly concerned
as European governments began to solidify their political control of African territory (Gershoni,
1987).
Indeed, the governments of both Britain and France took control of several areas to which
the Liberian government had laid claim. Ever since arriving in Africa, the settlers had been
experiencing resistance to their authority from indigenous groups. However, by the early
twentieth century, the Liberian government could no longer effectively deal with both
indigenous peoples’ revolts as well as the encroachment of European forces. Thus, in 1909, the
Liberian government requested aid from the U.S. which was provided as military expertise to the
Liberian army as well as loans to the government (Clegg, 1996). However, since the 1820s, the
U.S. government had made it clear that Liberia was not a U.S. territory, and neither did the U.S.
government consider Liberia’s survival its responsibility (Richardson, 1959; Gifford, 1993).
Nevertheless, M.B. Akpan notes that the settlers modeled the government of Liberia on
the example of the U.S. by establishing an elected president and a legislative branch composed
of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Significantly, however, the Liberian
Constitution of 1841 did not grant citizenship to any indigenous Africans, only to the settlers.
Akpan argues that without the franchise or access to government jobs, indigenous people were
de facto subjects of the settlers. Indeed, indigenous people were only able to obtain an abysmal
form of representation in the legislative branch through a government-appointed delegate, or in
some cases two delegates, to represent each ethnic group. However, each delegate was required
to pay a fee for the privilege of representing his ethnic community. These delegates, who could
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not vote, were only permitted to speak on issues directly concerning their particular ethnic group.
While the delegates tried to influence the government to build more schools and to provide for
other social and economic needs for their communities, their voices went largely unheeded by
the settler-dominated government (Akpan, 1973).
Similar to the heterogeneous groups which made up the indigenous population, the settler
community was likewise varied in composition. Overall, however, the blacks comprising the
settler class came mainly from the U.S. (Barnes, 2004). According to George Klay Kieh, Jr., the
initial hierarchy of the Liberian settler social order was made up of three groups: lighter-skinned
blacks, darker-skinned blacks, and Congoes (Kieh, 1989). Colin M. Waugh points out that the
settlers included a majority of mulattoes who usually had light skin color. Typically the children
of white slave-owning fathers and black female slaves, mulattoes often received their freedom
(Waugh, 2011). These lighter-skinned African-Americans were, in general, educated and thus
ranked in the upper tier of the settler class. Some were lawyers and doctors while others served
as high-ranking state officials, but there was also a significant middle class who made their living
as merchants or junior level state bureaucrats. The lower tier of the settler community was
composed of darker-skinned African-Americans who were often self-employed farmers or
artisans. Just below these blacks in the social hierarchy were the Congoes (Kieh, 1989).
This term “Congo” was originally applied to any African recaptured from slave-traders
who was then released in Liberia (Kieh, 1989). According to William E. Allen, approximately
6,000 Africans were repatriated to Liberia by British and U.S. navy patrols which targeted slavecarrying ships after the banning of the slave trade in 1807 in Britain and in 1808 in the U.S.
(Allen, 2004). However, over time, the term Congo was purposefully used in a derogatory
manner by indigenous people to refer to any non-native individual. Many of the U.S. settlers
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found it insulting to be called by a name which referenced Africa as the immigrants and their
descendants highly valued their past association with the U.S. (Waugh, 2011).
Akpan notes that most of the recaptured Africans arrived in Liberia between 1845 and
1862. Because these Africans were so far from their homelands, and despite discrimination
against them, they were largely assimilated into settler society (Akpan, 1973). According to
Amos Sawyer, with funding provided by the U.S. government, nearly every individual
recaptured from slavers was sent to live with a settler family during which time they were given
room and board, taught a trade, and encouraged to adopt settler customs and cultural norms
(Sawyer, 1992). Thus the majority of Congoes became Christians, spoke English, wore the
settlers’ style of dress, and participated in monogamous marriages. Moreover, they were granted
the same rights as the settlers, including the right to vote. Congoes lived either in settler towns or
in towns directly next to settler towns. Akpan surmises that the repatriated Africans were small
enough in number that they did not threaten the privileges of the settlers and in fact initially
provided a buffer between the settler and indigenous communities (Akpan, 1973). However, as
Waugh points out, with time, the settlers and recaptured Africans became largely
indistinguishable from one another and thus the term “Congo” came to refer to any person whose
ancestors were not indigenous to Liberia (Waugh, 2011).
Unsurprisingly, the relationship between the settlers and the indigenous groups in Liberia
was contentious from the beginning. The land which became the first settlement of Liberia,
Monrovia, was in fact purchased only at gunpoint from the king of the indigenous group the Dey.
This first major interaction between the arriving settlers and indigenous groups set the tone for
future settler-indigenous relations. Waugh argues that the descendants of the freed slaves, as the
new elite rulers of Liberia following independence in 1847, eventually put into place an
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apartheid society in which the indigenous ethnic groups were exploited by the settlers (Waugh,
2011).
First, however, the Liberian government actually adopted a policy of assimilation.
According to Akpan, the government had hoped to encourage Africans to embrace settler ideas
and values through the use of formal schooling of indigenous youths, expanded settler towns into
the interior regions, and apprenticeship programs in which indigenous children would be sent to
work in the homes of settler families. However, in practice such assimilationist policies remained
largely unimplemented as the Liberian government lacked funding. Even at the end of the 1890s,
the only sustained contact settlers had with any indigenous groups were those located on the
coasts, such as with the Kru, Vai, Dey, Bassa, and Grebo. Thus, at that point in the 1890s,
members of the government followed the examples of some European colonial powers and
implemented a system of indirect rule (Akpan, 1973).
Waugh explains that the Liberian government divided the hinterland into provinces and
then sub-divided each province into several districts which were run by provincial and district
commissioners. These commissioners were all settlers or descendants of settlers and thus were
essentially colonial administrators who enforced the laws of the Liberian government by relying
on local chiefs to deal with the day-to-day business of each district (Waugh, 2011). Akpan notes
that the indigenous groups suffered many injustices under this system of colonialism. In
particular, the Liberian government required an onerous hut tax, which applied only to
indigenous people, that constituted a large portion of the state’s revenue. Moreover, indigenous
groups were required to supply free labor for government projects, and district commissioners
and their aides often abused their power by levying illegal fees, taxes, and fines on indigenous
communities. According to Akpan, indigenous Liberians were given little in return as far as
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schools or hospitals. Unsurprisingly, frequent and bloody indigenous rebellions broke out
periodically against colonial forces, but such rebellions were always suppressed by government
forces that had superior weaponry, often supplied by the U.S. (Akpan, 1973).
3.3 Liberia’s Conflict over Identity
As clearly evidenced, people living in Liberia were conflicted over who constituted a
Liberian. Similar to Lebanon’s Christian-Muslim divide, Liberia’s historical debate over national
identity centered on the settler-indigenous division. According to Morten Boas, the settlers
designed a classic in-group/out-group system in which the indigenous population fell squarely
into the out-group. Additionally, the Liberian constitution institutionalized this system by
bestowing citizenship only on the settlers and their descendants. By denying anyone native to the
region the same rights as the settlers and their descendants, a pernicious alienation between the
two groups arose (Boas, 2005). Akpan describes the most telling sign of the divide between the
two populations as the low rate of intermarriage. Although settler men often engaged in sexual
relations with indigenous women, such relationships were never validated with marriage, which
indigenous Africans found offensive (Akpan, 1973).
According to Akpan, the settlers viewed the U.S. as their homeland and were also
culturally American in both their manner of dress and food preferences, as well as in the
construction of their houses which were often modeled on the plantations of the American South
(Boas, 2005; Akpan, 1973). Moreover, Akpan notes that the settlers spoke English and practiced
Christianity, and additionally adhered to monogamous marriages as well as the right of
individuals to own land. Viewing themselves as “civilized” as opposed to the indigenous people
living in Liberia whom they considered “barbarous,” the settlers saw their role as providing a
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model of “civilization” to the rest of Africa, especially through the conversion of indigenous
people to Christianity (Akpan, 1973).
Similar to the settlers’ view of the Africans, indigenous people likewise considered the
settlers to be unworthy, looking down on them for being former slaves. Unquestionably, the
indigenous Africans in Liberia differed culturally from these settlers, but also from one
community to another. As Akpan points out, for example, each ethnic group spoke its own
language (Akpan, 1973). Nonetheless, in general, almost all indigenous groups lived in homes
furnished of clay or mud with roofs of thatch or grass. In addition, almost all African groups held
land communally, and their cuisine included local foodstuffs such as cassava, plantain, yams,
and palm-oil, which many settlers avoided eating (Richardson, 1959; Akpan, 1973). Moreover,
Africans were either Muslims or Animists, and almost every ethnic group had age-group
organizations and/or secret societies, such as the most well-known, the Poro and Sande, which
provided for economic, political, and social needs in each ethnic community (Ellis, 2006).
Boas aptly describes the settler community as essentially transplanting the U.S. system of
plantations found in the Deep South to the colony of Liberia. The settlers placed themselves at
the top of the social hierarchy where both they and their descendants openly exploited the
indigenous population (Boas, 2005). In fact, by 1979, a mere four percent of Liberia’s population
controlled approximately sixty percent of its wealth. Unsurprisingly, it was the descendants of
the settlers who had access to markets, education, and technology. Meanwhile, the patronage
system run by the Liberian government co-opted local leaders in the countryside by enticing
them with various state resources in return for keeping the rest of the indigenous population from
gaining access to skilled jobs and education (Waugh, 2011). Akpan notes that indigenous
individuals appointed to collect taxes were actually removed if they did not extort the population,
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and were replaced by others, even if these new men did not have traditional claim to political
power. To maintain their power, such individuals were happy to represent the state’s wishes
(Akpan, 1973). A wide gulf existed between the general life experience of most indigenous
Liberians and those Liberians who were descendants of the settlers (Waugh, 2011).
In time, the descendants of the settlers became known as Americo-Liberians (Ajibewa,
1999). As previously mentioned, the black immigrants were proud of their connection to the
U.S., and the term Americo-Liberian perfectly captures that association. Yet, over time, even the
term Congo, initially viewed as offensive by the settlers, was adopted by Americo-Liberians as
they and the original Congoes, the recaptured slaves, became closely socially intertwined as the
ruling class (Waugh, 2011; Williams, 2013). However, according to Helen Cooper, AmericoLiberians applied the term Country People to indigenous persons (which they intended to be a
slur) (Cooper, 2008). Elizabeth Tonkin explains that the term Country Person sought to
emphasize the general Americo-Liberian view of the so-called “backwardness” of indigenous
groups and connate the inferiority of indigenous people (Tonkin, 2010). Boas refers to the
divisive mentality that permeated Liberian society as an “us versus them” syndrome (Boas, 2005:
76).
Nevertheless, while indigenous Liberian cultures were largely ignored by the settlers and
their early descendants, over time some local cultural practices were adopted by AmericoLiberians. For example, Allen argues that Americo-Liberians began to eat many food dishes that
were part of the traditional cuisine of some indigenous groups (Allen, 2004). Moreover,
Americo-Liberians, like most indigenous people, began to practice multiple forms of spirituality
which drew upon Western Christian traditions as well as many spiritual practices native to
Liberia (Waugh, 2011). For example, Stephen Ellis argues that secret societies such as the Poro
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were so integral to much of rural Liberian society that many Americo-Liberian politicians
practiced Poro rituals alongside Christianity in order to cultivate and maintain political power
(Ellis, 2006). Nevertheless, despite the adoptions of some indigenous practices, overall, most
Americo-Liberians did not endeavor to learn extensively about indigenous cultures. Pointedly,
few attempted to learn any indigenous languages, much less indigenous customs or traditions
(Waugh, 2011).
Thus, as far back as 1947, a civil war in Liberia was viewed as inevitable (Kupah, 1999).
One incidence in particular foreshadowed what would eventually become the fourteen year war.
On April 12, 1980, a Krahn by the name of Samuel Doe overthrew then President William
Tolbert, in a move that was largely celebrated by indigenous groups (Boas, 2005; Waugh, 2011).
Morten Boas indicates that since 1870 and until the 1980 coup, Liberia had been subjected to
one-party rule by the True Whig Party (TWP) (Boas, 2005). Although only between three and
five percent of the Americo-Liberian community ever ruled Liberia through the True Whig
Party, Colin M. Waugh points out that its leading membership was composed solely of settlers
and their descendants (Boas, 2005; Waugh, 2011). Moreover, the indigenous population grew
increasingly resentful of the Americo-Liberians in the decade prior to the 1980 overthrow of
Tolbert even as his administration had begun including more indigenous people in government
positions, and education was made more widely available to non-Americo-Liberians. It was too
late for such gradual reform (Waugh, 2011). Julius Emeka Okolo points out that it was the
Tolbert regime’s repression of an increasingly organized political opposition that played a major
role in triggering the coup (Okolo, 1987). For example, the student-dominated movements the
Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA), born in the University of Liberia, and the Progressive
Alliance of Liberia (PAL) were growing increasingly popular. When PAL founded the
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Progressive People’s Party (PPP) as an official opposition party in 1979, it was banned by the
Tolbert government, leading to rumors of a military coup as popular anger increased (Ellis,
2006). Helen Cooper concludes that the 1979 government decision to raise the price of rice by
fifty percent, the most basic of food staples for the economically disadvantaged, pushed antiAmerico-Liberian sentiment among the indigenous population to the breaking point (Cooper,
2008).
Immediately following the coup, the indigenous population embraced Doe’s regime,
celebrating one the “true” sons of Liberia finally coming to power. Doe was swift to abolish the
hut tax, and to raise the salaries of soldiers, two moves that were popular with indigenous groups
(Boas, 2005). In fact, Colin M. Waugh notes that the announcement of the overthrow of the True
Whig Party regime led to street celebrations in Monrovia (Waugh, 2011). However, the partying
was short-lived. Doe made it clear to Thomas Quiwonkpa, a sergeant in the Liberian army who
played a role in Doe’s ruling junta, the People’s Redemption Council (PRC), that he intended on
winning in a civilian election. Quiwonkpa feared that his own position in power would end as it
depended on continued military rule. Thus, when Doe rigged the 1985 election in his favor,
Quiwonkpa attempted a coup over Doe as leader of a rebel movement known as the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Although Quiwonkpa’s rebellion was foiled, Doe began to
favor those of his own Krahn ethnicity with power and resources (Kieh, 1992; Boas, 1997; Boas,
2001; Ellis, 2006). According to Mary H. Moran, Doe believed that by placing fellow Krahns in
his inner circle, he could protect himself from potential usurpers, such as Quiwonkpa, who
wished to overthrow the government as he himself had done. As a consequence of Doe’s
promotion of the Krahn, other indigenous groups responded accordingly by also turning to
ethnonationalism (Moran, 1996). In fact, Boas argues that it was under Doe that inter-ethnic
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hostilities between indigenous groups became an issue. Prior to this, it had simply been the
division between the settlers and their descendants versus indigenous groups (Boas, 1997; Boas,
2001). It is important to note that despite the killing of Tolbert and thirteen men from his
presidential cabinet, Doe did not persecute Americo-Liberians, and, in fact, eventually employed
many Americo-Liberian officials from both Tubman and Tolbert’s regimes in his own
government. Essentially, Americo-Liberian dominance remained in addition to a new group,
Krahns, who were also awarded power and resources (Giffords, 1993; Ellis, 2006).
Although the U.S. had largely ignored Liberia until the twentieth century, since World
War II, the U.S. had increasingly viewed Liberia as an ally (Giffords, 1993). This relationship
was especially important to the U.S. government during the Cold War. In fact, the main base for
U.S. Cold War intelligence in West Africa was located in Liberia, which included a satellitetracking system and C.I.A. station (Ellis, 2006). Paul Giffords notes that U.S. presidents and
vice-presidents had praised the Liberian government under the Americo-Liberian rule of both
Tubman and Tolbert. The U.S. government believed that in the context of the post-World War II
world, with many newly independent African states leaning toward socialism and Soviet support,
an ally like Liberia could promote U.S. interests, such as capitalism, in Africa. Nevertheless,
toward the end of Tolbert’s last ruling years, he had begun increasing contacts with U.S.S.R.
officials. When Doe took over in 1980, he realized that to ensure his position, he needed to
increase and reaffirm Liberia’s connection to the U.S. Thus, he decreased Liberian-Soviet
relations, and in return, received increased levels of military and civil aid from the U.S. Even in
1979, when Tolbert was still in control, Liberia received $20 million in aid from the U.S. By the
year 1985-1986, the U.S. gave Doe $90 million worth of aid, the highest that any African nation
received from the U.S. Yet this massive aid to Doe went to buy a faithful ally rather than to
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develop democracy (Giffords, 1993). Overall, most Liberians, even indigenous Liberians, felt
that they were no better off under Doe than prior to his coup, largely because he rigged elections
and favored the Krahns in the same way that the previous Americo-Liberian administrations had
favored Americo-Liberians (Kieh, 1992). This violent coup of 1980 was the first sign of the
impending Liberian civil war.
3.4 Summary of Liberia’s Civil War
In all, Liberia’s complex fourteen year civil war caused the deaths of approximately
200,000 Liberians and displaced about one million, mainly to Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea, but also
to Sierra Leone, Ghana, and the U.S. (Long, 2008; Waugh, 2011). The war can best be
understood in three phases: the period from 1989 to 1997 in which Doe was overthrown and
killed, the period from 1997 to 1999 in which Charles Taylor was elected president, and finally,
the period from 1999 to 2003 which resulted in further factional fighting, but culminated with the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
On December 24, 1989, a Liberian named Charles Taylor led a small group of armed
men into Liberia from across the border in Côte d’Ivoire. Taylor, who had once served under
Doe, now led what was once Quiwonkpa’s rebel movement, the NPFL (Boas, 2001). According
to Stephen Ellis, the NPFL under Quiwonkpa had not been a structured organization (Ellis,
2006). Essentially, a group of men who had defected from the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL),
the state military force, had fled to Burkina Faso and adopted the name NPFL. Following
Quiwonkpa’s death by Doe’s forces in 1985, several figures in the NPFL movement vied for
leadership. Through Taylor’s many personal connections, especially to Muammar Gaddaffi who
provided training and funds to NPFL fighters, he convinced the majority of NPFL members that
he was best suited to take over. Likewise, Taylor manipulated many Americo-Liberians into
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believing that the NPFL would help restore the True Whig Party’s control of Liberia and thus he
also received financial backing from them. Yet, Taylor truly only wanted the power of
controlling Liberia for himself, especially the associated wealth that this control would bring
(Ajibewa, 1999; Ellis, 2006).
Taylor’s preliminary force of 100 lightly armed NPFL men gradually swelled by
September of 1990 to include about 10,000 fighters (Boas, 2001). George Klay Kieh, Jr. notes
that Taylor enticed Liberian civilians, especially from the Gio and Mano groups, to join his
militia with promises of jobs, money, and plunder. However, in July of 1990, another member of
the NPFL, Prince Johnson, railed at Taylor’s leadership and split off to form the Independent
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) (Kieh, 1992; Ajibewa, 1999). On September 10,
1990, Johnson led his fighters, who controlled the majority of Monrovia, to murder Doe. By this
point, Taylor and his fighters controlled about ninety-five percent of the country, all of which,
however, lay outside of Monrovia (Ellis, 2006; Harris, 1999).
Meanwhile, on August 24, 1990, representatives of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) voted to intervene in the Liberian conflict by using a force which
would become known as the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) (Ellis, 2006). George Klay Kieh, Jr. believes that the leader of
Nigeria, dictator Ibrahim Babangida, pushed for the ECOMOG force as he feared Taylor could
inspire others to mount similar insurrections against regional governments in a domino effect
(Kieh, 1992). Max A. Sesay argues that likewise, the leaders of Ghana, Sierra Leone, the
Gambia, and Guinea agreed to an intervention fearing that their own regimes could possibly be
overthrown by copycats if Taylor or Johnson were able to depose Doe (Sesay, 1996). Although
the leaders of ECOMOG had installed an interim government in Monrovia known as the Interim
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Government of National Unity (IGNU) on August 7, 1990, it was little more than a puppet
regime which Liberians often referred to as the “Imported Government of No Use” (Waugh,
2011: 5, 145-6; Harris, 1999; Ellis, 2006). Around the same time, Taylor, who still controlled
over ninety percent of the country, set up a parallel government which he called Greater Liberia
(Ellis, 2006).
Fighting continued between various armed factions throughout the mid-1990s. In fact,
members of ECOMOG actually became embroiled in the conflict themselves by openly opposing
Taylor, in addition to being guilty of looting from civilians and even delving into arms dealing
(Sesay, 1996; Waugh, 2011). Moreover, other groups such as the United Liberation Movement
of Liberia (ULIMO), composed mainly of Doe’s former Armed Forces of Liberia soldiers who
had fled to Sierra Leone, and the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), comprised of mainly Krahns,
formed and began fighting as well (Ajibewa, 1999; Harris, 1999). Then, on September 22, 1993,
representatives of the United Nations Security Council sent the United Nations Observer Mission
in Liberia (UNOMIL) to assist ECOMOG in the disarmament and demobilization of combatants
during one of the many ceasefires that was eventually broken (Sesay, 1996; “Liberia—
UNIOMIL Background,” 2013). In fact, a series of unsuccessful ceasefires and peace talks
occurred throughout the early to mid-1990s (Harris, 1999). Adding further to the confusion, in
April of 1994, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia split into two factions, known as
ULIMO-K, and ULIMO-J, based on ethnic divisions with the former Mandingo-dominated, and
the latter composed mainly of Krahns (Ellis, 2006).
Yet on August 19, 1995, an agreement known as the first Abuja Accord held for long
enough that the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) formed. When fighting
broke out in Monrovia on April 6, 1996, it was resolved with the second Abuja Accord which
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implemented a ceasefire beginning August 31, 1996. The second Abuja Accord established the
Independent Electoral Commission (IECOM) whose aim was to see that free and fair elections
would be held. Additionally, the Accord set a timetable for disarmament of the various armed
groups (Harris, 1999; “Liberia—UNIOMIL Background,” 2013; Bekoe, 2008).
While elections did take place on July 19, 1997, the civil war was by no means over, but
had only entered its second phase which lasted from 1997 to 1999. In a relatively free and fair
election, Charles Taylor won the presidency. According to Harris, the reason that the majority of
the population voted for him was largely out of fear. Taylor’s personal army, the NPFL,
remained mobilized and armed throughout the electoral process as the second Abuja Accord,
which called for demobilization, failed to be fully implemented. Additionally, ECOMOG forces
had only a tenuous grip on security matters. Harris argues that the Liberian population voted for
the best alternative possible, a secure Liberia, as most reasoned that Taylor would never cease
fighting until he controlled the country. By having Taylor officially elected president, many
Liberians hoped that basic stability could be restored (Harris, 1999).
When ECOMOG forces were withdrawn earlier than planned in 1999, the state’s Armed
Forces of Liberia had not been fully retrained and restructured by ECOMOG (Aboagye, 1999).
Thus, Taylor took to using his NPFL fighters to handle national security concerns. This practice,
coupled with the failure of disarmament and demobilization, led to the continuation of the war
(Birikorang, 2003/2004; Jaye, 2003). As George Klay Kieh, Jr. observes, the peace-building
project in Liberia was an abysmal failure (Kieh, 2009a). Outright combat among the various
armed groups may have halted for two years, but as soon as ECOMOG forces left the country,
fighting among armed factions resumed (Jaye, 2003).
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Thus, the final phase of the Liberian civil war began when a new militia, called the
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), launched an attack on southeastern
Liberia from across the border in Guinea on April 21, 1999 (Kieh, 2009a). Emma Birikorang
notes that this force was composed mainly of Mandingo and Krahn combatants who had fought
before as part of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia. The sole aim of this armed force
was to unseat Taylor (Birikorang, 2003/2004). By this time, already an estimated 150,000
Liberians had been killed. At the end of the fourteen year war, approximately 200,000 to 250,000
Liberians were dead as a result of the fighting, and another 200,000 were believed to be
wounded. Likewise, at least 700,000 people had fled Liberia for safety by the end of the first
portion of the war in 1997. But by the end of the war, at least 1 million are believed to have
become refugees and another 1.4 million had become internally displaced persons (IDP) within
Liberia (Waugh, 2011; “Liberia—First Civil War,” 2013; “Liberia: Consequences of Liberian
Civil,” 2012).
Fighting between LURD and Taylor’s NPFL continued from April 1999 throughout 2002
as peace talks came and went, but nothing substantial was accomplished. In April of 2003, a
group of Krahn fighters splintered from the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
in order to form the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). This division, based once
again on ethnic lines, rendered LURD Mandingo-dominated and MODEL primarily composed of
Krahns. Beginning June 4, 2003, representatives of ECOWAS were able to mediate between
Charles Taylor’s forces, LURD, and MODEL. The talks, which took place in Accra, Ghana, also
included representatives of all Liberian political parties (Birikorang, 2003/2004). On August 18,
2003, the leaders of the three armed factions and political parties signed the “Peace Agreement
between the Government of Liberia (GOL) and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and
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Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political
Parties” in which all signatories committed to the disarmament and demobilization of all armed
forces, as well as the rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants into society (“Liberia:
Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” 2003). Additionally, the peace treaty, which became known
as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), set up a transitional government, known as the
National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), and outlined plans for elections to be held
in October of 2005 (Jennings, 2007; Sawyer, 2008).
Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, on October 1, 2003,
United Nations troops entered Liberia, as part of the second United Nations endeavor into
Liberia’s civil war, known as the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), in order to assist
with peacekeeping operations (“UNMIL United Nations Mission,” 2012). Kathleen M. Jennings
contends that the peacekeeping mission outlined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement did not
successfully reintegrate ex-combatants into society or lead to complete disarmament (Jennings,
2007). In fact, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement did not deal with the root causes of the war,
nor did it create a tribunal to prosecute war crimes. The negotiators at Accra believed securing a
ceasefire as soon as possible was more important than trying to force a system of retributive
justice on the leaders of the warring factions (Waugh, 2011). Moreover, Amos Sawyer argues
that those in the National Transitional Government of Liberia largely used their positions to
further participate in the plundering of resources, rather than helping to move the country
forward. Nevertheless, Sawyer contends that the 2005 elections were satisfactory overall,
especially for a society coming out of a devastating war. Although many political parties did not
promote an all-inclusive society, there were positive signs, including a resurgence in indigenous
institutions as well as a high rate of female participation (Sawyer, 2008).
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Lastly, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement established the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) of Liberia, which, unique to truth commissions, held public hearings in
fifteen countries so that many of the Liberians living in diaspora were also able to participate in
the process (Long, 2008). Nevertheless, the commission was criticized for poor methodological
standards that would never hold up in judicial review which inevitably invalidated its findings
(Steinberg, 2009). Another problem with the truth commission was that many militia leaders
openly bragged about their horrific misdeeds, blatantly denied committing any atrocities, and/or
accused their enemies of various offenses during the proceedings, none of which promoted the
healing of Liberian society. Finally, the assumption had been that the commission guaranteed
amnesty to those who participated. Thus, when the commissioners released their
recommendations, which included banning those guilty of war transgressions from public office
for upwards of thirty years, Liberian political elites, many of whom were former militia leaders,
were outraged (Waugh, 2011; Steinberg, 2009). Despite both Liberian politicians and the
international community ignoring the report, including its recommendations, the majority of the
Liberian public embraced the findings as a way to recognize the everyday suffering caused by
the war (Hayner, 2011; Steinberg, 2009).
Overall, the fourteen year war resulted in horrific conditions for the average Liberian.
Most of the war was waged against non-combatants and millions of dollars of property was
destroyed due to the fighting (Waugh, 2011; Thompson, 2008). The three phases of this
destructive civil war can be broken down into Doe’s overthrow and the factional fighting which
lasted from 1989 to 1997, Charles Taylor’s rule from 1997 to 1999, and finally, the period of
violence between armed forces from 1999 to 2003 which was resolved through the
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Comprehensive Peace Agreement. While the narrative of the war is complex, so too were the
many causes of the war.
3.5 The Causes of Liberia’s Civil War
Even more multifaceted than the actors and events are the causes of Liberia’s fourteen
year civil war. Primordialist scholars, or those that believe ethnicity to be an immutable
characteristic, most frequently cite ethnic conflict rooted in the separate origins of the AmericoLiberians and indigenous Liberians as the catalyst of the war (Ajibewa, 1999; Akpan, 1973;
Boas, 2005; Dolo, 2010; Pham, 2004; Jesse and Williams, 2011). Others argue that more
instrumentalist factors deriving from militia leaders’ youth manipulation and external
interferences are to blame for the civil war (Boas, 2005; Boas, 2001; Ellis, 1995; Kieh, 2009b;
Utas, 2008). Instrumentalist interpretations of ethnic conflict focus on how elites can obtain
support by rallying masses around ethnicity (Jesse and Williams, 2011). This appears to be the
case of the Liberian civil war.
Many have argued that the cause of the civil war is ethnic conflict specifically based on
the differing origins of Americo-Liberians and indigenous Liberians (Ajibewa, 1999; Akpan,
1973; Boas, 2005; Dolo, 2010; Pham, 2004). According to Morten Boas, identity in Liberia was
produced through the positioning of one’s group in relation to other groups. It was an “us versus
them” identification that did not expressly view others as enemies, but did make those falling
outside one’s group “strangers” (Boas, 2001: 701). While Colin M. Waugh acknowledges that
the last two Americo-Liberian presidents instituted reforms intended to ensure better treatment of
indigenous citizens, it was not enough to prevent Doe’s coup d’état, nor his initial widespread
support from indigenous groups (Waugh, 2011). After the outbreak of the civil war, ethnic
conflict continued, although it shifted from being between Americo-Liberians and indigenous
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groups to being an intra-indigenous ethnic conflict with Mandingos and Krahns aligned against
Gios and Manos. This was mainly the result of Doe’s preferential treatment of both Krahns and
Mandingos which Taylor took advantage of by playing up ethnic divisions and pushing many
Gio and Mano citizens to join his militia (Kieh, 2009b; Boas, 1997).
Relatedly, some scholars have argued that a religious divide further entrenched conflict in
Liberia. From the beginning of their migration to Liberia, Americo-Liberians had looked down
on indigenous groups’ religions with the exception of Islam, which most Americo-Liberians
viewed as deserving of some respect (d’Azevedo, 1994; Ellis, 2010). However, Paul Gifford
argues that with the arrival of U.S. Christian fundamentalist missionaries in the 1980s, there was
increased animosity between Christians and Muslims in Liberia due to American missionaries’
teachings. Furthermore, because many immigrant Lebanese Muslims and most of the largely
Muslim Mandingo population were successful economically, tensions further grew between
Christians and Muslims (Giffords, 1993). Moreover, according to Augustine Konneh, the
Mandingos were particularly disliked by other indigenous groups and labeled as “foreigners,”
despite having resided in Liberia since the eighteenth century. Due mainly to the Mandingos’
relationship with the True Whig Party which had granted them special economic privileges, but
also because of their Muslim faith which prevented them from utilizing indigenous religious
institutions such as the Poro and the Sande, other indigenous groups largely rejected their
presence (Konneh, 1996).
Indeed, Stephen Ellis notes that a large part of the United Liberation Movement of
Liberia’s membership included those formerly affiliated with the Movement for the Redemption
of Liberian Muslims, a militia created by Alhaji Kromah in 1991 specifically for Mandingos,
which eventually merged with Albert Karpeh’s Liberian United Defense Force to form the
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United Liberation Movement of Liberia. Kromah promoted the image of the NPFL as being antiMuslim since it targeted Mandingos. Ellis argues that it is quite possible that because of the
widespread anti-Mandingo sentiment in Liberia, over time there grew to be an anti-Islam bias
among many non-Muslim Liberians (Ellis, 1995).
Nevertheless, George Klay Kieh, Jr., argues that a simple ethnic or religious conflict
thesis fails to provide adequate motivation for the civil war and also unfairly homogenizes the
various social groups (Kieh, 2009b). Kieh qualifies that a major factor in the conflict between
Americo-Liberians and indigenous groups was the existence of severe economic inequalities
which caused an enormous class divide. Prior to Doe’s coup, the ruling cohort of AmericoLiberians in the True Whig Party, who made up only approximately four percent of the
population, controlled over sixty-five percent of the wealth in Liberia (Kieh, 1992). Furthermore,
there was a distinct class division between those living in urban milieus versus rural areas, with
the average urban family, usually Americo-Liberian, out-earning their rural counterparts,
generally indigenous, by about nine times (Kieh, 1992; Waugh, 2011).
Thus, militia leaders such as Taylor and Kromah promoted ethnic conflict in
instrumentalist ways such as through youth manipulation in order to inspire Liberians to fight.
The youth, long deprived of the economic means to support themselves due to the government’s
mismanagement of the economy, were ripe for conscription into militias which provided them
looting opportunities to make up for what they financially lacked (Kieh, 2009b; Keen, 1998;
Utas, 2008). Morten Boas argues that the leaders of the various armed forces fiercely fought for
control of resources. Economic motivation was of prime importance during the war with militia
leaders fighting for political control in order to obtain diamonds, gold, rubber, palm oil, timber,
marijuana, and looted goods (Boas, 2001). In fact, David Harris believes that one reason for the
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multiplying militias was the opportunity for commercial profits (Harris, 1999). Furthermore, an
empirical study by Havard Hegre, Gudrun Ostby, and Clionadh Raleigh confirms that the
majority of the fighting during the war occurred in areas which allowed for quick profits. For
example, in more urban spaces, shopping districts where made battle sites, whereas in the rural
areas mines and forests were targeted in order to obtain raw goods (Hegre, Ostby, and Raleigh,
2009).
This passion for greed is often traced to the nepotism which was rampant throughout
Liberia. Indeed, the leaders of the True Whig Party, all Americo-Liberians, maintained control
through a system of nepotism in which they, as patrons, made alliances with local indigenous
chiefs through the awarding of various resources (Boas, 2001; Waugh, 2011). Kieh also notes
that in addition to bribery, government officials treated state resources as personal property
(Kieh, 2009b). This mode of corruption was extended by Doe who in fact increased the role of
patronage under his regime, and was similarly continued later under Taylor (Waugh, 2011;
Gifford, 1993). Thus, when militia leaders promised young fighters the chance to loot, the youth,
long kept from accumulating any wealth, responded with gusto (Keen, 1998; Utas, 2008)
One of the most disturbing aspects of youth manipulation in the Liberian civil war was
the ubiquitous use of child soldiers. Although an exact number cannot be given, an estimated
5,000 to 38,000 children served (Pan, 2003; Veney, 2006). Researchers at Human Rights Watch
observe that child soldiers were used mainly due to the fact that most children are obedient, as
well as easily manipulated. Many youths voluntarily joined militias in order to survive after
losing their caretakers. However, there is also clear evidence that many were forced into
soldiering, often by being drugged and/or kidnapped (“Easy Prey: Child Soldiers,” 1994). After
the war, former child soldiers were largely stigmatized by mainstream Liberian society, being
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viewed as violent and untrustworthy (Holland and Kamara-Umunna, 2011). Moreover, Ruthie
Ackerman argues that the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and rehabilitation (DDRR)
programs for ex-combatants were largely inadequate, leaving most former child soldiers living
on the streets (Ackerman, 2009).
Lastly, the role of external interventions provides another way that ethnic tensions were
exploited by militia leaders of the NPFL, LURD, and others. Although the involvement by
ECOWAS, especially through the Nigerian government, has already been discussed, there were
other outside actors involved in the conflict which helped to foment and prolong the war.
Notably, the leaders of Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Libya all provided training, money,
and/or weapons to Charles Taylor (Sesay, 1996). Likewise, initially, the U.S. government
supported Doe in the form of military advisors. Following Doe’s murder, the U.S. government
lent support to Johnson, and then ECOMOG (Kieh, 1992). Nonetheless, as Max A. Sesay
observes, the U.S. government, despite the historical connection between the U.S. and Liberia,
largely ignored the worsening humanitarian situation in Liberia, as it was of no strategic
importance in the post-Cold War world (Sesay, 1996). In fact, after the U.S. invaded Iraq in
1991, the U.S. government’s attention to Liberia largely evaporated. Yet, many analysts,
including some in the U.S. Department, believe that the fighting could have ended in 1990 if the
U.S. had sent even a small contingent into Liberia. Later, in 2003, the U.S. government did
indicate its wish for Taylor to step down, but again there were no troops deployed to help end the
fighting, despite the calls of many Liberians requesting U.S. intervention (Waugh, 2011). Thus,
the involvement of the governments of Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Libya, and the U.S. in
Liberia, as well as the government of Guinea which also contributed to the war by supplying the
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Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy militia with arms, helped militia leaders to
inspire ordinary Liberians to fight one another (Smith, 2006).
Interestingly, one Liberian armed faction made its own intrusion across national borders.
In 1991, Taylor helped foment a proxy army in Sierra Leone called the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF), whose adherents murdered thousands of Sierra Leonean citizens and enslaved
many others in the mining of diamonds. These diamonds, which were exchanged with Taylor for
weapons, became known as “blood diamonds” (Petrou, 2009; Waugh, 2011). Later, in April of
2012, years after the Liberian civil war ended in 2003, Taylor was charged by the Special Court
for Sierra Leone with eleven counts of war crimes including such acts as terrorizing civilians,
unlawful killing, crimes of sexual and physical violence, using child soldiers, and abducting
people for the purpose of forced labor. In May 2012, Taylor was sentenced by the Court to 50
years in jail. He is currently serving out his sentence in Britain, although he is appealing his case
(Summers, 2012; Sesay, 2013; “Charles Taylor Trial: Investigator,” 2013; “The Accused,
Special Court,” 2012).
To conclude, the Liberian civil war was a drawn-out conflict that destroyed many
people’s lives and left many struggling to survive (“Africa Women and Peace Support,” 2004).
While many scholars cite ethnic conflict as the main catalyst of the war, for reasons associated
with differences in origin, the civil war is more attributable to the ethnic instrumentalism of
militia leaders who manipulated the youth and received support from external actors (Ajibewa,
1999; Boas, 2005; Boas, 2001; Ellis, 1995; Kieh, 2009b; Utas, 2008). Yet, while the context of
the war is important to the understanding of Liberian women’s wartime experiences, the ultimate
focus of this chapter, it is also crucial to appreciate Liberian’s women’s general experiences prior
to the start of the war.
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3.6 Women in Liberian Society
As with women in virtually all societies, Liberian women have historically faced multiple
forms of patriarchy, the institutionalization of male dominance over women and children within
the family and larger society (Lerner, 1987). Regardless of ethnicity, racial background, class, or
religion, Liberian women have had their lives structured by the patriarchal institutions of the
family, economy, and religion. A major form of patriarchy which has defined Liberian women’s
lives is the institution of the family. Historically, there were differences among the many
indigenous communities as well as in comparison with the Americo-Liberian community, but
overall marriage has been limiting for all Liberian women. According to Ayodeji Olukoju,
Liberian women have traditionally rendered many services within the home, such as cooking,
cleaning, and raising children, as part of their wifely duties (Olukoju, 2006).
Americo-Liberian women could file claims in court since their marriages were
recognized by governmental law, while indigenous women in traditional marriages, which were
based on customary law, did not have access to due process (Olukoju, 2006). As Kristina Scurry
Baehr and Chi Mgbako point out, the goal of customary law in marriage disputes was
reconciliation. Thus, women who brought their cases before a chief, who heard cases in the
customary tradition, were instructed to work out marital problems rather than divorce (Baehr and
Mgbako, 2011). However, despite the fact that Americo-Liberian women had the right to file for
divorce, historically, divorce was rarely granted. Santosh C. Saha notes that judges also sought to
preserve statutory marriages by promoting reconciliation between husbands and wives (Saha,
1998).
Another aspect of the patriarchal institution of the family is childbearing which has been
considered particularly important for all Liberian women, regardless of social location

132

(Olonishakin, 1995). Even urban professional women have traditionally maintained high fertility
rates (Kollehlon, 1984). The role of motherhood will be discussed in a later section. However, it
is important to note that nearly all scholars on the subject contend that motherhood is an
extremely significant concept in Liberia (Steady, 2011; Casimiro et al., 2009). Finally, another
factor which affected both Americo-Liberian and indigenous women within the institution of the
family was the role that men played as the final decision-makers within in the household
(Omanyondo, 2005). Linda Lacey and Irit Sinai confirm that across all strata of Liberian society,
males have traditionally been viewed as the heads of household, although there have always been
some female-headed households which were at clear financial and social disadvantages (Lacey
and Sinai, 1996).
The second major patriarchal institution in the lives of Liberian women is the system of
income generation within the household. In Liberia, most indigenous societies’ gender division
of labor differs drastically from the concept of a separate female private sphere and public male
sphere (Sudarkasa, 1986). Indigenous groups have practiced a gendered division of labor in
which women have, in addition to performing household chores as well as bearing and raising
children, helped economically support their husbands through farming and/or generating income
in a market setting (Olukoju, 2006). According to Niara Sudarkasa, the traditional role of West
African women in the economic sphere, whether through farming, trade, or artisan craft
production, was viewed as complementary to men’s work (Sudarkasa, 1986). Mary H. Moran
notes that in the southeast of Liberia, where women have traditionally performed most of the
farm labor, women had exclusive control over what they produced, and that any money earned
from selling surplus produce was theirs to keep (Moran, 1988). Nevertheless, such examples of
Liberian women’s involvement in public spaces have been construed as part of women’s
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responsibilities originating in the private sphere. For instance, Judith Van Allen notes that the
public/private divide in sub-Saharan Africa functions in a less overtly divisional way than in the
Western world. Throughout the region, women’s activities on the farm, in the factory, and/or in
professional settings are generally viewed as an extension of female reproductive activities, as it
is women’s economic labor which enables children to eat and obtain other necessities (Van
Allen, 2000; Casimiro et al., 2009).
In contrast, the Americo-Liberian community has held more closely to the Western
division of a female private sphere and a male public sphere. Unlike most indigenous women
who were expected to engage in economic activities, Americo-Liberian women have
traditionally relied on men for financial support (Blyden, 2002). The historic ability of AmericoLiberian women to abstain from paid labor was due to their class privilege as the AmericoLiberian community dominated the country’s economy and formed its aristocracy (Ellis, 2006;
Kieh, 2009b). Yet, despite this tradition of being supported by their husbands, some AmericoLiberian women have also worked outside the home, although mainly in such feminized fields
such as teaching and administrative labor. However, beginning in 1950s, Americo-Liberian
women began to serve in some government positions. Yet Veronika Fuest contends that their
participation was meant to prevent indigenous men from obtaining high level positions in the
government, with the ultimate intended purpose being to ensure that the Americo-Liberian
community’s hold on political power remained strong (Fuest, 2008).
One particularly interesting gendered division of labor phenomenon developed in Liberia
based on the Americo-Liberian social practice of women not working outside the home.
According to Mary H. Moran, this tradition, in addition to the influence of missionaries and
Europeans, led to the development of a concept called “civilized.” Being civilized referred to
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anyone living a so-called “Western” lifestyle. Moran explains that civilized status was earned
through both formal education and religious instruction as well as through the style of one’s
dress and household management. However, patriarchal notions dictated that civilized women
could lose their status if they engaged in market work or subsistence farming, the traditional
purview of indigenous women. Moran contends that most civilized women maintained their
status by being economically supported by men. When this was not possible, women of both
indigenous and Americo-Liberian background have felt pressured to fulfill the civilized lifestyle.
The burden has been especially great on single women but even married women underwent
many difficulties to avoid engaging in marketing or farming, or at least to give the appearance of
doing so (Moran, 1988). Clearly, this practice in which Liberian women sought to portray
themselves as well-off enough to not work is rooted in class-based ideals associated with the
traditions of the Americo-Liberian aristocracy (Ellis, 2006).
In addition to the structure of the family and systems of income generation, religion is yet
another traditionally patriarchal institution in Liberian women’s lives. Most scholars believe that
about 40 percent of Liberians identify as Christian and 20 percent as Muslim, while
approximately 40 percent of Liberians follow a form of an indigenous Animist religion (Olukoju,
2006). Other estimates have suggested that as much as 75 percent of the population practice
indigenous faiths while only 15 percent practice Christianity and 10 percent Islam (“Liberia,
World Factbook” 2012; Olukoju, 2006; Waugh, 2011). The reason that the religious breakdown
is so unclear is that the majority of Liberian Christians, regardless of class or ethnicity, have
combined indigenous religious practices with Christianity, especially through simultaneous
membership in Poro or Sande and a church (Ellis, 2006; Olukoju, 2006). Likewise, Islam began
to spread widely throughout Liberia in the nineteenth century by way of Mandingo traders. It
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was mainly Vai and Loma converts in the beginning, but later many within the Bassa, Mano, and
Gio communities converted as well. Yet, like Christians, most Liberian Muslims have also
continued to maintain many indigenous religious practices such as divination and ancestor
veneration although not membership in secret societies like Poro or Sande (Olukoju, 2006;
Waugh, 2011). While Muslim Vai, Mandingo, Gbande, and Mende girls were traditionally at a
high risk for early marriage, which typically occurred between the ages of 12 and 15, Marietta
Williams notes that interpretations of Islam within Liberia have historically been moderate and
Muslim women were permitted to join associations and activities outside of the home (Steady,
2011; “Women’s Rights in Liberia,” 2005).
Other religious traditions, such as the “secret societies” in the north/northwestern part of
the country, an indigenous religious institution based on age-groups served to initiate and
welcome men and women as adults into society. However, Stephen Ellis points out that the term
secret society is often a misnomer as nearly every adult would have been initiated into such
societies where they existed. The most well-known of these secret societies are the Poro and
Sande, for men and women respectively, connected adherents to the spirit world (Ellis, 2006;
Akpan, 1973). During Sande induction, female initiates were taught farming techniques and
household skills, as well as strategies to raise children and how to properly use medicine
(Bledsoe, 1980). Scholars such as Mark Hanna Watkins believe that secret societies were “bush
schools” which prepared girls for their future roles as wives and mothers (Watkins, 1943: 674).
Nevertheless, Caroline H. Bledsoe maintains that Sande initiation only symbolically
marked a young girl’s transition into adulthood, pointing out that Sande and secret societies were
actually a way to reinforce adherence to traditional authorities, especially to the leadership of
secret societies. According to Bledsoe, central to most traditional African systems of hierarchy

136

was the control of women. Men and the elderly have historically had rights over women and
children, and have manipulated women’s reproductive capacities and labor production in order to
build relationships with young men based on debt obligation. While Bledsoe notes that some
senior women in the upper echelons of the leadership of secret societies were able to become
powerful through their control of younger women, they never held secular, political control
within their communities. Nevertheless, through their leadership roles in Sande, women were
able to influence the behavior of men (Bledsoe, 1980). Sande and similar institutions were also
important for the bonds of solidary created among women within the community which
ultimately provided a system of support for women (Little, 1949).
As part of Sande initiation, females underwent clitoridectomies or labiadectomies, also
known as female genital cutting (FGC) which is labeled by the United Nations as a harmful
traditional practice (HTP) (“Liberia: Report on Female Genital,” 2001; Blesdoe, 1980;
“Declaration on the Elimination of Violence,” 1993). According to officials of the U.S.
Department of State, the exact number of Liberian females who have undergone genital cutting
is unknown, but they estimate that prior to the war, in some rural areas approximately half of the
female population was circumcised. However, in general, this is not a tradition for Muslim
women as well as Americo-Liberian, Krahn, Grebo, and Kru women. Instead, it has mainly
affected the female population living in Mande-speaking areas (“Liberia: Report on Female
Genital,” 2001).
Although Americo-Liberian women did not participate in Sande and female genital
cutting practices, they nevertheless also experienced patriarchy through their religion. Nemata
Blyden explains that the Americo-Liberian community centered on the “Christian values of the
West” (Blyden, 2002: 32). As Stephen Ellis notes, the forms of Christianity practiced by
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Americo-Liberian were based on the nineteenth century Christian interpretations of the U.S.
slave population. Ellis argues that theologically, in the majority of Americo-Liberian churches
God was viewed as a paternalistic master who punished individuals for their personal failings
(Ellis, 2006). Scholars such as Joanne Carlson Brown, Rebecca Parker, and Karen L. Bloomquist
explain that traditional Christian teachings have often tacitly encouraged both physical and
sexual violence specifically against women by promoting themes of suffering and atonement
(Brown and Parker, 1989; Bloomquist, 1989). Domestic violence has been a problem for
Americo-Liberian women, as it has been for Liberian women of all ethnic groups (Horton,
2013). Likewise, Rosemary Radford Ruether argues that much of Christian theology teaches that
women are inferior to men and consequently those in control of Christian institutions have
limited women’s political, social, and reproductive capacities (Ruether, 1989).
Nevertheless, like Sande, the Christian churches of the Americo-Liberian community did
provide women with a system of female support as well as an avenue to engage in activities
outside of the home. A few Americo-Liberian women became involved in missionary work,
although very marginally, while many more participated in regular church activities, especially
church associations (Blyden, 2002). Interestingly, Cheryl Townsend Gilkes and Patricia A.
Schechter argue that Americo-Liberian women’s participation in the church came full circle in
Liberia and can actually be traced back to what Kamene Okonjo calls “the dual-sex political
system” common to many African societies (Moran, 1989: 443, 455; Okonjo, 1976: 45;
Schechter, 2012; Gilkes, 2001). In contrast to the northern and western portion of Liberia,
eastern Liberia has historically lacked institutions like the Poro and Sande. Secret societies did
exist in the east, but membership was not universal (Moran, 2008). Instead, the dual-sex system
served many of the same social and political purposes as the secret societies of the north and
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northwest (Moran, 1989). Emblematic of many African societies, the dual-sex system was a set
of two village councils, one run by women and one run by men, through which each sex
managed its own affairs (Okonjo, 1976).
Moran recognizes this institution at play in eastern Liberia and traces its foundations to
the widespread belief in the region that men cannot adequately represent women, and women
cannot adequately represent men (Moran, 1989). For example, traditionally among the Grebo, a
council of female elders existed to represent the interests of the women within the village. The
council was typically composed of the female members of the village’s patrilineal clans and its
leader was called the blo nyene, which is usually rendered “the women’s president” (Moran,
1989: 453). The women of the council conferred with the men’s council on many matters, but
also had duties which they performed without men’s influences, mainly consisting of those
issues specifically affecting women (Moran, 2008).
Importantly, the women’s council did wield some political power in the past. For
example, historically, the women from the council were able to prevent war when it suited them
as the blo nyene had veto power over the men’s council. Moran notes that in addition to the
Grebo, many other ethnic groups throughout the southeastern portion of Liberia made use of the
dual-sex system (Moran, 2008). Although not viewed as the political or social equals men,
Moran believes that women in the female councils did hold some political power, although the
typical woman did not, and, moreover, what power the elders of the female council did hold was
limited (Moran, 2008; Moran, 1989). In general, Liberian women were historically limited by
their religion, whether it was a form of Animism, Christianity, or Islam. Ann Jones explains that
whether a Liberian man follows Christianity, Islam, or an indigenous religion, he was likely to
believe that God put men in charge of women (Jones, 2010).
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In conclusion, patriarchy is present in all societies at some level. Funmi Olonishakin and
others such as Veronika Fuest argue that overall, Liberian women have historically had a low
profile both within indigenous communities and in the Americo-Liberian community. While
Olonishakin and Fuest contend that there were a few prominent women, the vast majority of both
Americo-Liberian and indigenous Liberian women were not involved in politics (Olonishakin,
1995; Fuest, 2008). Liberian women, regardless of their ethnicity, class, or religion were
considered to be socially inferior to men (Fuest, 2008). Generally, Liberian women have felt the
presence of patriarchy most strongly in the family, economics, and religious traditions. These
three institutions certainly affected how Liberian women experienced their lives during the civil
war.
3.7 Liberian Women’s Experiences during the War Years
While the individual experiences of Liberian women during the civil war were diverse,
there are nevertheless common themes in women’s general wartime experiences. Overall,
women dealt with tremendous difficulties brought on by the displacement of resources and the
high levels of violence that were a result of the war (Danuweli, et al., 2011). This section will
highlight the growth of female headed households because of the war, the effects of the war on
women’s access to education, and the war’s economic consequences for women.
The effects of the civil war took a toll on the entire Liberian population. Throughout
1990, those in the east, in Nimba County, suffered the most. However, by 1991 and 1992, those
residing in the counties of Grand Gedeh in the southeast, and Lofa and Grande Cape Mount in
the north and northeast felt the brunt of the fighting. Residents of the capital, Monrovia, had
initially witnessed fighting, including a civilian massacre of women and children by Doe’s AFL
troops at St. Peter’s Lutheran Church, but saw little additional violence until an attack in October
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1992. Known as “Operation Octopus,” the NPFL launched an assault against ECOMOG, at least
6,000 civilians in the city perished in a matter of a few weeks. From 1993 to 1995, those in
Monrovia as well as the more rural counties of Lofa and Bong in the north and Maryland in the
south endured heavy fighting. In 1996, both Monrovia and surrounding rural areas, including all
the way into the next county, Bomi County, suffered the most violence. A lull in major fighting
between armed groups ceased until 2000 when LURD began attacking large numbers of civilians
in the north, in Lofa County. Civilians throughout the countryside, especially near Tubmanburg
in Gomi County but also those in Nimba County, suffered tremendously from attacks by LURD
and MODEL from 2000 throughout most of 2003. Those in Monrovia also experienced intense
fighting beginning in early 2003, lasting until the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended the
fighting that August. As Colin M. Waugh points out, no Liberian throughout the fourteen years
of war was unaffected. Everyone had a relative or friend who died, disappeared, fled, or suffered
an injury as a direct result of the war (Waugh, 2011).
On the whole, Liberian women were under a heavy burden during the war. Their
workloads and family responsibilities increased even as their access to food, land, medical care,
water, and employment opportunities drastically decreased due to the conflict (Veney, 2006).
Thelma Aremiebi Ekiyor and Leymah Roberta Gbowee assert that in particular, Liberian
women’s duties of caring for both children and the elderly were made difficult by wartime
constraints (Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005). Additionally, Liberian women frequently took in
extended family members and others rendered homeless by the war (“African Women and Peace
Support,” 2004). The heavy burden placed on women was in part due to the widespread wartime
phenomenon of men leaving relationships in order to avoid responsibilities. This, in addition to
the many men gone to fight and men who had been killed during the war, meant that there were
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increased numbers of widowed, separated, divorced, and/or single women as a result of the war.
Thus, one major consequence of the war was the increase in the number of female headed
households (Danuweli, et al., 2011).
Linda Lacey and Irit Sinai point out that even prior to the outbreak of war, female headed
households were much more likely to struggle due to having less access to resources than male
headed households (Lacey and Sinai, 1996). Therefore, the economic devastation wrought by the
war made circumstances even more challenging for women in charge of households. In fact,
during the war, even in households with a male breadwinner, women frequently had to work
outside of the home in order to bring in additional income (Nwogu, 2010; Danuweli et al., 2011).
According to Molly Kinder and Emily Stranger, the civil war led to an 18 percent increase in the
number of urban female headed households.10 Additionally, on average, six family members
lived in each urban, female headed household, which put a tremendous strain on the women who
had to support such a large number of people (Kinder and Stranger, 2008).
Nevertheless, as heads of households, women did experience some benefits. For example,
women discovered that they no longer needed to ask their husbands for permission to buy
something (Olonishakin, 1995). However, according to Victoria Ijeoma Nwogu, Liberian women
did not have access to the same resources, such as property, land, and capital, as men did, which
made it difficult for them to obtain what they and their families needed to survive (Nwogu,
2010). Thus, the lack of employment opportunities was particularly difficult, often forcing
women and girls into either early marriages or sex work (Danuweli et al., 2011).
A major reason for the high number of female headed households was how the war
dramatically affected Liberian women’s access to education. Scholars with the non10

Kinder and Stranger also note that because of the two decades of war, census data is largely unavailable for the
1989-2003 time period (Kinder and Stranger, 2008). A thorough review of the literature did not provide any further
statistics concerning the exact number of female headed households in Liberia either during or after the war.
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governmental organization Isis-Women’s International Cross-Cultural Exchange (Isis-WICCE)
and officials within the government’s Gender and Development Ministry believe that the large
scale phenomenon of school closures during the war left women and girls unable to continue
with their educations (Danuweli et al., 2011; “A Situation Analysis of the Women,” 2008).
Additionally, widespread wartime rape, which will be discussed more fully below in a following
section, also contributed to young girls’ inability to complete school when these rapes resulted in
pregnancy. Moreover, girls dropped out if they lived far from school since it was often too
dangerous to make the journey (Omanyondo, 2005).
In addition to affecting women’s access to education, the civil war also prevented many
women from carrying out their previous economic activities, which primarily consisted of petty
marketing in the informal sector (Danuweli et al., 2011). Thus, Funmi Olonishakin points out
that during the war, women would work any odd job that they could find in order to support
themselves and their families (Olonishakin, 1995). In fact, it was this very economic
vulnerability which often pushed women into sex work and/or into sexually exploitable
situations in which they bartered their bodies in order to obtain goods and services from
businessmen, teachers, and officers at checkpoints. Rural women, who often had to flee their
farms, their very means of subsistence, were particularly financially disadvantaged and were thus
the most easily exploited during the war (Omanyondo, 2005). Additionally, Elizabeth Ferris
points out that trading sex for food and/or medicine was particularly prominent within refugee
camps when rations were not enough. Often, some humanitarian workers purposely withheld
rations in order pressure women and young girls for sex (Ferris, 2007).
Nevertheless, while many scholars have emphasized the negative impact of the war on
women’s economic status, Veronika Fuest argues that some market women actually benefited
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financially despite the war. Many women, unlike men, were able to expand their businesses
across areas where fighting was taking place due the very fact that they were women. Men often
had to flee or go into hiding if fighting broke out, as they were more likely to be targeted by
combatants. Women from different areas of the country would meet with one another to
exchange goods, and additionally network, often relaying information concerning important
events and even teaching one another different business skills (Fuest, 2008). Emmanuel Kwesi
Aning adds that these market women who went behind enemy lines to engage in what Paul
Richards defines as “attack trade,” often helped reduce harmful stereotypes about ethnic groups
and populations that fell into areas under the control of opposing militias (Aning, 1998;
Richards, 1996: xxvii). Historically, Mandingo men had dominated trade in Liberia, but due to
the war in which fighters frequently targeted Mandingos, many had fled the country (Fuest,
2008; Kieh, 2009b; Boas, 1997). Thus, throughout towns and villages in Liberia, women from
other ethnic groups began to fill the trading void that the Mandingo men left (Fuest, 2008).
Indeed, many Liberian women opened small shops and businesses during the war in order to
support themselves and their families (“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004).
While it is debatable how beneficial the war was for women as far as increasing female
autonomy and business opportunities, Veronika Fuest’s interview with an educated Liberian
woman in August of 2005 sheds light on the overall situation. The woman is quoted as saying,
“What has helped women to see has been the war… The lady had to be the breadwinner of the
family, while the man got nothing to do. They [women] cannot see themselves as going back to
what was before the war” (Fuest, 2008: 209). This theme will be returned to later. In conclusion,
this section sought to elaborate on women’s wartime experiences by considering women’s roles
as heads of households, women’s access to education, and both the financial constraints and
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opportunities women encountered during Liberia’s civil war (“African Women and Peace
Support,” 2004). Obviously, individual’s experiences were diverse and unique. Yet there were
common themes in women’s experiences, especially in the tremendous difficulties brought on by
the scarcity of resources and the high levels of violence that were a result of the war (Danuweli,
et al., 2011). The next section will expand on the particular forms of violence which affected
women during the war.
3.8 Wartime Violence against Liberian Women
Although both men and women endured wartime violence, women in particular suffered
unique forms of gender violence simply because they were women. By far, sexual assault was
the biggest issue which affected women. However, other forms of gender based violence, general
wartime atrocities, and the particular injuries endured by women living in internally displaced
encampments are also major forms of wartime violence which women experienced (Ackerman,
2009; AFELL, Turshen, and Twagiramariya, 1998; Aryee, et. al, 1998; Danuweli et al., 2011;
Veney, 2006). Sexual assault is one of the most well-known features of the Liberian civil war
(Wiltz, 2010; Gross, 2009; Chandler, 2010). However, rape is extremely taboo in Liberia. In
1994, researchers with The Journal of the American Medical Association discovered that within
Liberian society there was not even a commonly understood word to describe rape. Instead,
researchers had to ask women if they had ever been forced physically to engage in sex. In fact, in
Liberia, any kind of violence directed specifically at women has been considered socially offlimits (Aryee et. al, 1998; Thompson, 2008).
Thus, throughout the war, rape often went unreported due to the shame that women felt,
but also because women feared that they would be rejected by their families and communities for
being raped (Danuweli et al., 2011). This was particularly true in rural areas which were more
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conservative than the cities. There, many husbands who discovered that their wives had been
raped would often reject them, meaning that both the women and their children lost the
husbands’ financial support. Yet, Funmi Olonishakin contends that even a raped woman whose
husband did not reject her often blamed herself for the rape and would end up separating from
her husband out of guilt and shame (Olonishakin, 1995). Thus, although nothing in the literature
is discussed in terms of “male honor,” it does appear that many Liberian men held such notions
as they did frequently repudiate their wives if they had been sexually assaulted, and because
women feared rejection by their communities if their status became known.
Additionally, lawyers with the Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia (AFELL) note
that older women were particularly traumatized and ashamed when they were raped by the young
fighters. This was mainly due to the fact that in Liberia, older women view all young men as
their sons. Thus, when an older woman was raped by a younger man, she experienced it as being
raped by her son (AFELL et al., 1998). According to researchers at Amnesty International,
Liberian fighters used rape to terrorize the civilian population and instill fear. Additionally, much
of the rape during the war appeared to have been ethnically motivated (“Document—Liberia: No
Impunity,” 2004). Even by 1992 it was well documented that rape was a systemic problem
(Nowrojee and Swiss, 1992). Researchers from The Journal of the American Medical
Association surveyed a diverse group of 205 Liberian women about their experiences of sexual
violence during the first five years of the war, from 1989 to 1994. The sample included women
from many age groups, religious affiliations, levels of education, economic statuses, and
ethnicities, and additionally included both rural and urban women. Within their sample, 49
percent of women had experienced at least one act of physical or sexual violence and 14 percent
of the women acknowledged that they had undergone more than one act of violence. In
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particular, 15 percent reported being raped or experiencing an attempted rape. Younger women,
typically age 25 and under, were more likely than women over age 25 to have undergone sexual
assault or attempted sexual assault (Aryee et. al, 1998).
This pattern of sexual violence directed at women continued throughout the remainder of
the war. In a 2008 cross-sectional study of 1,666 Liberian adults, researchers found that overall,
9.2 percent of noncombatant women, versus 7.4 percent of the noncombatant male population,
experienced at least one form of sexual violence during the war. For the portion of the population
involved in combatant operations, the same pattern held with more women than men affected:
42.3 percent versus 32.6 percent. It is significant to note that combatants were at a much higher
risk of sexual violence than the rest of the population (Asher et al., 2008). In a study performed
by Isis-Women’s International Cross-Cultural Exchange (Isis-WICCE) and Liberia’s Gender and
Development Ministry, even higher levels of sexual assault were discovered. It was determined
that half of their sample, all female, had suffered from sexual torture (Danuweli et al., 2011).
According to a study by the World Health Organization, in their sample of Liberian women
located in Loma, Nimba, Grand Gedeh, and Grand Bassa Counties, 81.6 percent endured some
form of physical or sexual violence during the war (Omanyondo, 2005). These counties did
experience the brunt of the fighting over the course of the war which is one possible explanation
for the high proportion in the sample (Waugh, 2011). Moreover, the World Health Organization
survey included those who had suffered physical assault in addition to sexual assault whereas the
other studies mainly only looked at sexual violence.
On the whole, rape appears to have been particularly high during the Liberian civil war
(Chandler, 2010). It is useful to compare the prevalence of rape in Liberia, in which an estimated
60 to 90 percent of the female population, or about 1.2 to 1.8 million women out of a population
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of 3.9 million, were raped, to other recent conflicts (Toral, 2012). In contrast, during the Bosnian
war, approximately 20,000 to 50,000 women were raped between 1992 and 1995 out of a
population of over 23 million (Cerkez, 2013; “Yugoslavia: Population,” 1990). During the 1994
Rwandan genocide, an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 women out of a population of
approximately 12 million were raped in the 100 days the genocide lasted (“Rwanda: ‘Marked for
Death,’ Rape,” 2004; “Rwanda, World Factbook,” 2013). Sierra Leone’s civil war from 1991 to
2002 resulted in a widespread rape epidemic. Like Liberia, there are no official numbers, but
some estimates have been as high as 275,000 out of a population of about 5 million (“Sexual
Violence within the Sierra Leone,” 2001; “TRC Sierra Leone,” 2008; “Sierra Leone, World
Factbook,” 2013). Estimates of rapes in the Congo crisis thus far have ranged from 1 million to
as high as 1.80 million out of a population of about 70 million (Bredenkamp, Palermo, and
Peterman, 2011). Thus, Liberia’s rape epidemic was exceptionally high compared to other recent
conflicts.
Overall, the state did not adequately protect women’s rights, and additionally failed to
provide women with access to adequate services to deal with the medical issues associated with
sexual assault (Nwogu, 2010; Danuweli et al., 2011). In fact, Ruthie Ackerman reports that
women were commonly afraid to file rape charges at their local police stations as they feared that
police officers were in fact involved in raping and sexually assaulting women (Ackerman, 2009).
According to Ann Jones, many judges, magistrates, and police officers took advantage of female
rape victims who attempted to bring the crimes committed against them to court. At best, police
officers and magistrates treated rape and sexual assaults as unimportant. However, widespread
victim-blaming occurred, and many in law enforcement even demanded sexual services in
exchange for a hearing (Jones, 2010). Moreover, as mentioned above, shame of the rape often
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kept women from seeking justice. Additionally, accusing a man of rape was considered an
offense against the man’s family (Baehr and Mgbako, 2011). Thus, Ann Jones observes that
women were frequently concerned with negatively impacting a rapists’ future by bringing a case
against him or by offending his family (Jones, 2010).
Naturally, many women suffered from serious gynecological problems due to the
violence which they experienced, especially violence associated rape. In one study, the most
common reproductive issues cited by women were abnormal vaginal bleeding and/or discharge,
infertility, leaking urine, and chronic abdominal pain. In more extreme cases, such as when
women underwent gang rape, women suffered from urinary and/or fecal fistula as well as genital
prolapse (Danuweli et al., 2011). Robin M. Chandler notes that fistula, known specifically as
traumatic gynecologic fistula (TGF), is the most horrific result of gender based violence, and
effectively renders the woman, or girl, incontinent, constantly leaking urine and/or feces
(Chandler, 2010). It was mainly young women under the age of 24 who suffered the most from
gynecological issues, although it is unclear exactly how many Liberian women experienced these
serious medical issues (Danuweli et al., 2011).
Although sexual violence during the civil war was horrific, even the general violence
which overtook Liberia during the fourteen year war is renowned for its brutality. As Colin M.
Waugh points out, most of the violence of the combatants was directed at civilians (Waugh,
2011). Terrorizing civilians was a part of the militias’ daily routine. For example, civilians were
forced to witness the murders of their own children, often while being commanded to applaud or
laugh. If they cried out, then they themselves would be killed (AFELL et al., 1998). In fact,
many atrocities were committed including the severing of hands, arms, legs, and feet (Ackerman,
2009). Both women and men experienced many others forms of general violence including being
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beaten, tied up, strip searched, and/or physically detained (Aryee et. al, 1998). A particularly
brutal tactic used by fighters was ramming the butt of a rifle into a person’s back. Not only
incredibly painful, it usually resulted in permanently paralyzing the person’s legs (Jones, 2010).
The final aspect of wartime violence against women is what occurred to women living in
encampments for internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to Cassandra Veney, in these
displacement centers, women faced certain gender based acts of violence, such as abduction,
rape and/or other acts of physical and sexual violence. Furthermore, women were subjected to
strip searches, beatings, and killings. At these camps, women lacked basic necessities such as
food and clean drinking water, but also went without access to birth control, school, health care,
and economic opportunities. Additionally, they were often separated from family members and
thus rendered more vulnerable. In fact, internally displaced persons were in a more
disadvantageous position than refugees who were at least entitled to international protections and
some assistance (Veney, 2006). Moreover, many women and girls in both refugee and internally
displaced persons camps also underwent forced marriages and forced pregnancies. This, in
addition to the already mentioned lack of health care and birth control within in these
displacement centers, increased women’s risk to HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections
(STIs) (Danuweli et al., 2011).
In conclusion, women experienced several forms of violence throughout the war period.
However, rape and other forms of sexual violence were especially problematic. Yet even the
general violence which both men and women experienced during the war was brutal. Finally,
women living in displacement centers endured particular forms of violence associated with their
limited circumstances (Ackerman, 2009; AFELL et al., 1998; Aryee, et. al, 1998; Danuweli et
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al., 2011; Veney, 2006). In general, women sought to deal with the onslaught of wartime
violence in several ways, which will be discussed in the next section.
3.9 Liberian Women’s Coping Mechanisms
During the fourteen year civil war, besides the physical destruction, Liberia as a society
suffered as well. The widespread killings, abductions, and sexual assaults, combined with the
extensive use of forced labor, torture, and recruitment of child soldiers exacted a heavy toll on
the Liberian population. As a result, both men and women experienced mental and emotional
trauma (Danuweli et al., 2011). Researchers with The American Medical Association Journal
estimate that approximately 800,000 Liberians suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) and 750,000 Liberians experienced major depressive disorder (MDD) as a result of the
war. Additionally, in the Journal’s study, another 205,000 Liberians were discovered to have
contemplated suicide during the war while 112,000 had actually attempted suicide. Pointedly, the
researchers note that those who had experienced sexual violence were more likely to experience
these disorders and thoughts of suicide (Asher et al., 2008).
Yet, while both men and women suffered as a result of the war, women in particular
experienced more backaches, pains in the joints, and swelling than did men. On the other hand,
men more frequently attempted suicide. Nonetheless, women with serious medical problems,
usually as a result of rape, also had more psychological trauma which led them to have attempted
suicide and abused drugs more than women who had not endured such serious gender based
violence (Danuweli et al., 2011). Overall, women dealt with war trauma in a variety of ways,
including by becoming involved in humanitarian work, finding solace through creating art,
seeking comfort in their religion, and some by turning to drugs (Danuweli et al., 2011; “African
Women and Peace Support,” 2004; Moran et al., 2004; “Pray the Devil Back,” 2008).
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Many Liberian women dealt with the difficulties and trauma of war was by engaging in
community work. Overall, women involved in such endeavors were principally focused on
providing food relief, as food remained in short supply throughout the war. In fact, former
President Amos Sawyer declared that Liberian women sustained life on an unprecedented level
through their volunteer work. Some women provided relief to those in need as individuals, but
many others served through well-known organizations such as the Young Women’s Christian
Association (YWCA) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). In addition to these
international groups, women also joined local organizations such as the Special Emergency Life
Food Programme (SELF). As mentioned, food relief was a top priority, but other humanitarian
activities included caring for displaced children, providing shelter to those who had lost their
homes, offering trauma counseling, and even hosting mediation and conflict resolution courses
(“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004).
One well-known humanitarian effort was the brainchild of a collective of Monrovian
women who opened a shelter for homeless teenagers and children, especially those who had
become involved in sex work. The women called their organization Our Sister’s Place. In
addition to providing shelter, those with Our Sister’s Place also offered assistance to those who
were dealing with trauma caused by war, most notably with those who had served as fighters
and/or those who had been raped (Aning, 1998). Members of the Women in Liberian Liberty
(WILL), led by Myrtle Gibson and Mona Wureh, sought to provide trauma services for citizens,
as well as food aid (Badmus, 2009). Women with other groups such as the non-profit the
Liberian Women for Reconciliation and Peace International (LIWORP) focused on providing
vocational training to women and their children to help them find a way to eke out a living
during the difficult war years (Aning, 1998).
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Such vocational training most often took the form of traditionally feminine trades such as
sewing, knitting, and baking. Income earned from small scale sewing and baking was not enough
to help women prosper, but the intention was to provide women with enough skills to enable
survival for themselves and their families (Harman, 2002; Moran and Pitcher, 2004). For
example, Johnetta Massaquoi opened the Wise Center in 1998 in order to help train women and
girls to sew skirts and dresses, hoping to provide women an alternative to sex work (Harman,
2002). Overall, these programs were largely ineffective as what often occurred was a market
oversaturated with those trained in tie-dye and similar tasks. Furthermore, the programs did not
reach very many women, thus those helped were so few in number that the programs have also
viewed as ineffective for this reason (Moran and Pitcher, 2004).
Another way that some Liberian women attempted to cope with the effects of the war
was by engaging in creative endeavors. One woman wrote a wartime cookbook entitled Liberian
Civil War Recipes which sought to provide women with ideas for making meals with limited
access to most ingredients, and particularly how to cook using ingredients associated with food
aid such as bulgur wheat and corn soy milk. In addition, the cookbook provided information on
the location of food relief centers. Most importantly, however, the cookbook was meant to serve
as a souvenir of the war years for Liberian women (Moran and Pitcher, 2004; Porte, 1991).
Likewise, during the postwar years women such as Agnes Fallah Kamara-Umunna and Leymah
Gbowee documented their wartime experiences in memoirs, And Still Peace Did Not Come: A
Memoir of Reconciliation and Mighty Be Our Powers: How Sisterhood, Prayer, and Sex
Changed a Nation at War, respectively, in which they sought to find healing by working through
their ordeals in writing (Holland and Kamara-Umunna, 2011; Gbowee and Mithers, 2011).
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In other instances, many Liberian women turned to their religion as way to deal with the
hardships of war. Stephen Ellis notes that throughout Liberia during the war, the importance of
religion was frequently emphasized. In particular, there was a widespread belief among both
religious leaders and laypeople that Liberians’ disregard for God was a major cause of the war.
However, Liberians were divided into two major camps concerning the cause of this. The first
viewed the general Liberian population’s straying from indigenous religious practices, especially
Poro, as the root of the war, which incidentally, did lead to a revival of Poro and other
indigenous practices. On the other side were evangelical Christians who believed that many of
those practicing Christianity were causing spiritual discord by mixing indigenous religious
practices in their Christian worship. Evangelicals viewed any traditions deriving from indigenous
religions as being associated with the “devil” and thus causing the war (Ellis, 2006). According
to Paul Gifford, Liberians had been turning increasingly to religion, particularly U.S.
fundamentalist Christian teachings, but also to Islam, as a way to deal with the economic and
social decline that most experienced under Doe’s administration in the 1980s (Gifford, 1993).
Thus, many women found comfort in turning to religious leaders and various religious practices
during the war. Like the revival of the institution of Poro mentioned above, many Sande
societies throughout northwestern Liberia regained prominence as members associated with its
leadership sought to reach out to young girls who lost their parents or caretakers (Moran et al.,
2004). Likewise, the film Pray the Devil Back to Hell depicts the comfort both Christian and
Muslim women found in their churches and mosques (“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008).
Finally, drug usage during the war was a method some women used to cope with stress
and trauma, largely as a form of escape. As a consequence, the abuse of drugs and alcohol
became widespread and a serious societal issue. Although hard numbers are difficult to come by,
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scholars with the non-governmental organization Isis-Women’s International Cross-Cultural
Exchange (Isis-WICCE) and officials within the government’s Gender and Development
Ministry note that women and girls most often turned to tobacco, alcohol, marijuana, opium, and
cocaine to manage war-related stress (Danuweli et al., 2011). In conclusion, while individuals
experienced and coped with the war differently, in general, Liberian women most frequently
sought to manage war-related problems through humanitarian work, creating art, and/or by
finding solace in their religion, and some by turning to drugs (Danuweli et al., 2011; “African
Women and Peace Support,” 2004; Moran and Pitcher, 2004; “Pray the Devil Back,” 2008).
Such coping mechanisms often influenced the kind of roles women took on during the war years
and reflected the status of women prior to the war.
3.10 Liberian Women’s Roles in the War
Liberian women were affected by and participated in the war in different ways. While
most Liberian women were mothers, they also served in other capacities. The primary roles that
the vast majority of women filled were serving as fighters and/or the wives or girlfriends of
fighters who provided both sexual services and domestic work to men the militias, either by
choice or by force (Veney, 2006; “African Women and Peace Support,” 2004).
As many scholars note, Western journalists were generally fascinated by Liberian female
fighters, particularly their often feminine attire which they wore even during battle. Yet, this was
not a glamorous role (Utas, 2005). Irma Specht reports that most women became fighters out of
necessity, in order to protect to themselves as it was either “kill or be killed” (Specht, 2005: 9).
Ruthie Ackerman asserts that simply being female in Liberian society made women and girls a
target of sexual violence. She believes that this pushed women to serve as combatants in an
attempt to protect themselves from rape (Ackerman, 2009). Yet there were other reasons women
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chose to fight. Like many men, some women joined factions out of a sincere belief in what the
militia was fighting for or for purposes of financial gain (Olonishakin, 1995; Utas, 2005).
Importantly, the women who cleaned, cooked, transported equipment, and/or served messengers
for fighters were not generally recognized as being combatants but in fact through these roles
women and girls also served militia causes (Ackerman, 2009; “Document—Liberia: No
Impunity,” 2004).
Isiaka Alani Badmus notes that, in particular, women were prominent in the NPFL, with
many women rising to the higher echelons of authority. For example, Grace Minor and Reffel
Victoria both made important decisions in the militia’s war strategy, with Reffel instrumental in
supporting Charles Taylor’s interactions with ECOWAS representatives (Badmus, 2009). Mats
Utas also describes another reason women became fighters: it simply made them feel empowered
to wield a weapon (Utas, 2005). However, it is important to note that many women and girls
were kidnapped and forced to serve in militias as well (Veney, 2006; Badmus, 2009). Utas notes
that some female fighters, such as Julia Rambo, Martina Johnson, Agnes Taylor, Ruth “Attila”
Milton, and Black Diamond, became quite famous. Utas contends that these women were often
viewed as role models by other Liberian girls and women because they appeared self-sufficient
and in control of their own lives (Utas, 2005). According to Funmi Olonishakin, female fighters
were noted for being particularly fierce, and reportedly did not take pity on civilians. People
often said women combatants were more likely to get angry and more likely to kill than their
male counterparts. This was likely do to the fact that women felt that they needed to prove their
toughness, due to traditional perceptions that women were weak, in order to be taken seriously
(Olonishakin, 1995).
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Yet, according to Ruthie Ackerman, female fighters were under a triple burden. As
mentioned, women in general were prime targets of sexual violence for simply being women.
When they sought to become militia fighters to protect themselves from rape, they discovered,
however, that rape and violence were as frequent on the frontlines as off the battlefield.
Moreover, female fighters were stigmatized by larger society which failed to recognize them as
the equals of their male counterparts, both as citizens and combatants (Ackerman, 2009). Thus,
despite Liberian women serving prominently in various militias, female fighters were generally
discriminated against for engaging in acts which mainstream Liberian society viewed as
“unfeminine” or unbecoming of women (Danuweli et al., 2011).
Another prominent role women held during the war was being a girlfriend or lover of a
male fighter. Many women were abducted by militia fighters and forced to be their “bush wife”
(Veney, 2006: 211). While Mats Utas argues that some women willingly sought to engage in
romantic relationships with male fighters, who often engaged in looting, due to the perceived
financial benefits, other scholars, such as Cassandra Veney, point out that many only “willingly”
chose to become a fighter or wife in order to obtain food, clothing, and shelter. Thus, it may not
have been much of a choice at all (Utas, 2005; Veney, 2006). Overall, Liberian women’s roles
during wartime covered a broad range that included serving, often by force, as fighters,
providing militias support through cooking and cleaning, and/or by carrying out romantic
relationships with fighters (Veney, 2006; “African Women and Peace Support,” 2004). This
knowledge of women’s wartime roles will aid in understanding women’s organizing during the
war. Yet the context from which this activism arose must first be highlighted.
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3.11 History of Women’s Activism in Liberia
The roots of Liberian women’s wartime activism are not tied to a widespread women’s
movement. Scholars instead suggest that a tradition of female leadership, the Nigerian women’s
uprising against the British colonial government in 1929, and past instances of collective female
action contributed to Liberian women’s wartime organizing (Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005; Moran,
1989; Casimiro et al., 2009; Steady, 2011; Fuest, 2008). A history of some individual women in
leadership positions is often cited by many scholars in relation to women’s activism (Steady,
2011; Fuest, 2008; Adams, 2008). One of the most famous female Liberians to be in a position of
influence was Nye Suakoko who was born sometime in the 1880s. Suakoko, an important zoe
(priest) in the Sande, was the first woman to be a paramount chief and was well-known for her
efforts to end the fighting between the settlers and indigenous groups. Through the female
council of elders or by working within the top echelon of the Sande’s hierarchy, some Liberian
women, such as Suakoko, were able to build alliances by arranging marriages and thus gaining
some distinction in society (Steady, 2011).
Likewise, within the Americo-Liberian community, women such as Mary Antoinette
Brown Sherman, the first female president of any African university, and female senators and
legislators such as Elizabeth Collins and Catherine Collins have existed alongside women like
Mary Brownell, the founder of the Liberian Women’s Institute and Angie Brooks who was the
second woman and first African female president of the United Nations General Assembly
(Moran and Pitcher, 2004; Steady, 2011). Clearly, these women, in addition to indigenous
women like Suakoko, were privileged with a great access to resources while the majority of
Liberian women have not historically wielded power in society (Steady, 2011; Olonishakin,
1995). Nevertheless, scholars such as Filomina Steady and Veronika Fuest argue that such

158

examples of influential women were resources which Liberian women drew on for inspiration
during the civil war (Steady, 2011; Fuest, 2008).
Similarly, Liberian activists Thelma Aremiebi Ekiyor and Leymah Roberta Gbowee view
the 1929 women’s uprising in Aba, located in eastern Nigeria, as the foundation for Liberian
women’s groups’ activism (Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005). This event, which would become known
as the Women’s War, began in October of 1929 as Ibo and Ibibio women in eastern Nigeria
began to fear that the British colonial government intended to place a tax on them at a time when
the palm produce market, in which women dominated, had bottomed out due to the worldwide
economic recession. Rumors of a possible tax began when warrant chiefs, which were those men
appointed by the government to carry out colonial law, began taking a census of men, women,
and their property in September of 1929. In 1926, following a census of local men, the
government had instituted a tax on each man counted. Thus, the women began to meet to discuss
what could be done as they believed that since they were being counted that they too would be
made to pay a personal tax (Ifeka-Moller, 1975). By that November, women from the region of
Aba joined with one another to protest against any new taxes. At its highest point, an estimated
ten thousand women were involved in the uprising (Van Allen, 1976). During demonstrations,
women attacked the native courts of the British colonial system, as well as European-owned
factories, and even the warrant chiefs who worked in the native courts (Ifeka-Moller, 1975;
Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005; Hanna, 1981-1982).
In addition to the attacks on the courts and the looting of the factories, another primary
tactic employed by Nigerian women during the riot was a practice which predated colonialism,
known as “sitting on a man” or “making war on a man” (Van Allen, 1976: 61). This occurred
when a group of women gathered outside of the home of a man who had offended them in order
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to sing songs and dance “lewdly” in the hopes of both shaming the individual and preventing him
from sleeping or resting (Hanna, 1981-1982; Ifeka-Moller, 1975). Indeed, during the Liberian
civil war, many activists in women’s groups engaged in songs and dance as part of their protests
(“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008). The government response to the Aba protests of 1929 was quite
violent. In particular, in the town of Opobo, colonial police forces opened fire on protesting
women which resulted in the deaths of 32 women and left another 31 wounded (Hanna, 19811982). Although smaller and more isolated protests continued through early 1930, the British
eventually deployed enough soldiers and police to put a stop to the violence after a couple
months (Van Allen, 1976).
Nonetheless, the rioting women did end the rule of the warrant chiefs, which was the
system of indirect colonial rule, even securing some positions in the courts for women (Eikiyor
and Gbowee, 2005; Afigbo, 1972). However, Judith Van Allen argues that the violent repression
used by the British, along with the influence of Christian missionaries which sought to downplay
indigenous institutions as antithetical to Christianity as well as “uncivilized,” diminished
women’s collective agency in Aba and took away Ibo and Ibibio women’s major form of
political power (Van Allen, 1976). Nevertheless, the legacy of the Aba women’s war remains
strong and is often interpreted by scholars, such as Caroline Ifeka-Moller, as a feminist protest
(Ifeka-Moller, 1975).
According to Mary H. Moran, incidents similar to the Women’s War of 1929 occurred
frequently in the past throughout West African villages and towns (Moran, 1989). For example,
during Moran’s anthropological fieldwork in Maryland County, Liberia, she witnessed one of
these typical collective actions. It was staged by Grebo women who, like their Ibo and Ibibio
counterparts of the Aba riots, were concerned about taxes. During the 1983 event, Moran was
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informed that Grebo women typically organized when they felt they had been insulted or treated
unjustly. Moran was told a story, which had occurred in the recent past, about a woman accused
of witchcraft by a prominent chief. However, all the women in the village were upset by the
chief’s accusation and thus collectively relocated to a neighboring village. This left all the men in
the village to cook and carry water, among women’s many other tasks, in addition to their own
work. The offending chief had to beg the women to return by apologizing and presenting them
with gifts (Moran, 1989; Moran, 2008). Thus, although the grievances were not always
obviously political in nature, Liberian women have historically engaged in collective action.
However, in 1983, Grebo women engaged in an overtly political act. That year Doe had
instituted a new tax that required every household to pay $10 for each resident between the ages
of 15 and 60. Since Doe had gained power, his administration had confiscated land in the
southeast in order to give it to government-funded companies and private corporations which
used the land to grow sugar, rubber, and oil palms for commercial use. While such ventures had
initially provided local men with jobs, the worldwide recession of the early 1980s meant that
most of the companies had let workers go, leaving many Grebo men without jobs. Furthermore,
now less land was available for women to grow their crops, which were the main source of food
in the area. Grebo women viewed the new tax as an additional burden on them, rather than men,
as they foresaw that women would need to grow more food in order to sell the surplus for money
to pay the new tax (Moran, 1989).
In the summer of 1983, approximately 240 Grebo women from interior villages gathered
over the course of a week and began trekking, single file, toward Harper City, where the seat of
the local administrative center in Maryland County lay. The president of each village’s female
council was present and as the women walked, they rang hand bells and blew whistles, which
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were the traditional instruments of the council of female elders in the Grebo community. The
Maryland County superintendent was out of town, but the mayor of Harper City met with the
women. When the leaders of the group stated their position, that the new tax was overly
burdensome on women in particular, they were informed by the mayor that they were violating
the government’s ban on political activities. He stated that he could have had them all arrested.
Rather than do so, however, the mayor told the women that they should return to their homes and
devise a way to pay the tax (Moran, 2008; Moran, 1989). Thus, while the effort was ultimately
ineffective in removing the new tax, this collective action of 1983 shows an important precedent
in Liberian women’s organizing prior to the civil war. Many Liberian women have historically
sought to address what they viewed as women’s issues by uniting and collectively seeking to
take action in order to attempt to make changes that would benefit them. Moran’s documentation
of the 1983 gathering of Grebo women who sought to make changes to a new tax policy which
they felt unfairly burdened women is an excellent example of such an event (Moran, 1989).
To conclude, Liberian women’s wartime organizing can be traced to the examples set by
significant individual women in Liberian history, the 1929 uprising by Nigerian women against
the British colonial government, and collective actions such as the 1983 Grebo women’s protest
(Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005; Moran, 1989; Casimiro et al., 2009; Steady, 2011). Overall, there
was no coherent women’s movement in Liberia prior to the civil war although women have
clearly been involved in political causes. It appears that women’s activism during the civil war
was the impetus for a women’s movement in Liberia. The next section will address this activism.
3.12 Liberian Women's Activism during the War
Veronika Fuest notes that since the end of the civil war, women’s organizations in
Liberia have proliferated at a rapid rate (Fuest, 2008). Yet even during the war women’s
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organizing was prominent. In fact, women’s groups were the only civil society organizations
which functioned continuously throughout the fourteen year civil war (O’Reilly, 2011). This
section will highlight the three major moments in women’s wartime activism, provide a case
study of the women’s organization the Liberian Women’s Initiative, and address reactions to
women’s organizing during the war.
Major Events in Women’s Wartime Organizing
As noted, female activists in Liberia became engaged in organizing early on in the war,
as soon as they began witnessing the mounting social, economic, and political chaos created by
the fighting, in order to help themselves and their families survive (“African Women and Peace
Support,” 2004; Sewell, 2007). Specifically, women participated in demonstrations, sit-ins, and
other events. However, the three main events regarding women’s activism largely took place
closer to the end of the war. The first event was the campaign by members of the Mano River
Women’s Peace Network to convince the leaders of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea to meet in
Rabat, Morocco. Later the Mass Action for Peace movement was staged by affiliates of the
Women in Peacebuilding Network, and multiple women’s groups organized protests in Accra,
Ghana which led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. These events are
defined by scholars as significant because they contributed to bringing an end to the conflict
(“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004; Gbowee, 2009).
The first major event in women’s wartime organizing began in 2001 and was initiated by
activists with the Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET). Founded in May
2000 in Abuja, Nigeria, MARWOPNET served to facilitate the efforts of women living in the
region to work together toward conflict resolution in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.
Organizers with the Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS), a Swiss-based non-governmental
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organization in existence since 1996, brought together the initial members of MARWOPNET to
help guide them in the creation of the new women’s group. These first members of the
organization largely consisted of elite, professional women who were mainly ministers,
academics, members of parliament, journalists, lawyers, and researchers (Femmes Africa
Solidarité, 2005). Later, after the organization was officially established, women from other
socioeconomic classes and many ethnic backgrounds also joined (Johnson, 2011). Essentially,
MARWOPNET, headquartered in Freetown, Sierra Leone, was an umbrella organization that
brought together those in development-focused women’s groups11 (Femmes Africa Solidarité,
2005; “Profile of the Mano River,” 2013). Significantly, MARWOPNET activists believed that
women could influence their husbands and children to work toward ending the conflicts (Sewell,
2007). Thus, a substantial part of the group’s focus was on women’s embodiment as wives and
mothers. Toward this end, members of Femmes Africa Solidarité provided those in
MARWOPNET with training in conflict resolution (“Profile of the Mano River,” 2013; Femmes
Africa Solidarité, 2005).
A major project undertaken by MARWOPNET, which began in June of 2001 and ran
through that August, worked to bring the presidents of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia
together in order to address the ongoing civil wars in both Liberia and Sierra Leone (“Profile of
the Mano River,” 2013). After successfully convincing Charles Taylor and then-president of
Sierra Leone Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to meet with one another, the delegation of Liberian, Sierra
Leonean, and Guinean women sent on this mission encountered difficulties in in Conakry,
Guinea. Previously, then-president of Guinea, Lansana Conté, had made clear that he did not
wish to meet with Taylor under any circumstance. However, the MARWOPNET delegation
11

One of the more than thirty groups represented by the Network was the Liberia Women’s Initiative (LWI), an
organization which will be profiled later in this paper (Femmes Africa Solidarité, 2005; “Profile of the Mano River,”
2013).
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reportedly approached Conté by emphasizing their status as mothers and sisters. According to
Amelia Ward, the women were to have said to him, “Look at us, we are your mothers, your
sisters, your people are suffering; your mothers are dying; your children are dying. We came as
mothers to you” (Sewell, 2007: 18). Additionally, during this meeting, MARWOPNET member
Mary Brownell informed Conté that he had to meet with Taylor and that, furthermore, she would
lock the two together in a room and sit on the key until the men worked out a plan to end the
fighting in the Mano River region (Femmes Africa Solidarité, 2005).
Such tactics proved persuasive as Conté agreed to follow the women’s recommendation.
Erica K. Sewell believes that Conté agreed to meet with Taylor and Kabbah in March of 2002 in
Rabat, Morocco due to the delegates’ sincerity (Sewell, 2007; Femmes Africa Solidarité, 2005).
Scholars with Femmes Africa Solidarité add that Conté also stated that the demanding manner in
which the female activists addressed him would have been completely unacceptable to him if the
delegates had been men. Regarding Brownell’s threat that she would lock both Taylor and he in
a room together, Conté is quoted as saying, “Only a woman could do such a thing and get away
with it” (Femmes Africa Solidarité, 2005: 589). However, despite the fact that the women’s work
directly led to the meeting of the three heads of state, MARWOPNET representatives were
excluded from the meeting. Officials associated with the negotiations mentioned the meeting to
members of MARWOPNET only two days prior to it taking plus, thus giving the women no time
to arrange funding to send a delegation. Yet, even if the women had been able to attend, they
would only have received observer status, rendering them unable to actually participate in the
proceedings (“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004). As noted by member Mary Brownell,
the mentality of the men was simply that women should not be involved in such matters
(Fleshman, 2003).
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Nevertheless, as a result of the 2002 meeting between the three heads of state, Conté,
Kabbah, and Taylor agreed to begin peace talks, reopen the borders between the three countries,
work to decrease the availability of small arms, and find ways to increase economic development
in the Mano River region (Femmes Africa Solidarité, 2005). Although the fighting in Liberia
would continue for another year, the women were not only successful in persuading the three
leaders to meet, they also saw signs of progress as the men began at least outlining steps to
address the massive security needs of those living in the Mano River countries.
The second major event in Liberian women’s wartime organizing, known as the Mass
Action for Peace campaign, had its start in November 2001 when members of the West African
Network for Peace-building (WANEP), a civil society organization founded in 1998 to work
toward ending conflicts in West Africa, created a new branch which sought to increase
peacebuilding strategies through women’s activism (Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005; “About Us,
West Africa Network,” 2013; “WIPNET: Women in Peacebuilding,” 2013). The program was
labeled the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) and was designed not simply to end
conflicts within West African, but also to address women’s rights issues, such as the systemic
violence against women, particularly rape and human trafficking, as well as harmful traditional
practices such as female genital cutting. According to Thelma Aremiebi Ekiyor and Leymah
Gbowee, members of WIPNET believed that these forms of gender based violence were due to
the lack of women’s participation in civic and political institutions (Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005).
Yet, it was not until April of 2003, as LURD fighters marched from the countryside
toward Monrovia, that Liberian WIPNET members officially instituted the Mass Action for
Peace effort (“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008; Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005). However, this movement
actually had its roots in the personal experience of a WIPNET activist, Leymah Gbowee, a social
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worker, who in June 2002 dreamed that God asked her to call upon the women in her Monrovian
church to gather together in order to pray for peace in Liberia. After sharing the idea with her
fellow female church members, Gbowee went to women in churches throughout Monrovia to
recruit for her project. Based on the idea of women praying together for peace, female members
belonging to several churches formed the Christian Women Peace Initiative (“Pray the Devil
Back,” 2008).
During one of these recruitment speeches in a church in June 2002, a Muslim police
officer named Asatu Bah Kenneth heard Gbowee describe her vision of Christian women
praying for peace. Kenneth was inspired to create a parallel collective within the Monrovian
Muslim community, which she called the Liberian Muslim Women’s Organization. Furthermore,
Kenneth envisioned Liberian Muslim women praying alongside their Christian counterparts, and
working together for an end to the war (“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008; “Activists in the Film,”
2013). Thus, leaders within the two organizations united forces to show Liberian women’s
solidarity, joining under the banner of WIPNET. There was some initial resistance from certain
Christian and Muslim women who were hesitant to work with those outside of their own faith.
However, leaders of both organizations emphasized Liberian women’s commonalities, such as
all women being targets of the fighters, and soon members of both the Christian Women Peace
Initiative and the Liberian Muslim Women’s Organization agreed to work with one another
(“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008).
By March 2003, when it became apparent that LURD leaders were planning a large scale
attack on the civilian population, members of the two groups developed a plan for a
demonstration to call for an end to the violence. Consequently, on April 11, 2003, approximately
1,000 members from both groups, dressed in all white, began to meet daily in the fish market of
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Monrovia which was located in a central area, on a road that President Taylor was driven on
daily. The women, transformed into activists who not only prayed for peace but also openly
defied government restrictions against protests, began publically demanding that Taylor
acknowledge them. The women wanted recognition for their petition which requested an
immediate ceasefire from all sides as well as an official dialogue between the warring parties to
be monitored by a third party (“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008; “African Women and Peace
Support,” 2004).
Although during the first week of the women’s rally in the fish market Taylor and his
administration ignored the activists, the daily practice of gathering at the market had begun to
create strong bonds between the Christian and Muslim women. It was by working together that
members of the Liberian Muslim Women’s Organization and the Christian Women Peace
Initiative decided on a second tactic to work toward a ceasefire. In addition to their continued
street protests, by April 2003 they also began to employ a “sex strike,” in essence refusing to
have sexual relations with their husbands or boyfriends until the fighting stopped. Members
hoped that this would influence their romantic partners to press for a ceasefire. Vaiba Flomo,
leader of the Christian Women Peace Initiative, explained that the activists’ philosophy was that
part of a woman’s power lies in denying her husband access to her body (“Pray the Devil Back,”
2008). It remains unclear how effective this tactic was, although journalists certainly seized upon
reporting the strike, publicizing it extensively (Witter, 2008; Gbowee, 2010).
Nevertheless, the strategy that was undeniably effective was the on-going street protest.
The daily demonstration at the fish market had blossomed into the official WIPNET Mass Action
for Peace campaign by early April. As the activists became a daily presence in the streets of
Monrovia, even during rainstorms, they began to attract major attention from both the media and
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the general public (Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005; “Pray the Devil Back,” 2008). During the
demonstrations, female activists held signs demanding an end to the fighting and also sang songs
decrying the violence. The slogan for the Mass Action for Peace was, “We Want Peace; No
More War,” words which also became part of the song that activists sang during the protests
(Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005: 135). At one point, over 2,500 women participated in the daily
protests (“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008).
These women involved with the Mass Action for Peace were recruited from diverse
settings, including internally displaced persons’ camps, markets, schools, churches, and nongovernmental organizations (Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005; “Pray the Devil Back,” 2008).
Moreover, women involved came from a multitude of ethnic groups (“Profile: Leymah
Gbowee—Liberia’s,” 2011). However, it is important to note that at the start, most members
were mainly rural women. Initially, many elite Liberian women viewed the campaign as being
“beneath” them. Class tensions were a real issue as those already participating felt insulted that
most urban, professional women did not take them seriously. It was not until weeks into the
protests, when the media had started to publicize the demonstrations, and elite women felt the
staying power of the campaign that they began to join in the Mass Action for Peace activities
(Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005).
Through the skillful manipulation of the international media, members of the Liberian
branch of WIPNET were eventually able to pressure Charles Taylor to meet with them (Ekiyor
and Gbowee, 2005; “Pray the Devil Back,” 2008). During this meeting with Taylor and
representatives of his administration, which occurred on April 23, 2003, the activists demanded
that Taylor develop an immediate ceasefire with the leaders of the rebel factions. Gbowee made
the official statement to Taylor in which she stressed that a major concern of the women
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associated with the Mass Action for Peace movement was the future of their children (“Pray the
Devil Back,” 2008). Taylor did not agree to the activists’ demands in April, but due to their
continued daily protests at the fish market, as well as their participation in additional
demonstrations outside the U.S. embassy, the parliament, and other government buildings,
activists kept international interest in the situation high. By June of 2003, international pressure
compelled Taylor to submit to negotiations in Accra that would ultimately lead to the final
ceasefire agreement that ended the war in August of 2003 (“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008;
Lederach and Lederach, 2010; Badmus, 2009).
The success of the WIPNET members in forcing Taylor to attend the Accra peace talks is
exceptional. However, members did not end the campaign there (Ekiyor et al., 2005). When
these peace talks began on June 4, 2003, delegations from several women’s groups also attended
the conference, although they were not officially invited (Sewell, 2007). Those with WIPNET
sought to continue their Mass Action for Peace effort and thus secured funding to send some
their members to the negotiations (Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005; Lederach and Lederach, 2010). It
was in Accra during the peace talks that the third major women’s wartime organizing effort
began. There, several women’s organizations joined together and essentially forced the warring
factions to sign onto the final ceasefire agreement which ended fourteen years of war in Liberia
(“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008). Eight members of MARWOPNET’s Liberian branch, led by Ruth
Sando Perry, officially represented all of the women’s groups at the negotiations, and
MARWOPNET’s vice president Theresa Leigh-Sherman signed the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement as a signatory witness (“Profile of the Mano River,” 2013; Sewell, 2007).
During their time in Accra, women wept and pleaded for peace. Some scholars have
traced this form of protest to the roles played by women in West African funeral traditions where
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women’s collective weeping was a prominent feature of the funeral rite (Casimiro et al., 2009).
Gbowee stated to reporters at the demonstrations that the women were there to be the men’s
conscience. In other words, the mere presence of the women was meant to put pressure on the
men to work toward ending the war (“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008).
As part of their protesting, several activists developed position papers on the direction
that they believed the negotiations should go, which they presented to both the warring parties
and the third party negotiators. However, before presenting their recommendations, the various
women’s groups in attendance had to lobby for access to the hall where the actual discussions
were taking place. Through persuasive arguing, female activists secured a place for themselves at
the peace table, with two representatives and two observers who were present throughout the
talks (Sewell, 2007). Additionally, activists worked together to issue collective statements to
journalists and reporters. Such testimonials included comments on both the horrific living
conditions for Liberian civilians, as well as petitions asking for a United Nations intervention
force to help end the war. Furthermore, WIPNET members met individually with the
representatives of each faction, as well as with many of the third party mediators, and also held
what they termed the Liberian Women’s Forum in which participating women gathered to
discuss their analyses of the ongoing peace negotiations (Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005).
When the negotiations appeared to stall, members of all the women’s groups decided on a
more extreme tactics (Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005). The final breaking point came on June 21,
2003, following a bombing of the U.S. Embassy by LURD forces in which a large community of
internally displaced persons, who had been staying within the embassy’s walls, died as a result of
the attack. Activists in Accra realized that it was time for a more radical course. First, they began
by recruiting more women to join them in the area outside of the negotiation room (“Pray the
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Devil Back,” 2008). Once gathered, the female activists, numbering over 200, barricaded the
door to the negotiation room where representatives of the warring factions and Taylor’s
government were meeting. This sit-in prevented both the leaders of the various factions as well
as the official mediators from leaving the negotiation table (Sewell, 2007; Ekiyor and Gbowee,
2005; Gbowee, 2009). Activists held up signs which included statements such as, “Killers of our
people—no impunity this time!” and, “How many babies do you intend to slaughter?” (Ekiyor
and Gbowee, 2005: 137). For two hours, even at the behest of lead negotiator General Abubakar,
the activists refused to relent, and continued blocking the men from leaving (Gbowee, 2009).
Eventually, security guards were called and Leymah Gbowee, one of the most prominent of the
women’s groups’ leaders, was threatened with arrest for obstructing justice (“Pray the Devil
Back,” 2008).
At this point, Gbowee declared that the guards, all men, could arrest her and that she
would make it easy for them, and thus, she began disrobing. Not only considered a taboo
throughout most West African societies, it is also considered a great curse for a man to see his
mother naked (“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008; Lederach and Lederach, 2010). As previously
noted, in Liberian society, men view all women older than themselves as their mothers (AFELL
et al., 1998). Filomina Steady describes Gbowee’s defiant act as a “weapon symbolizing the
power of motherhood,” specifically meant to shame the men so that they would not arrest her
(Steady, 2011: 105). Thus, when Gbowee began to strip, the male security guards became
agitated, and her actions caused a massive uproar in the hallway in front of the negotiation room
(“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008). Gbowee explains that those outside of Liberia are often confused
that in a country with such a high number of rapes that the security guards felt so strongly against
seeing her naked. According to Gbowee, the act of her disrobement, in addition to being a curse,
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was also disturbing to the men because she was actively choosing to undress. Thus, it was also
about her agency and power in the context of the situation that made the men so uncomfortable
(Carmon, 2010).
In the end, Gbowee’s gamble was successful and the guards failed to arrest her. In fact,
her ploy created such pandemonium that a LURD general attempted to climb over some of the
activists in order to escape the negotiation room. However, several women pushed him back into
the room, upsetting the general who appeared ready to retaliate by striking some of the women.
Fortunately, the lead negotiator, former Nigerian president General Abulsalami Abubakar,
prevented such a reprisal by shaming all of the representatives, informing them that if they were
“real” men, the women would not have to treat them like boys. Following this, the female
activists finally agreed to let the men leave. However, the women threatened that if progress was
not made within two weeks’ time, they would again lock the men in the negotiating room (“Pray
the Devil Back,” 2008). The activists articulated what they meant by progress, giving the men
three ultimatums. First, the women demanded that the delegates representing the warring parties
attend all further negotiation sessions; second, the men must cease insulting the female activists;
and, lastly, all parties had to sign onto a final peace accord within two weeks (Gbowee, 2009). In
addition to these threats made by the women, the media was attracted to the great furor caused by
the protest, which provided yet another reason for the men to resume talks as they felt
international pressure upon them (Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005).
This demonstration is cited by many analysts as the single event which put enough
pressure on rebel leaders and Taylor to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which led to
the end of the fourteen year civil war (Sewell, 2007; Gbowee, 2009). The mood of the
conference participants changed perceptibly following the sit-in in front of the negotiating room.
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Prior to the event, the leaders of the warring factions refused to compromise, obviously relishing
both their hotel amenities as well as the attention they were receiving. However, the women’s
activism created a changed atmosphere that made the talks no longer enjoyable for the men.
Within two weeks of the sit-in, the delegates representing Taylor and his administration, as well
as delegates from both militias, LURD and MODEL, all signed onto the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, officially ending the Liberian civil war (“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008; Birikorang,
2003/2004).
However, just prior to the men’s two week deadline, female representatives from fortyfive Liberian women’s organizations gathered at the Golden Tulip Hotel on August 15, 2003.
Leaders of MARWOPNET worked with members of the United Nations Development Fund for
Women (UNIFEM) to create a one-day workshop to help bring women’s issues to the fore at the
peace conference (“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004). Specifically, these women
gathered to issue policy recommendations regarding the future role of women in Liberia. Under
the leadership of Ruth Sando Perry, the activists created a list of recommendations which
included: increasing women’s participation in peacekeeping missions and in disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration services; increasing women’s involvement in the peace
negotiation process; reserving half of the leadership positions within the transitional government
for women; encouraging Liberian women to support female political candidates; asking for
support for women’s groups from the Liberian government, the Joint UN Programme on
HIV/AIDS (UNAID), and the United Nations Development Fund for Women to assist in
controlling the HIV/AIDS epidemic that had become widespread during the war; including the
delegates at the Golden Tulip in the reconstruction and redevelopment effort; and establishing
contacts with donor agencies to provide programs on skills training and microcredit lending.
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These policy recommendations became known as the Golden Tulip Declaration (“The Golden
Tulip Declaration,” 2003).
As highlighted, MARWOPNET representatives signed onto the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement. The women were invited because of the important role that they played in the
negotiation process (Casimiro et al., 2009). Additionally, some gender-relevant policies were
included in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but they were vague (Fuest, 2008). For
example, Article XXVIII of the accord read, “The Parties shall reflect national and gender
balance in all elective and non-elective appointments within the NTGL [National Transitional
Government of Liberia]” (“Liberia: Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” 2003). However,
although there was not a significant focus on women within the agreement, even the limited and
vague gender references within the accord were better than what has been written into most
postconflict treaties (Fuest, 2008).
Therefore, in conclusion, the role of women in leading to an end to the Liberian civil
war has been well chronicled. As Mary H. Moran and M. Anne Pitcher observe, such organizing
is especially striking since women from across Liberian society participated. From the most
influential, elite women of the urban areas to illiterate villagers of the rural areas, women became
involved in collective movements to end the war (Moran and Pitcher, 2004). Furthermore, it was
women’s activism which ultimately led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (“Pray the Devil
Back,” 2008). The three most decisive wartime activist efforts by women are: the success of
MARWOPNET members in convincing the leaders of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea to
meet; WIPNET’s Mass Action for Peace movement; and the major demonstration in Accra,
Ghana. To further highlight the work performed by female activists, the next section will present
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a case study of the women’s group the Liberian Women’s Initiative which actually had its start
early on in the war.
Case Study
As mentioned, almost as soon as the conflict began in 1989, many Liberian women
became involved in women’s organizations which addressed issues related to wartime
conditions.12 One such organization was the Liberian Women’s Initiative, which had a profound
influence on the efforts and techniques employed by female activists near the end of the war
(Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005). This section will trace the origins of the Liberian Women’s
Initiative, describe its membership, discuss the tactics and strategies that the organization’s
members employed, and finally, highlight the three greatest achievements of the organization.
On February 4, 1994 in Monrovia’s City Hall, the Liberian Women’s Initiative was
founded by Mary Brownell, Etweda Cooper, and Maureen Shaw. These leaders developed the
women’s group to serve as an umbrella organization for civil society groups (Sewell, 2007;
AFELL et al., 1998; “African Women and Peace Support,” 2004; Badmus, 2009; Aning, 1998).
Brownell states that the Liberian Women’s Initiative sought to encourage women to play a more
meaningful role in the civil sphere (Sewell, 2007). Specifically, its formation was noteworthy as
until this point of the war, women had been involved primarily in humanitarian activities, but the
women who joined this group sought to become involved in political activism (“African Women
and Peace Support,” 2004). Ruth Cesar said that the catalyst for the creation of the Liberian
Women’s Initiative was that “enough was enough.” Members were fed up with seeing their
relatives die, especially their husbands and children, and wanted an immediate end to the
12

Women remained prominent in both activist and humanitarian endeavors throughout the war by joining such
organizations as the Association of Women in Action, the Abused Women and Girls Project, the Women’s
Development Association, Concerned Women of Liberia, the Women’s Development Association of Liberia
(WODAL), the Federation of Liberian Women, Women in Action for Good Will, and the Rural Women’s
Association (Sewell, 2007; “African Women and Peace Support,” 2004).
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fighting. Notably, Cesar directly ties the groups’ activism to the women’s “…natural-born
instinct to protect the family, to protect our children…” (Sewell, 2007: 16). Such statements
highlight the strong maternal basis the Liberian Women’s Initiative’s membership.
The specific makeup of the membership of the organization was incredibly diverse,
despite its founding members being elite, urban professionals (“Best Practices in Peace
Building,” 1998). According to Mary Brownell, the women who composed the group spanned all
religious and ethnic backgrounds. Moreover, members came from both rural and urban contexts,
and from various socioeconomic backgrounds. In fact, rural women played a prominent role in
the work performed by the organization. The diversity of the Liberian Women’s Initiative proved
crucial to many of the group’s undertakings, especially in proving their objectivity in interactions
with factional leaders since women from rural and urban areas, and of all ethnicities, belonged to
their organization (“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004).
With the Liberian Women’s Initiative, Brownell essentially organized a number of
women to form a pressure group that focused a large portion of its activities on approaching the
various militia factions to plead for an end to the fighting. In addition, Brownell also noted that
the group wanted an end to the rape epidemic associated with the war (Sewell, 2007). The
organization’s active campaign to end the fighting spanned from 1994 until 1996, concluding
once Taylor won the presidential election in 1997 (Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005). One of their most
prominent tactics was the use of street demonstrations to protest the violence (Sewell, 2007).
According to Isiaka Alani Badmus, nearly every rally demanding an end to the bloodshed during
the period from 1994 to 1996 was organized by members of the Liberian Women’s Initiative
(Badmus, 2009). In addition, the activists also engaged in letter writing campaigns. Several
significant figures, such as all of the leaders of the various factions, United Nations officials,
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members of the U.S. Black Caucus, ECOWAS, and the European Union, received letters.
Moreover, members even telephoned the Secretary General of the United Nations, then U.S.
First Lady Hillary Clinton, two U.S. senators, and the first ladies of every state which
contributed troops to ECOMOG (“Best Practices in Peace Building,” 1998; AFELL et al., 1998;
“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004).
Another major strategy that members employed was working toward disarmament,
especially by trying to improve the control of small arms (Casimiro et al., 2009). The women
circulated recommendations and made statements to Liberian and international journalists,
politicians, and government officials indicating that they wanted the banning of arms sales and
total disarmament of all militias fighting in Liberia (“African Women and Peace Support,”
2004). Following the second Abuja Accord, activists focused their efforts on assisting the
ECOMOG forces in the demobilization process (Badmus, 2009). Another tactic included weekly
meetings in both mosques and churches to pray for an end to the fighting (“African Women and
Peace Support,” 2004).
The Liberian Women’s Initiative’s most striking form of activism was arriving,
uninvited, at the conferences in which representatives of the various factions met to attempt to
work out ceasefire agreements. Mary Brownell recalled informing the militia leaders, who were
often displeased by the women’s presence, that she would follow the militias wherever they went
until they finally stopped fighting (Sewell, 2007). The first conference that the women attended
was the 1990 peace talks in Banjul, Gambia. Through skillful use of the media, members made it
known that they wanted to be involved in the negotiation process and pressured ECOWAS
officials, who sponsored the talks, to recognize their right to be present. By December 1994, at a
peace conference in Accra, Ghana, members were awarded with recognized status by ECOWAS,

178

although they were still not formally invited to the negotiations (“African Women and Peace
Support,” 2004).
In May of 1995, members attended a peace conference in Abuja, Nigeria, uninvited as
usual, during which time they insisted on putting forth their colleague Theresa Leigh-Sherman to
address members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Sewell, 2007; “African Women
and Peace Support,” 2004). Official mediators at the conference initially told the women that
Leigh-Sherman would not be permitted to present her paper. However, Ghanaian President Jerry
Rawlings, one of the third party negotiators, deviated from the proscribed proceedings and
announced to the leaders of the warring factions that while they had heard from the men, they
also had to hear from the women, and thus invited Leigh-Sherman to address the conference
attendees. Leigh-Sherman’s position paper, which began a practice adopted by other women’s
groups, especially at the 2003 Accra peace talks, included several recommendations for
disarmament, in addition to policy recommendations concerning the form that a new government
of Liberia should take, particularly that it be more inclusive of women. One specific
recommendation was the group’s demand for the participation of women in all state matters,
beginning with the peace process (“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004). This
presentation at the 1995 Abuja conference was the first major achievement of the Liberian
Women’s Initiative.
Following the conference in May 1995, ECOWAS officials began to recognize the role
that women could play in helping to end the war. Thus, they actively encouraged members of the
Liberian Women’s Initiative to approach factional leaders in order to pressure the men to meet
with one another and start peace talks again. The delegations sent by the Liberian Women’s
Initiative to urge the militia leaders to meet with one another were successful in bringing the
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leaders together in July 1995 in Monrovia. This critical meeting was a watershed moment as the
July 1995 talks in Abuja would never have occurred if the activists had not met individually with
factional leaders in order to persuade them to agree to more negotiations. However, while some
members were present at the July negotiations in Abuja, they were only observers. Thus, despite
the crucial role that they had played earlier that month during the discussions in Monrovia, they
were unable to participate in the sessions at Abuja (“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004).
In July 1996, a delegation including women affiliated with the Liberian Women’s
Initiative was invited to Abuja for yet another round of talks between warring factions. A former
Liberian senator and Liberian Women’s Initiative member, Ruth Sando Perry, was part of this
delegation. However, when she arrived at the hotel where the negotiations were taking place, she
was denied admittance. It was only at the insistence of a Nigerian official that Perry joined the
proceedings, where she was surprised by her nomination to be leader of the Council of State, the
transitional government. Perry’s struggle to enter into the male-dominated space of the peace
conference, even with an invitation, exemplifies the struggles that female activists as a whole had
in participating in the conflict resolution process (“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004).
While Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’s status as the first female democratically elected president
of Africa is more well-known, Ruth Sando Perry’s position as the first woman to head an African
state is also acknowledged by many scholars and analysts as an important historical event
(Adams, 2008; Fuest, 2008). At the 1996 second Abuja Accord, Perry’s name was put forward
due to her status as a former senator, but it was her work with the Liberian Women’s Initiative
which so clearly earned her the nomination as Liberia’s transitional leader. Perry was dedicated
to reconciliation between all sides and had a proven track record of working to end the fighting.
Current Liberian president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has emphasized the vital precedent that Perry
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set by proving to those in mainstream Liberian society that women are as capable as men
(“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004). Nevertheless, Perry was only able to rise to leader
of the transitional government by emphasizing that her values and politics derived from her
status as a mother. For example, bestowed with the title “mother of the nation” by journalists,
Perry saw it as her special duty to address the issue of child soldiers (Aning, 1998: 14-5). Indeed,
following Perry’s appointment as head of state, women with the Liberian Women’s Initiative,
including Perry, focused their attention on the process of demobilization (Aning, 1998).
The third major achievement of the Liberian Women’s Initiative’s members’ activism is
the legacy of their efforts, especially WIPNET’s Mass Action for Peace campaign (Ekiyor and
Gbowee, 2005). Likewise, the practice of creating and presenting policy recommendations was
employed by members of several women’s organizations during the final peace agreement in
2003, but began with the members of the Liberian Women’s Initiative in the early 1990s
(“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004). Overall, the prolific wartime organizing
performed by Liberian women’s groups, such as the Liberian Women’s Initiative, has been
widely acknowledged (Fuest, 2008; O’Reilly, 2011; “Profile of the Mano River,” 2013; Gbowee,
2010). MARWONEP was collectively awarded the 2003 United Nations Prize in the field of
Human Rights, while Leymah Gbowee, leader of WIPNET’s Mass Action for Peace, won the
2011 Nobel Peace Prize, alongside Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Yemeni activist
Tawakkul Karman (“The Nobel Peace Prize,” 2013; Sewell, 2007). However, within Liberian
society, female activists are not always appreciated.
Societal Reactions to Women’s Organizing
Despite the attention many women’s groups and specific individuals have garnered
internationally, some within the mainstream of Liberia have not been receptive to the work of
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female activists. During the war, detractors would often ostracize, mock, and question the
motives of the women involved in organizing. While many expressed appreciation for the
activism performed by women during the war, there were others within Liberian mainstream
society who did not believe that women should become involved in activism under any
circumstances. Two major problems that faced many women while they were involved in
wartime organizing were isolation and ostracism. It was particularly difficult for individuals who
were the only visible women in their communities engaged in organizing. Such women were
greatly stigmatized. Frequently, those who disapproved would pressure women into refraining
from protests by socially ostracizing them. In fact, their continued involvement in women’s
groups even led some women to be shunned by their communities (“African Women and Peace
Support,” 2004).
Moreover, some women were actually publicly humiliated for being activists. Such open
attacks became more common as women’s groups found success in their organizing. According
to Massa Washington, as female activists gained acknowledgement for their efforts, they were
increasingly subjected to negative criticism. For example, some detractors would verbally attack
activists, mostly by questioning their motives. Members with the Liberian Women’s Initiative
were frequently described by detractors as “frustrated women whose husbands had left them”
(“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004: 32-33). Thus, women were often lampooned and
denigrated for being activists simply because of their gender. In fact, during Ruth Sando Perry’s
tenure as head of the transitional government, she and her administration were often disparaged
by remarks which focused on Perry’s gender. For example, a common expression of the time
referred to Perry and her administration as the “petticoat government” (Steady, 2011: 141).
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Stephanie Anne Johnson notes that this negative criticism directed at female activists is
due to the common belief in Liberian society that women should restrict their activities to that
which directly impacts the home or domestic sphere (Johnson, 2011). Although Western
concepts of the private sphere and the public sphere do not necessarily have historical roots in
Liberia, such ideas have nevertheless spread throughout many societies in sub-Saharan Africa,
including Liberia, due to colonialism, including through Americo-Liberian influence (Sudarkasa,
1986; Olukoju, 2006; Hansen, 1992; Akpan, 1973).
However, many Liberian men supported the work of women’s organizations during the
war. Yet in the postwar period, many of these same men felt that the women should no longer be
activists, especially because after the war much their activism focused on integrating women into
the political sphere. Women working toward ending the fighting fit with many traditional ideals
of women as essentially peaceful and particularly skilled at mediating conflicts. Thus, many
within mainstream society embraced the role that female activists played in ending the war
because it exemplified women’s roles as mothers. Yet the idea of female activists becoming
involved with other political matters was viewed by many as incompatible with the role women
should play in Liberian society (Lederach and Lederach, 2010; “African Women and Peace
Support,” 2004).
The role of women in society raises the question of the influence of feminism in Liberian
women’s organizing. It is unclear exactly how many of these activists viewed themselves as
feminists. Leymah Gbowee, one of the most prominent leaders of the women’s movement, is a
self-declared feminist. Gbowee’s feminist praxis has centered on being an advocate for the end
of intimate partner violence, demanding increased reproductive rights and access to education,
and eliminating child marriages (Knowles, 2012). While Gbowee is the only documented
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feminist involved in Liberian women’s wartime organizing, it seems doubtful that she was alone
in embracing feminism. Certainly, many female activists were working to improve the social
status of women. However, it remains unclear whether such individuals avoided the term
feminism in order to be less controversial or if they in fact rejected the feminist ideology.
Indeed, as Owen Alik Shahadah points out, many Africans reject the concept of
feminism, even if they in fact support increasing women’s rights. Such individuals argue that
feminism is a Western import that is anti-African and even imperialistic. They believe that
feminism causes familial relations to deteriorate since they view feminism as forcing men and
women to compete against one another (Shahadah, 2010). Other African scholars such as
Oyèrónké Oyewùmí question whether the concept of womanhood is even relevant in the context
of sub-Saharan Africa where social identities are often so overlapping and intersecting that
gender does not unite women the way it does in the Western world. Nonetheless, Oyewùmí
concedes that rising gender consciousness is a major trend in Africa (Oyewùmí, 2003).
Meanwhile, some anti-feminist Africans also contend that feminism is anti-motherist and thus
prevents women from fulfilling their biological and cultural roles. Others believe that only
“authentically” African ideas and practices can improve the situation for women (Shahadah,
2010).Yet feminist defenders such as Minna Salami observe that it is only when Africans begin
discussing feminism that they are accused of forgetting their African traditions and/or being
brainwashed by imperialists (Salami, 2011).
Yet even within the larger context of sub-Saharan Africa, feminists often emphasize
different issues than Western feminists. For example, many African feminists insist that they do
not want to be want to be treated or viewed in the same way that men are (Casimiro et al., 2009).
According to Hildra Tadria, African feminists frequently do not support gender neutrality or the

184

idea that women should be able to do anything that men can do. Such feminists often view
women who take on traditionally male roles as causing men to feel less valuable or even
sidelined. Instead, many African feminists seek to build an appreciation for what women already
do, and to present these duties and roles as equally worthy of respect as the roles that men fulfill.
For example, such feminists would argue that cooking food and raising children is as important
as working outside the home to provide money for the household (Knowles, 2012). Thus,
feminism in Liberia functions differently than it does in the West. Instead of fighting traditional
stereotypes or promoting gender equality in the workplace, it focuses on building appreciation
for traditional feminine tasks (Knowles, 2012; Casimiro et al., 2009). However, the question
remains if such an approach in fact challenges unequal gender relations. Overall, it is clear that in
Liberia, female activists were controversial.
3.13 Motherhood as Mobilization for Activism
Political institutions, as well as social and cultural norms, typically prevent women from
being “agents of change,” however, worldwide, many women attempt to circumvent these
constraints by mobilizing on the basis of their maternal identity (“Best Practices in Peace
Building,” 1998: 6; Sharoni, 1997). This was essentially the case within Liberian women’s
wartime organizing where much of the desire to transform society derived from the activists’
identification with motherhood. Leymah Gbowee typified this point of view in a PBS interview
by stating, “We believe that as mothers, we are the ones who will change everything” (Steady,
2011: 23; “Bill Moyers Journal,” 2009).
One significant way that women mobilized around maternalism was by centering their
concerns on children, especially their futures (“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004). For
example, during the meeting between women involved in the Mass Action for Peace movement
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and Charles Taylor and his administration, Leymah Gbowee emphasized that the activists were
demanding a ceasefire mainly because they were alarmed about the dangers to children’s wellbeing (“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008). Likewise, members with the Liberian Women’s Initiative
felt that they had a natural desire to protect their families, most especially their children (Sewell,
2007). Clearly, such strong concern for children highlights women’s maternal identities.
Another maternal mobilization strategy was emphasizing the skills that women possessed
due to their roles within the family. Women were described as having high level expertise in
reconciliation and mediation methods due to their status as wives and mothers (“African Women
and Peace Support,” 2004). Typical of this philosophy is a quote from Elizabeth Bannerman, of
the Women’s Chamber of Commerce, who states, “Motherhood is an advantage. If you can
manage a home, you can manage a nation” (Steady, 2011: 133-4). Steady notes that this
philosophy, that running a household enabled women to become capable of many things,
contributed to women’s efforts during the war (Steady, 2011). In particular, the skills associated
with maternal roles were viewed as providing activists with the ability to facilitate negotiations
between warring factions. As Evelyn Townsend of the Liberian Women’s Initiative explains, the
women would approach the factional leaders objectively, attempting to treat all the men the same
in order to build up the men’s confidence in the women’s impartiality (“African Women and
Peace Support,” 2004). Stephanie Anne Johnson describes this technique as part of the
“relational skills” that women employ within the home, especially between squabbling siblings.
Such abilities to be flexible and inclusive were thought to serve women in their roles as mothers,
but also in their roles as facilitators in mediating between warring factions (Johnson, 2011).
Finally, Liberian female activists employed maternalism by pressuring young male
fighters to feel a filial debt to the women. For example, in the July 1995 discussions among
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warring factions in Monrovia, one militia leader is to have stated, “When your mother calls you,
you must show up,” implying that although he may not have wanted to attend a peace talk, he
felt that he should honor the women’s wishes (“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004: 28).
Following the Abuja meeting between militia leaders that May, it had appeared impossible to
secure another dialogue due to the animosity between the men. However, female activists
approached factional leaders by emphasizing their roles as mothers and were able to secure
another round of talks (“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004). It appears that the women
created feelings of duty and obligation in the male militia leaders as the men felt compelled to
attend peace talks. A similar situation occurred in 2001 when MARWOPNET members
approached Conté in order to secure his attendance at a meeting with Taylor and Kabbah. The
women simply told Conté that they came to him as mothers and sisters, which was likely a veiled
way of asking him to consider his familial duties and honor their wishes (Femmes Africa
Solidarité, 2005; Sewell, 2007).
Why was motherist mobilization so effective in Liberia? According to Emmanuel Kwesi
Aning, when Liberian women identify themselves as mothers, they do so in the context of
African matriarchal philosophies (Aning, 1998). One such example is what Filomina Steady calls
“the queen mother paradigm,” which has existed historically in many sub-Saharan African
societies, and heavily influenced female activists in Liberia (Steady, 2011: 30; Lebeuf, 1963).
Another reason maternal mobilization was prominent among women in the civil war is that
political motherhood has been used as a mobilizing tool with great frequency within the modern
women’s movement throughout sub-Saharan Africa, including Liberia. Maternal identity
provides women with the “moral authority” from which to argue for their right to be included in
political systems and in decision-making processes (Casimiro et al., 2009). This point of view
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resonates worldwide, and is particularly strong in Africa; even in the African diaspora the
symbol of female leadership is often portrayed through mother imagery (Steady, 2011). Scholars
such as Emmanuel Kwesi Aning and Jennifer Pollack argue that maternalism is strategically
employed by Liberian women in order to allow them the culturally acceptable space to exercise
their right to be in the public realm since motherhood is so highly valued within the society
(Aning, 1998; Pollock, 2007). Likewise, Mary H. Moran and M. Anne Pitcher argue that for
rural Liberian women during the war, motherhood was used to justify concern for their
communities and their work within the communities. Thus, activists argued that their
involvement outside the private sphere was an extension of their natural caring roles (Moran and
Pitcher, 2004).
Finally, Stephanie Anne Johnson argues that motherhood as a tool of mobilization
allowed diverse groups of Liberian women to find commonalities and cross social bridges by
emphasizing their shared status as mothers (Johnson, 2011). As noted, the Liberian Women’s
Initiative, WIPNET, and MARWOPNET, among others, included women from multiple ethnic,
racial, class, and religious backgrounds, and included diversity across education, occupational,
and environmental (rural/urban) cleavages. Oyèrónké Oyewùmí believes that the concept of
motherhood unites African women, making it easy for women to relate to one another through
their shared experiences as mothers, making an excellent basis for solidarity among women
across Africa (Oyewùmí, 2003). It appears that during Liberia’s civil war, female activists
exemplified Oyewùmí’s theory.
Overall, this section sought to highlight the motherist mobilization in Liberian women’s
groups’ wartime activism. Motherhood is an immensely valued concept in Liberia where women
receive admiration from men for their work as mothers. Many Liberian women were inspired to
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become activists during the civil war based on maternal roles and representations. Such
maternalism centered on themes of wanting to protect children; the belief that women possessed
unique skills as mothers; and through strategies that sought to influence male fighters, militia
leaders, and officials by implying that these men had a duty to honor their mothers by following
the women’s wishes (“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004).Motherhood is a major focus
on this paper. In the final chapter of this thesis, process-tracing of the war will be employed to
assess whether women’s activism was one of the main causes in increasing women’s rights
immediately following the war. Nevertheless, this section provides evidence that much of the
activism during the war was motherist.
3.14 Gender Interests Typology
This next section will analyze the form of activism taken by Liberian activists during the
civil war through the use of Maxine Molyneux's gender interest typology13. This tool will help to
determine whether the overall form of women's activism during the civil war was overtly
feminist on the basis that strategic gender interests directly challenge patriarchy and are thus
distinctively feminist. Since the ultimate goal is to understand whether it is the form of women's
activism, motherist or feminist, which affects gains in women's rights, it is important to clearly
define what is feminist in the work performed by those in Liberian women's groups. Obviously,
women’s organizing was diverse. However, overall, three main goals of women’s groups
emerged during the war. First, nearly all female activists attempted to stop the fighting between
the various militias in an effort to end the war and also universally pursued the goal of increasing

13

Molyneux developed the typology to define the form, strategic or practical, that women's gender interests take in
activism. Strategic gender interests seek to alleviate women’s subordinate status while practical gender interests
address urgent needs which usually do not entail immediate female emancipation or gender equality (Molyneux,
1985).
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women's involvement in public life. Additionally, some Liberian activists targeted improving the
political and social status of women.
The first major action during the war taken by those involved in women’s groups was the
campaign to bring Taylor, Kabbah, and Conté together for a meeting to address security concerns
in the Mano River region, specifically the on-going conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. With
delegations sent to each individual head of state, MARWOPNET activists were eventually
successful in persuading the three leaders to meet (Femmes Africa Solidarité, 2005). However,
Mary H. Moran and M. Anne Pitcher argue that the efforts undertaken by the activists were
undermined precisely because they were women. While the male officials praised the women for
succeeding in convincing the three heads of states to agree to talks, it was the women’s very
status as female which prevented them from being considered important enough to be involved
in the actual proceedings of the meeting (Moran and Pitcher, 2004).
Clearly, those with MARWOPNET wanted to be involved in the Rabat discussions.
However, from their statements made individually to Taylor and Conté, the only conclusion that
can be drawn with absolute certainty is that the women wanted an end to the violence in the
region. The activists defined their concerns as the safety of women and children, and focused on
the suffering which women were subjected to by the ongoing fighting (Sewell, 2007). Thus, the
emphasis of these activists was on women’s practical gender interests and role as mothers. Had
the Rabat meeting led to substantial steps toward ending the civil war it certainly would have
helped Liberian women, along with men and children as well. Yet nothing, at least based on the
available literature, suggests that MARWOPNET members made demands concerning issues of
gender inequality or improving the status of women in any direct or transformative sense.
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Furthermore, the entire purpose of the WIPNET campaign, the Mass Action for Peace,
was aimed at bringing an end to the fighting between the various warring factions. Peace was the
resounding theme surrounding the entire movement, whether through the women’s prayers for an
end to the violence or in their protests for a halt to the fighting (“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008).
Thus, WIPNET’s activism was also focused on practical gender interests since their campaign
centered on ending difficult wartime conditions. Likewise, the majority of the protesting and
organizing associated with the 2003 Accra peace conference was similarly aimed at restoring the
basic security situation in Liberia by halting the fighting among warring factions. This confirms
once again that a major theme of Liberian women’s wartime organizing centered on addressing
women’s practical gender interests (“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008).
In each of the above examples, the activists’ intentions were channeled toward improving
the immediate needs of women by finding a way to end the violence. An end to the war would
have benefited women, along with the rest of society, but such efforts for peace were ultimately
grounded in practical gender interests rather than strategies to address gender relations. However,
one method that activists often employed to reach this goal of ending the fighting was by
insisting that their demands for peace were heard because they were mothers. Activists used their
status as mothers to demand respect and to be heard, and thus, in this capacity sought to increase
respect for women which, in fact, indirectly addressed women’s strategic gender interests by
challenging women’s inferior status to men.
Likewise, these same actions also increased women’s prominence in the public sphere.
While they may not have overtly challenged women's subordination to men, such efforts did
apparently lead Liberian women to view themselves in a different light. For example, Clara
d’Almeida stated that women who were activists proved to themselves that they could do more
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than wash dishes and take care of children (“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004). As
noted elsewhere, movements which further women's practical gender interests have often
empowered women. Involvement in any form of collective organizing, regardless of whether it
attempts to improve women’s lower social status, can lead women to self-actualization
(Hartmann-Mahmud and Huiskamp, 2006). Thus, activism focused even on only ending the
fighting proved to Liberian women that they were competent. For example, activists presented
position papers to government officials, released statements to the media, organized
demonstrations, used management skills, and spoke out in a public setting (“African Women and
Peace Support,” 2004; “Pray the Devil Back,” 2008).
Another major theme addressed by some female activists targeted improving the political
and social status of women. Some women’s wartime activism attempted to end rape, a form of
gender based violence which both produces and continues inequalities between men and women,
while also reinforcing male power and control (“Gender Equality,” 2013). Ending a form of
gender based violence would address women’s strategic gender interests, as eliminating the
practice would challenge unequal gender relations. A primary reason that members of the
Liberian Women’s Initiative focused on strategies to bring warring factions to agree to ceasefires
was to work to end the widespread rape epidemic (Sewell, 2007). WIPNET members recognized
that all forms of violence against women, including female genital cutting, rape, and sexual
slavery, were symptoms of the structural inequalities that define women in West African
societies as second class citizens (Gbowee, 2009; “Gender Equality,” 2013). While not directly
addressing misogyny in their efforts, Liberian female activists nonetheless did address the power
differential that is at play in the gender based violence of sexual assault. Thus, by finding ways
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to combat rape, Liberian female activists hoped to improve women’s status by ending one facet
of male domination.
The other major instance where Liberian women’s activism dealt with strategic gender
interests was in recommending policies which would help to integrate women into political
processes, especially into decision-making roles. Activists sought to bring women into the peace
negotiation process, the disarmament and reconstruction process, and into the upper echelons of
the next government of Liberia (“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004; Gbowee, 2009).
Female activists who issued the Golden Tulip Declaration were focused primarily on increasing
women’s involvement in government, civil society, and employment. They demanded reserved
leadership positions in the transitional government for women, and also promoted the idea of
encouraging women to run for office. In addition, activists advocated for increased funding from
the Liberian government and outside sources to promote women’s continued involvement in civil
society groups, and recommended that Liberian women be provided with skills training and
access to microcredit loans in order to improve their economic position (“African Women and
Peace Support,” 2004; “The Golden Tulip Declaration,” 2003).
However, Leymah Gbowee notes that the majority of the activism performed by
women’s groups during the 2003 Accra peace negotiations failed to secure an increase in
women’s strategic gender interests as the women’s efforts were mainly focused on putting a stop
to the fighting. Indeed, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement neither reflected the role that
women played in helping end the war, nor did it address women’s issues (Gbowee, 2009).
Clearly, however, efforts to increase the role of women in government, civil society, and the
economic sphere were put forward, and such recommendations did attempt to help women gain
strategic gender interests. According to Molyneux, actions such as these are a way of addressing
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women's strategic gender interests because they not only highlight women's inferior status to
men, they also seek to change that status.
Maxine Molyneux's gender interest typology is a useful tool in determining whether the
overall form of women's activism during the Liberian civil war was overtly feminist or not.
Based on the logic that strategic gender interests directly challenge patriarchy, acts falling under
this category are labeled distinctively feminist. Since the ultimate goal of this paper is to
understand whether it is the form of women's activism, motherist or feminist, which affects gains
in women's rights, it is important to clearly define what is feminist in the organizing work
performed by Liberian women's groups. Overall, the two main goals of most female activists
were efforts to stop the fighting between the various factions in order to end the war, and the
second theme was to increase women's involvement in public life. In addition, some women’s
groups aimed at improving the political and social status of women, thus suggesting that there
was what could be characterized as a feminist element to at least some of women’s organizing.
Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that women can become involved in government and the
economic sphere without the intention of expanding women’s rights. Thus, the mere presence of
women may not necessarily be feminist or even beneficial to more equitable gender relations. In
spite of this, it is still characteristic of feminism to seek to expand women’s roles outside the
home. Table 2 serves as an illustration of Liberian women’s activism following Molyneux’s
typology.
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Table 2: Molyneux’s Typology Applied to Liberian Women’s Groups
Strategic Gender Interests
n/a

Women’s Action
Mano River Women’s Peace
Network

Sought an end to rape and
other forms of gender-based
violence
Golden Tulip Declaration
recommended increased roles
for women in government,
civil society, and economic
sphere
Pursued an end to the rape
epidemic and recommended
women become more involved
in the public sphere

Mass Action for Peace

Practical Gender Interests
Persuaded government leaders
to meet to address security
situation, focusing on an end
to the fighting
Held street protests
demanding a ceasefire

2003 Accra Peace Talks

Demanded an end to fighting
by sequestering and
threatening factional leaders

Liberian Women’s Initiative

Demanded ceasefire through
protests and through conflict
mediation

Thus, defining what counted as feminist activism is important. It is clear that in the case
of Liberian women’s wartime organizing both motherist and feminist mobilizations played a
role. The following section will analyze the progress that women made in the postwar period.
3.15 Gains in Women’s Rights Following the War
The final portion of this chapter will measure the changes in the dependent variable,
women’s rights, as a result of the war. To measure these changes, five indicators are employed,
female literacy rates, the availability of birth control, the rate of maternal mortality, the number
of women in parliament, and changes to the family code, which were selected due to their status
as widely accepted measures of equality (Issan, 2010; Lovenduski and Norris, 2003; Pezzini,
2005; Bianco and Moore, 2012).
As described in chapter one, the changes in the dependent variable will be traced five
years prior to the war and five years following the war in order to ascertain whether women’s
rights increased. Thus, in the case study of Liberia, the years 1984 to 1989 will be compared
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against the years 2003 to 2008. Similar to Lebanon, it is difficult to obtain female literacy
statistics. According to the World Bank, in 1984, 19.3 percent of the female population age 15
and older was literate. In the context of postwar Liberia, the only available year falling into the
five year radius is 2004, when female literacy for those 15 and older had risen to 47.9 percent14
(“Data, World Bank,” 2013). In comparison to similar countries, the female literacy rate in
Liberia was about average in the 1980s. For example, in 1988, Côte d’Ivoire had a female
literacy rate of 23 percent and Senegal a rate of 18 percent. While the female literacy rate for
Liberia in 2004 was lower than the Cameroonian 2007 rate of 63 percent, Liberia’s female
literacy rate was much higher than other West African nations. In 2005, Burkina Faso had a 22
percent female literacy rate, Nigeria had a 2003 female literacy rate of 43 percent, and Senegal
had a 2006 female literacy rate of 33 percent (“Data, World Bank,” 2013).
This rise in Liberian female literacy is likely connected to the increase in girls’ access to
education that came as a result of the war. According to officials with the Liberian Ministry of
Education, while females are still a minority in the education sector, girls’ enrollment in both the
primary and secondary levels have noticeably risen from prewar numbers. Notably, in the time
period from 1998 to 2001, girls went from consisting of 40 to 42 percent of all primary school
students, and from 31 percent to 41 percent of all secondary students. Since the end of the war,
Liberian parents of various ethnic and religious backgrounds report that they believe the
education of girls to be as important as educating boys. Since so many women became heads-ofhouse during the war, parents are concerned that many girls could grow up to be women who
have to be the main providers in their families, or at least important contributors to the family’s
finances, and thus now see the necessity of educating daughters (Fuest, 2008).

14

The next available year is past the five year marker of this study. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in 2010,
56.8 percent of the Liberian female population 15 years and older were literate (“Data, World Bank,” 2013).
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In regards to the second indicator, birth control, the percentage of Liberians using birth
control15 in 1986 was estimated at 6.4 percent. After the war, in 2007, it was estimated that 11.4
percent of Liberians were using some form of contraception (“Data, World Bank,” 2013). SubSaharan African countries in the south have higher usage of contraceptives than those in West
Africa. For example, in 2007, birth control was used by 9 percent of the Mauritanian population
and 15 percent of the Nigerian population, while 53 percent of the Batswana population and 41
percent of the Zambian population employed contraception. Thus, Liberian usage of birth control
does not appear to be drastically low in relation to other West African countries, although it is
certainly a considerably low percentage of the population who uses contraception (“Data, World
Bank,” 2013). Worldwide, contraceptive usage is lowest in the sub-Saharan African region. Even
in 2010, only 21.83 percent of those living in sub-Saharan Africa used birth control
(“Contraceptive Prevalence…in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 2013). There is a high unmet need for
contraception in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in West Africa (Gribble and Haffey, 2008).
Concerning the third indicator, maternal mortality rate, the World Bank reports that in
1988 Liberia had a maternal mortality rate of 578 per 100,000 live births (“Data, World Bank,”
2013). Following the war, the World Bank and UNICEF agree that in both 2007 and 2008,
approximately 990 women died in childbirth for every 100,000 live births (“At a Glance:
Liberia,” 2003; “Data, World Bank,” 2013). To compare Liberia to other West African states,
Guinea Bissau had a maternal mortality rate of 910 per 100,000 live births in 1990. Thus,
Liberia’s 1988 rate of 588 deaths appears to be low for the region.16 However, Liberia’s 2007
and 2008 rate of 990 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births is an overall high for the region.
Benin’s maternal mortality rate stood at 400 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in 2006,
15

The World Bank defines contraception as any method which attempts to prevent pregnancy (“Contraception
Prevalence,” 2013).
16
No other maternal mortality rates for West African nations are available for the mid to late 1980s time period.
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Burkina Faso’s maternal mortality rate was 310 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2006, Guinea’s
2005 maternal mortality rate was 980 per 100,000 live births, Mali’s 2006 maternal mortality
rate stood at 460 deaths per 100,000 live births, and Nigeria’s 2008 rate was 550 women’s deaths
as a result of childbirth per 100,000 live births (“Data, World Bank,” 2013). Liberia’s maternal
mortality rate, one of the highest in the world, is directly tied to the civil war. During the conflict,
Liberia’s healthcare system essentially disappeared as infrastructure was destroyed and trained
medical professionals largely left (“Liberia: Maternal Health Worsened,” 2008; Nyepon, 2011).
In the years leading up to the civil war, there were women who served in the Liberian
parliament. However, there is a lack of information concerning just how many women served in
the legislative branch in the 1985 election17. It appears that one female was elected as a member
of parliament in 1985,18 Ruth Sando Perry19 (Beyan, Burrowes, and Dunn, 2001). In the first
postwar elections, which occurred in 2005, 8 out of 64 seats in the House of Representatives
were won by women, while women claimed 5 of the 30 Senate seats (“Liberia: House of
Representatives,” 2013; “Liberia: The Liberian Senate,” 2013). As Melinda Adams and Gwynn
Thomas point out, women’s representation in the legislative branch has been lower in Liberia
than in other postconflict African states such as Rwanda, Mozambique, South Africa, Burundi,
and Uganda. Despite the adoption of an election reform law in January 2005 by the National
Elections Commission which stipulated that 30 percent of the candidates nominated for public
elective offices for each political party should be women, this gender quota was not enforced in

17

The Inter Parliamentary Union archive on Liberian elections does not indicate the gender breakdown until the
2005 elections (“Liberia: House of Representatives,” 2013; “Liberia: The Liberian Senate,” 2013). Ellen JohnsonSireaf did win a Senate position in 1985, but turned it down to protest Doe’s rigging of the presidential election that
year (Johnson-Sirleaf, 2009).
18
Based on available information, other past female legislators have included Sally Howe, Elizabeth Collins, and
Catherine Collins, who served in 1952 (Fuest, 2008; Steady, 2011).
19
Certainly, there may have been others, but no records exist to confirm this. Regardless, the number is likely quite
low.
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the 2005 elections. As a result, only 12.5 percent of the House of Representatives and 16.7
percent of the Senate was composed of women (Adams and Thomas, 2010).
The final indicator used in this study is the number of positive changes for women made
to the family code. Kristina Scurry Baehr and Chi Mgbako explain that both formal and
customary law have existed simultaneously in Liberia, noting that this tradition is rooted in the
socio-political differences between the more recently arrived Americo-Liberian community and
indigenous Liberian groups. Historically, individuals from indigenous ethnic groups were not
covered by formal laws which meant equal rights have not traditionally existed among those
living in Liberia (Baehr and Mgbako, 2011; Ajibewa, 1999). Essentially, magistrate and civil
courts ensured the operation of formal law while clan chiefs, town chiefs, and paramount chiefs
had initial jurisdiction over civil cases, although not criminal cases (Baehr and Mgbako, 2011).
The postwar period in Liberia has seen changes made in the family code to benefit
women. The most important of these was the Equal Rights of the Customary Marriage Law of
2003. This law guaranteed that a woman had the right to own property and also could not be
forced to marry a man against her will. The law also stipulated that a woman should inherit one
third of her husband’s property if he dies, and finally, the law noted that dowry was to be viewed
as a gift and was therefore not required to be paid back if a couple divorced. Prior to the war,
most indigenous Liberian women were not permitted to own or inherit land or property, putting
them at a severe disadvantage to men. Yet, this important law, a formal law it must be noted,
does not always protect women in the way that it was intended. It relies on the chiefs overseeing
civil cases to follow formal law rather than customary law, and as Kristina Scurry Baehr and Chi
Mgbako observe, most chiefs are apt to follow customary law rather than the Equal Rights of the
Customary Marriage Law (Baehr and Mgbako, 2011).
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Another new law was developed in the postwar period which deals with rape.
Traditionally rape has been handled between families, where the accused rapist is asked to pay
the family of the rape victim (Baehr and Mgbako, 2011). As previously noted, involving the
courts is believed to disrespect the family of the accused rapist (Jones, 2010). However, in 2005,
the Act to Amend the New Penal Code Chapter 14 Sections 14.70 and 14.71 and to Provide for
Gang Rape, also known as the Rape Amendment Act (RAA), was passed. This law defines rape
as any non-consensual sex and declares that a person under age 18 cannot give consent, even in
the case of child marriage (Kalwinski, 2007). The provision relating to child marriages is
particularly important, and gives child brides a legal measure to fight back. However, Melanie
Teff points out that while this represents positive change, overall, the law is largely not enforced
and it is difficult to even come by a copy of the law meaning that not many people are aware of
their rights (Teff, 2009).
In the aftermath of the Liberian civil war, these two laws represent major changes to the
family code that promote gender equality. The Equal Rights of the Customary Marriage Law
gives all Liberian women the opportunity to inherit property and land and also gives them the
legal right to refuse marriage to a man not of their choosing. However, implementation is
difficult in areas where customary law has normally taken precedence. Likewise, the Rape
Amendment Act does criminalize rape, but ignorance of the law is a problem. Nevertheless,
these laws are integral to transforming unequal gender relations between men and women. The
first law attempts to ensure that women have the same opportunities as men to inherit and own
land and property, while also guaranteeing that women and men can both choose their marriage
partners. Similarly, criminalizing rape attempts to safeguard women from a gender based
violence that promotes hierarchical gender relations.
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Thus, by comparing the five indicators of female literacy rates, the availability of birth
control, the rate of maternal mortality, the number of women in parliament, and changes to the
family code, in both the prewar and postwar contexts, it is clear that there were improvements in
women’s rights following the Liberian civil war. One major change was the increase in female
literacy rates. A year after the war, literacy rates for women age 15 and above had increased by
148.2 percent. Likewise, there was a jump of 78.1 percent in the use of birth control, although
even in 2007 only a small portion, 11.4 percent of the population, used contraception. However,
the rate of maternal mortality not only failed to improve in the aftermath of the civil war, it in
fact shows complete regression in maternal health care since then. One year into the war,
maternal deaths increased by 107.6 percent from 1988 levels. In 2007, rates had decreased from
1990 levels by 17.5 percent, but still had shown an overall increase of 71.3 percent from
maternal deaths before the war. As previously noted, Liberia’s health infrastructure was
destroyed during the war (Atwood et al., 2012). This at least partially explains the increase in
maternal mortality rates.
As described, the number of female parliamentarians in the 1985 election is difficult to
determine. Ruth Perry is the only confirmed winner of these elections when the total number of
seats in the Liberian parliament stood at 90 (“Liberia: Date of Elections,” 2013). Thus, women
made up only 1.1 percent of the parliament, if Perry was indeed its only female member who
won election in 1985. By the 2005 elections, 13.8 percent of the members of parliament were
women, indicating an incredible increase of 1,154 percent in female representation, although
women’s participation rate is still below the world average20. Similarly, substantial progress has
been made concerning the area of family code through the Equal Rights of the Customary

20

Of course, it is debatable if Perry was the only woman serving in the 1985 elections so this jump may not be as
drastic as it would appear.
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Marriage Law and Rape Amendment Act, at least in terms of changes to the law, if not its
implementation.
In conclusion, Liberian women’s wartime organizing focused on both practical and
strategic interests while also implementing motherist mobilization. However, only half of the
improvements in women’s rights, in female literacy rates, access to birth control, number of
women in parliament, and changes to the family code to benefit women, can be attributed to
women’s activism. Female literacy rates improved largely due to the conditions of wartime.
Parents increasingly began to send their daughters to school as they feared that their daughters
might have to one day financially support themselves since the war was resulting in so many
female-headed households (Fuest, 2008). Likewise, the rise in access to birth control was not
something that female activists ever focused their organizing on during the war, and is more
likely attributable to other civil society actors. However, the rise in the number of women in
parliament is likely connected to Liberian women’s activism which repeatedly focused on
strategies to include more women in government. Jacqui Bauer believes that the high number of
women’s organizations in Liberia combined with the high level of women’s grassroots activism
led to the increased rates of female participation in politics. Bauer also attributes women’s
increased political participation to the presidential candidacy of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf which
inspired women to want to become more involved in politics (Bauer, 2009).
Similarly, Liberian women’s activism is connected to both the Equal Rights of the
Customary Marriage Law and the Rape Amendment Act. Those with AFELL, the Association of
Female Lawyers of Liberia, organized female activists beginning in 1995 to advocate for a bill
which addressed issues associated with a woman’s right to choose their marriage partner as well
as inherit land and property. In 2002, AFELL led Liberian women activists in a march of support
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for the Equal Rights of the Customary Marriage Law when the bill was stalled in the national
legislature (Massquoi, 2007). Likewise, activists associated with AFELL were instrumental in
advocating for the Rape Amendment Act, and in fact AFELL lawyers actually wrote an initial
draft of the bill (Massquoi, 2007; Paye-Layleh, 2005). Therefore, while female literacy and
access to birth control increased for other reasons, Liberian women’s activism, which focused on
both practical and strategic gender interests while combining motherist and feminist
mobilizations, did influence the outcome of increased female parliamentarians and the changes
to the family code that benefited women.
3.16 Conclusion
In Liberia, women’s organizing did not end with the conclusion of the civil war as it did
in the Lebanese context. The vast majority of Lebanese women put aside their political agendas
in order to focus on more urgent needs, such as finding adequate food, but also to simply focus
on rebuilding their personal lives (Maksoud, 1996). In contrast, Liberian women involved in
women’s groups stayed active following the war’s finish. For example, many women who had
mobilized during the war continued their efforts by supporting Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’s bid for
the presidency (Bauer, 2009). The next chapter will use process-tracing to compare the
difference in the types of mobilization techniques used by the majority of Lebanese women and
Liberian women in order to explore whether this had any effect on the differences in the
respective postwar situations in Lebanon and Liberia.
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Chapter 4: Analysis and Conclusion
4.1 Introduction
The ongoing debate among scholars concerning whether war and its aftermath bring an
opportunity to further women’s equality in political, economic, and social standing has largely
centered on women’s direct participation in fighting and women’s entrance into the workforce
(Bop, 2002; Meintjes, 2002; Turshen, 2002; Enloe, 1993). This thesis seeks to contribute to the
possibility of a connection between women’s liberation and war by considering motherist and
feminist movements in Lebanon and Liberia in order to determine whether it is the approach of
activists which affects women’s rights. Thus, this final chapter will employ the process-tracing
technique to assess and compare Lebanese and Liberian women’s respective wartime organizing
in order to trace whether the type of activism had any effect on postwar gains in women’s rights.
Additionally, this final chapter will answer the posed research questions and offer suggestions for
future research.
4.2 Process-tracing
This section will briefly review Lebanese and Liberian women’s wartime activism,
employ process-tracing to determine if motherist or feminist mobilizations affected women’s
rights in the aftermath of war, and consider other factors in the differing postwar situations for
women in Lebanon and Liberia. In Lebanon’s civil war from 1975 to 1990, the overall tone of
women’s groups was motherist. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that there were feminists
involved in wartime activism and that feminist actions were taken by many women’s
associations. However, the main method of mobilization during the Lebanese civil war was
through women’s maternal identity. In contrast to Lebanon’s situation, Liberia’s women’s
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movement during the civil war, which lasted from 1989 until 2003, was hybrid motheristfeminist, meaning both a motherist and feminist orientation was employed.
Therefore, through process-tracing, what follows will highlight how the different
orientations of the respective activists in Lebanon and Liberia affected female literacy, women’s
access to birth control, maternal mortality rates, the number of women in parliament, and
changes to the family code that benefited women. After first comparing the changes in the
dependent variable in Lebanon and Liberia and briefly reiterating the major points of women’s
activism in each case study, there will be an analysis of the role of Lebanese and Liberian women
in the respective peace accords. This will be followed by a discussion of the differing methods of
confrontation used by women’s groups as well as the decision of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to run for
president in the first postwar Liberian election.
In Lebanon, female literacy, which increased by 44.9 percent, and maternal deaths, which
decreased by 64.1 percent, saw a drastic improvement from the prewar years of 1970 and 1971
respectively, to the postwar year of 1995. Likewise, it was certainly positive that birth control
was legalized and that its use increased by 15.3 percent from 1971 to 1996. Nevertheless, the
number of women in parliament did not rise substantially, only by 2.3 percent from 1972 to 1992
(Hariri, 1996; “Data, World Bank,” 2013; “The Situation of Children and Women,” 1995;
“Global Health Observatory Data,” 2013; “Lebanon: Parliamentary Chamber Majlis…1992,”
2013; Hajjar, 2003).
Likewise, in the five year period following the war, although some changes occurred in
the family code to benefit women, women nonetheless still faced many discriminatory laws, in
issues such as polygamy, inheritance rights, and divorce, and were at the mercy of religious
judges (Mansour, 2005; Livingstone, 1992). Most importantly, such changes to the family code
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did not represent substantial gains in equitable gender relations, although they certainly
contributed to the reduction of patriarchy. The 1993 decision to count the testimony of men and
women on equal terms in court was a major step toward ending gender inequality (Suad, 1997).
Nevertheless, other improvements made in the five years after the war did not substantially
address hierarchal gender relations. For example, women were deemed competent enough to
testify in court in real estate matters and were also permitted to start a business without first
securing their husband’s permission. Additionally, female diplomats were allowed to continue
working if they married non-Lebanese men and women were no longer placed under the legal
categorization of “incompetent” or “underage” in Lebanese law (Shehadeh, 2010; Lattouf, 2004).
While addressing strategic gender interests, these changes to the family code nevertheless did not
substantially alter inequitable gender relations, but were a step in that direction.
In Liberia, literacy rates for women age 15 and above had increased by 148.2 percent
from the prewar to the postwar period. Likewise, from 1986 to 2007 there was a 78.1 percent
jump in the use of birth control. However, the rate of maternal mortality failed to improve in the
aftermath of the civil war. One year into the war, maternal deaths increased by 107.6 percent
from 1988 levels. In 2007, rates had decreased from 1990 levels by 17.5 percent, but still had
shown an overall increase of 71.3 percent from maternal deaths before the war (“At a Glance:
Liberia,” 2003; “Data, World Bank,” 2013; “Global Health Observatory Data,” 2013).
Nevertheless, the number of women in the Liberian parliament increased by 1,154 percent from
1985 to 2005 and significant changes to the family code that benefited women also occurred. For
example, the Rape Amendment Act penalized non-consensual sex, not just gang rape as the law
had stood before, and the Equal Rights of the Customary Marriage Law gave all Liberian women
the opportunity to inherit property and land and also the legal grounds to refuse marriage to a
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man not of their choosing (“Liberia: Date of Elections,” 2013; Kalwinski, 2007; Baehr et al.,
2011).
In contrast to the changes to the family which benefited women that were made in
Lebanon, the changes made to the Liberian family code went further in addressing gender
inequality. Criminalizing rape, a form of gender based violence, is a major step toward ending
patriarchy since it seeks to address power differences in hierarchical gender relations (“Gender
Equality,” 2013). Similarly, the issues addressed in the Equal Rights of the Customary Marriage
Law seek to rectify the inequalities between men and women’s access to land and property,
which have historically disadvantaged a large proportion of Liberian women. Additionally, this
law also provided a woman the legal right to turn down a marriage if she did not want it and,
furthermore, also protected against child marriage. Both are substantial steps toward more equal
gender relations since such stipulations seek to change the traditional power differences between
women and men (Baehr and Mgbako, 2011). Table 3 offers a comparative illustration of the
differences made by Lebanese and Liberian women during their respective civil wars:
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Table 3: Differences in Lebanese and Liberian Women’s Wartime Gains:
Lebanon

Liberia

Female Literacy Rate

44.9% increase

148.2% increase

Availability of Birth Control

15.3% increase

78.1% increase

Maternal Mortality Rate

64.1% decrease

71.3% increase

Number of Female
Parliamentarians
Changes to Family Code
which Benefited Women

2.3% increase

1,154% increase

Raised retirement age for
women from age 54 to 64;
gave equal weight to men and
women’s testimony in court;
allowed women to testify in
real estate matters;
allowed women to work
without husband’s permission;
allowed female diplomats to
maintain Lebanese citizenship
upon marrying non-Lebanese;
recognized women as a
separate legal category from
“incompetent” or “underaged”

Allowed women to own land
and property;
guaranteed women would
inherit one third of husband’s
property upon death;
gave women right to refuse
marriage to man not of their
choosing;
criminalized rape;
criminalized all sex with those
under 18 as sex, even in case
of child marriage

By comparing the postwar outcomes in changes to the dependent variable as measured by
the indicators of female literacy, availability of birth control, maternal morality rate, number of
women in parliament, and changes to the family code that benefited women in Lebanon and
Liberia, it becomes apparent that one of the most crucial differences between the two cases is the
number of female parliamentarians in the respective countries. While changing the leadership
does not necessarily change the system, there is a widespread literature indicating many positive
associations with increased roles of women in leadership. One major advantage associated with
female leadership is that political institutions tend to become more inclusive of women, as well
as others traditionally located outside of the centers of powers. According to Alyse Nelson,
women typically bring power sharing ideas in their leadership styles that promote participatory
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politics (Nelson, 2012). Thus, the extreme rise in the number of women in the Liberian
parliament is a clear indication of important changes for women. When women are in positions
of power, they have a greater ability to facilitate changes which affect women’s rights. While
Lebanese women’s participation rates in parliament did increase, it was by a mere 2.3 percent. In
comparison to Liberia, with a rise of 1,154 percent in female parliamentarians, it is obvious that
Liberian women were far better off than Lebanese women in the postconflict period. Political
participation is integral in the fight for gender equality. While increases in female literacy rates
and availability of birth control, decreases in maternal morality, and changes to the family code
that benefit women are important, they are only beneficial if women use these benefits by
becoming involved in the public sphere. There is little significance in achieving greater access to
education or laws which increase women’s access to economic outlets if women do not pursue
decision-making positions in these fields.
In addition to the comparisons between women’s postwar situations in Lebanon and
Liberia on the issues of female literacy, women’s access to birth control, maternal mortality
rates, the number of female parliamentarians, and changes to the family code that benefited
women, it also important to note that Lebanese women largely halted their activism in the
aftermath of war while Liberian women continued organizing (Maksoud, 1996; Bauer, 2009). In
fact, even in 2012, Lebanese women have some of the lowest rates of political participation in
the Middle Eastern region (Stamadianou, 2012). Although Liberian society still largely believes
that politics in men’s business, and while much of Liberian women’s increase in politics has
been through government appointments rather than through voting, in contrast to their Lebanese
counterparts, Liberian women continue to make substantial progress in increasing their political
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participation (Holmgren, 2013). In order to understand why these differences exist, the critical
instances of Lebanese and Liberian women’s respective wartime activism will be reviewed.
To reiterate, the actions taken by the three major women’s groups during the Lebanese
civil war were the ten-member delegation sent by the Lebanese Women’s Council in 1975 to
request that those in government end the ongoing violence, the 1983 women’s conference put on
by the Lebanese Women’s Council, and the 1984 peace march in Beirut (Ghurayyib and
Stephan, 1983; al-Khatib, 1984; Shehadeh, 1999a; “No to the War, No to the 10th Year,” 1984).
Following Maxine Molyneux’s typology of gender interests, it was determined that the majority
of actions around these events sought to address practical gender interests, specifically the
ending of violence associated with the war (Molyneux, 1985). Nevertheless, a majority of the
efforts which took place during the 1983 “The Role of Women in the Save the Lebanon
Campaign” conference were feminist-based. For example, those attending the conference
advocated for government policies that openly acknowledged female oppression in Lebanon and
the attendees also made specific recommendations such as increasing female access to education,
and increasing the number of women in professional jobs in the government and private sectors,
and into decision-making positions in the realm of politics (Ghurayyib and Stephan, 1983).
Likewise, the two case studies of Lebanese women’s groups provide evidence that the
emphasis of such associations was largely on maternalism. For instance, while the Women's
Renaissance Gathering sought to help women and their children find normalcy in war, promote
efforts to end the war, and advocate for women's rights, the majority of its focus was on women
as mothers. This was best exemplified through the group’s efforts to cater to mothers and their
children by creating activities that the two could share together. Additionally, while steps were
taken to improve the status of women, it was often tempered by distancing the Women’s
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Renaissance Gathering from feminism, usually by avoiding phrases such as “women’s rights”
(Narsh, 1982; Ward, 2009).
In the other case study, the disability rights group, there was indeed a feminist
orientation. Most of the association’s activities concerned providing humanitarian relief, but the
group also equipped members with the necessary terminology to explore the intersections of
disability, gender, and neocolonialism, and similarly encouraged women living with disabilities
to become involved in activities outside the home. Significantly, the group did not emphasize
women’s status as mothers, yet some of the women in the group nonetheless proclaimed that
their interest in becoming activists was due to their maternal identities (Wehbi, 2010).
Therefore, overall, Lebanese women’s groups’ activism was mobilized not through
feminism but rather maternalism. In contrast to Lebanon’s situation, Liberia’s women’s
movement during the civil war was hybrid motherist-feminist. The three major events in Liberian
women’s groups’ wartime activism were: the 2001 demand made by members of the Mano River
Women’s Peace Network to the leaders of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea to work to end the
ongoing violence; the 2003 Mass Action for Peace movement put on by affiliates of the Women
in Peacebuilding Network; and finally, the activities in Accra, Ghana organized by multiple
women’s groups which ultimately led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in
2003 (Sewell, 2007; “Pray the Devil Back,” 2008).
While much of the mobilization and many of the strategies employed by Liberian women
were motherist, a significant portion of women’s groups’ mobilization during the war was
feminist oriented. Thus, while the delegation with MARWOPNET used their status as mothers to
put pressure on the presidents of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, they nevertheless had hoped
to be included in the meeting so that they could inform the leaders of their own opinions and
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insights (Sewell, 2007; “African Women and Peace Support,” 2004). Likewise, the Liberian
branch of WIPNET typically mobilized women around concerns for their families, especially
children, but also emphasized women’s strategic gender interests, especially as targets of gender
based violence (Sewell, 2007; Ekiyor and Gbowee, 2005; “Pray the Devil Back,” 2008). Most
notably, even as the many women gathered at the 2003 peace conference in Accra, Ghana used
motherist tactics, such as shaming the men by treating them as boys or employing the taboo
against seeing one’s mother naked, they also put forward a feminist platform (“Pray the Devil
Back,” 2008). This was best embodied by the Golden Tulip Declaration in which activists sought
to increase women’s involvement in government, civil society, and the economic sphere (“The
Golden Tulip Declaration,” 2003). Similarly, the case study on the Liberian Women’s Initiative
also indicated women’s simultaneous mobilization through motherhood and feminism. The
group sought to engage in both practical and strategic gender interests by seeking not only to end
the general violence of war, but additionally, to end the gender based violence of rape. Most
importantly, those with the Liberian Women’s Initiative demanded an increased role for women
in government and civil society (Sewell, 2007; “African Women and Peace Support,” 2004).
Thus, while Lebanese women largely centered their activism around their status as
mothers, Liberian women’s organizing entered a gray area where maternalism merged with
feminism. Female activists in Liberia, like their counterparts in Lebanon, sought to address the
practical gender interest of finding a way to end the war. However, Liberian women also went on
to push for important strategic gender interests such as advocating for a role in the final ceasefire
agreement.
Despite the differences in approaches, as mentioned in chapters two and three, gains for
women were made in both the Liberian and Lebanese postwar contexts. After the war, Lebanese
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and Liberian women saw a rise in female literacy rates, increased access to birth control, overall
decreases in maternal mortality rates, more women in parliament, and improvements for women
within the family code (Hariri, 1996; “Data, World Bank,” 2013; “The Situation of Children and
Women,” 1995; “Global Health Observatory Data,” 2013; Hajjar, 2003; “Lebanon:
Parliamentary Chamber Majlis…1992,” 2013; Shehadeh, 2010; Suad, 1997; “At a Glance:
Liberia,” 2003; “Liberia: House of Representatives,” 2013; “Liberia: The Liberian Senate,”
2013; Fuest, 2008). However, the Lebanese case shows that such gains were not nearly as
extensive as in Liberia. In fact, Kirsten Schulze maintains that most of the wartime gains made
toward female equality in Lebanon were lost in the aftermath of the war (Schulze, 1998). One
purpose of this paper is to determine if the larger role of feminism in Liberian women’s approach
contributed to the contrasting respective postwar situations for Lebanese and Liberian women.
The first crucial distinction between the cases lies in the respective conflict resolution
processes. Lebanese women were not involved in the final peace agreement, the Ta’if Accord,
while Liberian women played a role in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Fisk, 2002;
Lebanon: Majlis; Fuest, 2008; “African Women and Peace Support,” 2004). As minor as
Liberian women’s contributions were to the writing of the peace agreement, nonetheless, some
vague references to gender equality were written into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(Fuest, 2008; “Liberia: Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” 2003). While a line about how “[t]he
Parties shall reflect national and gender balance in all elective and non-elective appointments
within the NTGL [National Transitional Government of Liberia]” may seem relatively
insignificant, such a difference presents a striking contrast between the two case studies as the
Ta’if Accord does not include any mention of women, much less seek to rectify gender
imbalances in the government (“Liberia: Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” 2003; “The Ta’if
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Accord,” 2013). This is likely due to the fact that no women participated in the talks that led to
the Ta’if Accord which were negotiated by those parliamentarians of the 1972 election who were
all men (Hanf, 1993; Hajjar, 2003; “Lebanon: Majlis Al-Nuwwab,” 2013).
In fact, it appears that women’s involvement in the peace agreement process is pivotal.
Donald Steinberg argues that gender-neutral peace accords essentially neglect the voices and
representation of women, and ultimately fail to address the needs of half of the population
(Steinberg, 2011). Furthermore, according to Sheila Meintjes, it is from the start of ceasefire
negotiations and well into the postconflict period that women must be present and participating,
rallying around a cohesive women’s agenda that actively promotes increasing women’s equality
in political, economic, and social terms if there is to be any hope that positive changes gained
during the social upheaval of war will be maintained (Meintjes, 2002). Overall, the work of
Steinberg and Meitjes indicate that women’s active participation in the peace accord is critical to
improving the political and social standing of women.
Therefore, the significance of the input of Liberian women into the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement may have been more than simply a vague reference to gender equality. By
participating in the process and even having female representatives of the Mano River Women’s
Peace Network sign onto the official accord, it set into motion a precedent for increasing
women’s involvement in overtly political matters and increasing women’s role in decisionmaking positions (“Profile of the Mano River,” 2013; Sewell, 2007). In fact, the long tradition of
the members of the Liberian Women’s Initiative in attending peace conferences beginning in
1990 blazed the trail for women’s participation in the 2003 Accra talks and consequent
involvement in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (“African Women and Peace Support,”
2004). Moreover, Liberian women’s inclusion in the 2003 Accra talks signified that they were
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important and acknowledged that they were members of society who had as much at stake as any
Liberian man. As a result of their presence, women were able to secure, at least as a rule, that
there was to be a 30 percent gender quota for women in the legislature in the 2005 elections.
Although not implemented, the quota nevertheless led to at least the idea that the inclusion of
women in government was something to strive for (Adams, 2008). In contrast, Lebanese
women’s groups did not seek to involve themselves in any of the ceasefire negotiations which
occurred throughout the war which likely confirmed to many in the mainstream that women were
not interested in political matters.
A second point in which the cases diverge was in confrontation methods. Liberian
women attended ceasefire conferences, which as previously noted usually occurred without
official invitation to do so, but furthermore, Liberian women spoke directly to many men and
those in government when they demanded increased roles for women in the public sphere. For
example, members of Liberian women’s groups informed men at various peace talks that they
wanted increased representation in the political sphere, especially in decision-making positions
(“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004). In comparison, during the Lebanese civil war,
women largely only made such demands at the 1983 conference organized by the Lebanese
Women’s Council. Such an event was mainly attended by women and although a statement was
released declaring the necessity of increasing the social status of women, allowing more women
into government, and increasing women’s access to education and job opportunities, such
demands were not acknowledged by mainstream Lebanese (Ghurayyib and Stephan, 1983).
Lebanese female activists did not appear to publisize their feminist demands which meant that
outside of the community of those involved in the women’s movement, most mainstream
Lebanese remained ignorant of the demands of women activists.
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Finally, the decision of an individual woman to run for president in Liberia, both during
the war in the 1997 elections as well as in the postwar election of 2005, had a profound effect on
the different outcomes of the two case studies. Essentially, the 2005 presidential campaign of
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf epitomized the call for increasing women’s roles in decision-making
positions made by Liberian female activists. Although Sirleaf embraced an essentialist motherist
trope in her campaign, the mere act of her running for president nevertheless embodied the call
for women’s rights. While the election of a female president does not necessarily alter gender
relations, Melinda Adams and Jacqui Bauer argue that Sirleaf’s campaign united the women’s
movement around an agenda that kept them organizing beyond the end of the war (Adams, 2008;
Bauer, 2009). In Lebanon, there was no parallel woman who stood for election at that level.
Thus, unlike Lebanese women who largely put their activism aside following the Ta’if Accord in
order to address the individual problems in their personal lives, Liberian women stayed in
activist mode largely because of Sirleaf’s campaign (Maksoud, 1996; Bauer, 2009).
Overall, the primary difference between the postwar situations for women in Lebanon
and Liberia is centered on maternalism, which emphasizes women’s roles as mothers. As Shirin
M. Rai notes, women mobilized as mothers obscure their own status as individual women and
are thus rendered invisible as individuals. Instead, they only appear as wives and mothers (Rai,
1994). By emphasizing motherhood, Lebanese women’s groups prioritized women’s duties to
serve their families. It would seem only natural that most Lebanese women then put aside their
political agendas to focus on the rebuilding of their personal lives as this capacity to serve others
was promoted by maternalism (Maksoud, 1996).
Unquestionably, the destruction wrought by the civil war did tremendous damage to the
family life of millions of Lebanese (Abu Nassr, 1996). Yet a consequence of this decision to turn
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inwards and away from the community resulted in the loss of many advances in women’s rights,
especially the chance for changes to the family code that benefited women. The responsibilities
of motherhood would appear to be a crucial part of many women’s decision to turn inward. The
notion of a good mother centers on serving one’s husband and children, even to the extent of
sacrificing one’s own desires and needs. As Mirna Lattouf notes, Lebanese women are often
criticized for becoming involved in organizing efforts that seek to increase women’s rights as
mainstream society views their activism as a shirking of their motherly duties by focusing on
their own needs rather than devoting their attention exclusively to their children and husbands
(Lattouf, 2004).
It appears that the central difficulty with the ideology of motherism as a strategy to
increase women’s rights is that motherism itself often seeks to take the focus off women and put
it on others, usually children. Rather than argue that as mothers women deserve rights, Lebanese
women largely advocated for an end to the war so that children’s suffering would end, albeit
alongside their own. In contrast, activists associated with the Liberian women’s movement
paired motherism alongside more feminist concerns during the war, such as demanding a
presence at the ceasefire negotiations. Because the majority of Lebanese women were mobilized
around their identities as mothers, they were much less political in their demands for increasing
their rights than their Liberian counterparts as their strictly motherist orientation led them to
focus on others rather than themselves. Yet, Liberian women activists were mobilized on both
maternalism and feminism, and their more feminist stance appears to have allowed them to
advocate for themselves.
The hypothesis discussed in chapter one predicted that motherist mobilization would not
be enough to secure advances in women’s rights. However, Lebanese women did make gains in
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women’s rights. Thus, on one level the hypothesis is refuted in that motherist mobilization at the
very least does not preclude advances to women’s rights. Nonetheless, it would seem to be, as
predicted, that a more feminist orientation allows women to maintain wartime gains in women’s
advancements. Thus, the Liberian example indicates that partially mobilizing women based on
their maternal identities does not negatively impact longer term increases in the social,
economic, and political status of women. However, it is only with the development of an overall
feminist orientation of the women’s movement that would seem to lead to sustained and larger
increases in women’s rights. Therefore, motherism is not detrimental to women’s rights as many
Western feminists have argued (DiQuinzio, 1993). Yet, neither does maternalism alone appear to
lead women closer to full equality, mainly because it does ensure that gains are sustained.
Nonetheless, as argued by many scholars, maternalism does serve as an important entry
point for women into political activism as it legitimizes women’s actions or obscures the fact that
women are even acting politically (Aning, 1998; Pollack, 2007; Rai, 1994). In both Lebanon and
Liberia during their respective civil wars, women’s activism was accepted by mainstream society
when it related to their roles as mothers. This is best demonstrated in the Lebanese context by the
efforts of most women’s groups to end the general wartime violence as such activism confirmed
the innate peacefulness of women, which is often associated with women’s roles as mothers (alKhatib, 1984; Shehadeh, 1999a; “No to the War, No to the 10th Year,” 1984; Ruddick, 1983).
Likewise, a group such as the Women’s Renaissance Gathering spent considerable time trying to
improve the status of women, yet it also focused on designing activities for mothers and children
to do together (Narsh, 1982; Ward, 2009). Similarly, in Liberia, women’s efforts to work toward
disarmament, along with campaigns to end the fighting also confirmed women’s maternal roles.
For instance, Liberian women were viewed as being skillful at helping warring factions to arrive
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at compromises because they were mothers and thus were used to resolving fights among their
children (“African Women and Peace Support,” 2004; Johnson, 2011; Steady, 2011).
Furthermore, in Lebanon, the Bakleen chapter of the Women’s Renaissance Gathering
had male support through members’ work in the community kitchen. There, embracing the
traditional feminine role of caretaker of the family and home, women cooked meals for the men
guarding the town’s borders from Israeli attack. Certainly, the women were claiming their right
to be involved in the public sphere and their right to be political. However, these women fully
embodied ideals associated with motherhood (Ward, 2009). Similarly, Liberian women were
openly praised for their roles in bringing about an end to the war which was often associated
with women’s maternal desire to protect their children (Lederach and Lederach, 2010; Sewell,
2007). Overall, those within the mainstream of both Lebanon and Liberia tolerated, or even
advocated for, women’s involvement in activism when such work appeared to conform to
stereotypes associated with traditional maternal roles.
Likewise, many Lebanese and Liberian women only seemed to become interested in
joining women’s associations when recruited as mothers. For instance, Liberian activist Leymah
Gbowee indicated that she, like many others involved in the Mass Action for Peace campaign,
were demanding that Charles Taylor meet with opposing factions to work out a peace agreement
because of their concern for the future of their children (“Pray the Devil Back,” 2008).
Elsewhere, Gbowee has stated that many Liberian women felt that since they were mothers, they
could transform Liberian society (Steady, 2011; “Bill Moyers Journal,” 2009). A parallel
example of this same philosophy in the context of Lebanon were women such as Iman Khalifeh,
conceptual designer of the 1984 peace march in Beirut, who plainly stated that her decision to
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become involved in activism was rooted in her concern for the suffering of children in wartime
(“The Right Livelihood Awards 1984,” 2013).
However, as far as the research question, Is a more motherist approach better than a
more feminist approach in promoting women’s rights?, it must be acknowledged that, in fact,
maternalism alone does not appear to help women to gain more rights than if a more feminist
approach were pursued. Through process-tracing, it was revealed that it was Liberian women’s
use of a melding of motherism and feminism into a motherist-feminist hybrid that led activists to
want to continue organizing and working for change following the civil war. In the case of
Lebanon, the overall lack of a feminist conviction in women’s organizing coupled with the full
embrace of maternalism appears to have left women without the desire to coalesce around an
agenda pushing for women’s rights in the wake of the war (Maksoud, 1996). It would appear that
the majority of Lebanese women emphatically embraced their maternal roles and purposefully
distanced themselves from the women’s movement to instead fully return to “hearth and home.”
Yet while many feminists, such as Patrice DiQuinzio, have feared that maternalism
wrongly reduces women to their biological capabilities, women’s connection to motherhood
nonetheless remains an important tool in raising female consciousness by emphasizing the
uniqueness and importance of motherhood as a social institution (DiQuinzio, 1993; Forcey,
1991). Many non-Western scholars have pointed out not only how important motherhood is in
many parts of Africa, Asia, and South America, but also how maternalism and feminism can in
fact be combined (Oyewùmí, 2003; Afshar, 1996; Gheytanchi, 2001). The case study on Liberia
provides an excellent example of this technique. Liberian women’s actions during the war
showcased their simultaneous connection to motherhood and feminism, and that motherism,
when combined with feminism, does not prevent strident and sustained gains in women’s rights.
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The next portion of this section will address the second sub-research question which
asked whether feminism would create a backlash to women’s rights, possibly increasing
resistance to female equality. According to Ann E. Cudd, lessening the oppression of one group
often requires the loss of certain advantages or privileges of another social group. Thus,
backlashes typically follow any advancement toward progress (Cudd, 2002). This was the case in
both Lebanon and Liberia, regardless of the respective mobilizing formats. In Lebanon, Kirsten
Schulze believes that nationalism, based on sectarian affiliation, was both in the lead up to and
during the civil war at an all-time high, and she argues that this trend continued after the war.
According to Schulze, during the war, the nationalist discourse allowed women only temporary
access to new public roles as they were needed to help assert their community’s power over other
confessions. However, following the war, nationalism actually limited women’s abilities to
demand new rights as it forced them to conform to so-called “traditional” norms which were
connected to ideas of nationalism (Schulze, 1998). As Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis have
noted, nationalist discourses often hold up women as the transmitters of culture and thus
encourage women to embrace all of an ethnic community’s cultural traditions. By rejecting
traditional roles, women are often condemned as rejecting their communities (Anthias and
Yuval-Davis, 1983).
In fact, there was a significant backlash against Lebanese women’s advances in the
aftermath of the civil war. Despite women’s increased levels of education, the ideas promoted by
larger society were that women could not be both a mother and working professional.
Additionally, society pushed the notion that a woman must find a husband to look after her and
that women were not rational enough to make good decisions (Schulze, 1998; Lattouf, 2004).
Such narratives embraced stereotyped notions around the “traditional” roles of women and were
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a part of the intense nationalism that pervaded Lebanon after the war. Regardless of the fact that
Lebanese women had largely mobilized on their maternal identities, society sought to push them
back into traditional roles that only tolerated women’s presence in the private sphere.
Similarly, a backlash also occurred in the context of Liberia. Leymah Gbowee noted that
those who had previously supported the efforts of female activists during the war believed that
women should return to the private sphere in the postwar period. Many men were tolerant and
even proud of women for their role in helping to bring about the final ceasefire. Yet, such
individuals did not want to see women becoming involved in other political matters that
threatened their own privileged position (Lederach and Lederach, 2010). However, many
Liberian women remained active and committed toward advancing women’s rights and refused
to leave the public spaces in which they had made such significant inroads during the war
(Adams, 2008). Thus, the backlash was not as detrimental to the gains that Liberian women had
made during the war because the overall more feminist conviction of the women’s movement
appears to have led women to continue organizing, mostly by supporting Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’s
presidential campaign (Bauer, 2009). Yet, in the case of Lebanon, most of the wartime gains
toward female equality were lost after 1990. Kirsten Schulze believes that a major reason
Lebanese women were unable to maintain wartime gains was due to society’s portrayal of
women as not competent enough and not strong enough to adequately continue performing new
public roles (Schulze, 1998).
Overall, the generally motherist mobilization and orientation of most Lebanese female
activists reinforced the role that nationalist movements assigned to women, which is that of wife
and mother, the upholder of tradition (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1983). Therefore, the fact that
Lebanese women’s activism embraced a motherist ideology contributed to most women’s
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philosophy that they were best at being mothers. Essentially, both civil society and mainstream
society were touting the same narrative which was that women’s duties were to serve others as
mothers. To be good mothers, larger societal ideals in Lebanon promoted the notion that it would
be best for women to stay at home and to not engage in paid work in order to fully care for their
children (Kikoski, 2000). However, in order to be at home with children, women relied upon
men for financial support. Due to the traditional role of men as the final decision-maker of the
household, women were left without the ability to make decisions within the home. Additionally,
since most women were likewise not working outside the home or participating in politics, they
were also deprived of making decisions in the economic sphere or in government (Abu Nassr,
1996). For example, Nancy W. Jabbra’s longitudinal study of a rural village in the Bekka Valley,
composed mainly of Melkite Greek Catholics, indicates that roles for women remained largely
identical in both prewar and postwar contexts. Whether in the early 1970s or early 2000s, women
were expected to not only marry and have children, but to also drop out of the workforce upon
marriage in order to focus exclusively on their roles as mothers and wives (Jabbra, 2008).
Thus, whether women pursue motherist or feminist approaches in their activism, a
backlash would appear inevitable. Likewise, based on the examples of Lebanese and Liberian
women’s wartime experiences, it appears that while a feminist approach creates resistance to
women’s rights, a movement which at least partially embraces feminism seems better suited to
ensure the maintenance of wartime gains. Certainly, Lebanese women, despite the generally
maternalist approach of most women’s groups, saw positive increases in their access to
education, job opportunities, and power within the household (Abu Nassr, 1996; Moghadam,
2003). Nevertheless, there was a backlash against such gains that pushed the narrative that
women should contain their lives to the private sphere (Schulze, 1998).
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Overall, it is clear through the use of process-tracing that women’s groups’ mobilization
plays some role in whether gains made during wartime are sustained in the aftermath of war. As
evidenced in the study of Lebanon, more motherist oriented mobilizations, which do indeed
provide female activists with social legitimacy, when not paired with feminist mobilizations
ensure that an overemphasis on women’s roles as mothers will largely encourage women to
strictly pursue a life in the private sphere. This is most likely because both women’s groups, even
if they advocate for increasing women’s roles in public spaces, employ the same narrative as
larger society: that women are best at being mothers. Thus, women have little encouragement to
maintain their presence in the public sphere, but a number of incentives from the more
conservative elements of society to renounce activism and instead focus largely, or even
exclusively, on their caretaking roles of wives and mothers. Nevertheless, as both case studies
demonstrate, motherist mobilizations do not prevent gains in female literacy, the availability of
birth control, reductions in maternal mortality, the number of female parliamentarians, and
changes to the family that benefit women. However, sustained and larger gains are only to be
found when some form of feminism is employed. Finally, backlashes against advances in
women’s rights are inevitable whether women’s mobilization is based on feminism or
motherhood.
This section will conclude by considering other factors which may account for the
differences between Lebanon and Liberia. Certainly, while citing the variables between the
outcomes of the respective postwar situations for women’s rights in both Lebanon and Liberia
based specifically on the form of women’s mobilization is important, it is also necessary to
consider other factors. A central difference between the two cases is the particular respective
socio-historical contexts of Lebanon and Liberia. Lebanon, as a country in the Levant, and
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Liberia, as a country in West Africa, have very different histories and cultural influences.
Particularly relevant to this study is the very pronounced concept of the female private sphere
and male public sphere that exists in Lebanon for women of all confessions but which is not as
strong for a large portion of Liberian women (Van Dusen, 1976; Olukoju, 2006). In fact, the
majority of indigenous Liberian women have traditionally connected their maternal duties to
performing farming or marketing work in the public sphere as there is a common understanding
in many Liberian communities that mothers must sometimes work outside the home in order to
provide for their children (Casimiro et al., 2009). Thus, Liberian activists who mobilized around
their identities as mothers had to overcome a less significant barrier than Lebanese women who
more often found that they had to justify their presence in the public sphere even when they were
mobilized as mothers. Likewise, it may have been easier for Liberian women to combine
motherist and feminist mobilizations since the social institution of motherhood was not restricted
to the private sphere as it was in Lebanon.
4.3 Future Research
Studies which consider the focus of women’s groups’ mobilization, whether motherist,
feminist, or hybrid mother-feminist, must be expanded to cases beyond that of Lebanon and
Liberia. It would be pertinent to further analyze the mobilization of women’s activism in
nationalist independence wars, which has already been done in works such as Elizabeth Baron’s
Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics and Elizabeth Thompson’s Colonial
Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon.
Likewise, studies of women’s activism that compare motherist and feminist movements from
other civil wars would be also be important, especially if they were drawn from other areas of the
world, such as Latin America, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and South Asia, among other
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regions. Additionally, incorporating further case studies from both sub-Saharan Africa and the
Middle East would also expand knowledge concerning types of mobilization and likely reveal
more about the particular situations in Lebanon and Liberia and how to sustain progress and
build upon it. It would also be interesting to analyze cases following John Stuart Mill’s method
of agreement in which the examples were similar except for the timeframe during which the wars
took place, in order to investigate the possible effects of international and transnational women’s
organizations on local women’s mobilization.
4.4 Conclusion
To conclude, this thesis explored the topic of women and wars, particularly regarding the
possibility that wars allow increases in women’s political, economic, and social standing (Bop,
2002; Meintjes, 2002; Turshen, 2002). While the majority of this literature has focused on
women’s direct participation in fighting and entrance into the workforce, this paper instead
sought to analyze the issue from the angle of female activists’ wartime mobilization, whether it
was more motherist or feminist, and the results associated with each (Enloe, 1993).
This paper began by providing a review of the relevant literature on the topic of wars,
feminism, and motherism, in addition to describing the research question, Is a more motherist
approach better than a more feminist approach in promoting women’s rights?, and two subresearch questions: (1) does a motherist approach allow women a culturally acceptable space
from which to make demands? and (2) can a feminist approach backfire and actually increase
resistance to women’s rights? Then followed two chapters which explored the respective case
studies of Lebanon and Liberia by providing general background information, summaries of the
civil wars, and descriptions of women's experiences both prior to, and during, the wars. This
final chapter reviewed Lebanese and Liberian women’s wartime activism using process-tracing
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to determine whether motherist or feminist mobilizations provide better gains in women’s rights
in the aftermath of war, and considered other factors in the differing results of the Lebanese and
Liberian women’s rights situations.
The hypothesis, that the motherist approach limits gender equality in comparison to a
more feminist approach, appears to be the case in regards to the postwar situations in Lebanon
and Liberia. Lebanese women, who employed a mostly motherist approach in their organizing,
did obtain important advances toward ending hierarchical gender relations. Many women had to
become heads-of-household as a result of wartime conditions which enabled them to prove to
themselves and others that they were capable of being self-sufficient. Women’s access to
education increased as did the number of women working outside in the home in professional
fields (Abu Nassr, 1996). Likewise, female literacy, access to birth control, and the number of
women in parliament increased while maternal mortality decreased (“Data, World Bank,” 2013;
“Lebanon: Parliamentary Chamber Majlis…1992,” 2013). There were also changes made to the
family code which benefited women (Shehadeh, 2010). Nevertheless, while these were all
critical developments in ending gender inequality, the changes were not as extensive as the
transformations made in the postwar context of Liberia where women’s organizing was hybrid
motherist-feminist.
Liberian women, like their Lebanese counterparts, also increasingly found themselves as
heads-of-household due to the war, which led to the same realization of their ability to be selfsufficient (Danuweli, et al., 2011). Liberian women also witnessed increased rates of literacy,
access to birth control, and number of female parliamentarians (“Data, World Bank,” 2013;
“Liberia: House of Representatives,” 2013; “Liberia: The Liberian Senate,” 2013). Changes to
the family code which benefited women were particularly important in transforming hierarchical
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gender relations. The Equal Rights of the Customary Marriage Law attempts to rectify women’s
unequal access to land and property, and also address child and forced marriage which produce
and sustain gender inequality (Baehr and Mgbako, 2011). Likewise, the Rape Amendment Act
attempted to address the gender based violence of rape, a profound impediment to gender
equality (“Gender Equality,” 2013).
Thus, Liberian women’s blend of maternalism and feminism led to their making more
progress in their postwar situation than Lebanese women. For Lebanese activists who solely
embraced motherist ideals, the overall narrative that they received from both mainstream society
and civil society was that women were best at being mothers. Thus, following the Ta’if Accord,
women turned their attention to their family life and largely removed themselves from organizing
campaigns. In contrast, Liberian women, seemingly inspired by the feminist messages in their
organizing, remained activists in the war’s aftermath.
Therefore, it is clear that while maternalism does not preclude advances in women’s
rights, it nevertheless does not maintain gains in women’s rights to the extent that mobilization
and orientation that feminism provides. However, motherism can provide crucial social
legitimacy for female activists by opening the door for involvement in the public sphere and
allowing women to be heard by mainstream society. Yet, this study finds that if maternalism is
not paired with feminism, most the gains made in war will be lost. Finally, a motherist
mobilization is no more effective at preventing backlashes than a feminist mobilization.
Therefore, these findings offer lessons that may benefit non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
which seek to promote women’s rights, and help women in postconflict situations reap all the
gains to which they are entitled as citizens.
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